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APPENDIX A
LITERATURE REVIEW FOR TRADABLE PERMITS
Robert W. Hahn
One of the most frequently heard criticisms of the current 
standards-based approach to environmental regulation is that it fails 
to meet prescribed environmental objectives in a cost-effective 
manner. If this is in fact true, it would seem incumbent upon those 
bent on improving the environment to provide alternatives which would 
be less expensive than the current approach, but also have the 
possibility of being adopted. This paper examines one candidate which 
has been suggested as a viable alternative to the existing mode of 
environmental regulation. The general idea is to set up a market 
where rights to emit one or several pollutants can be bought and sold. 
This approach has been referred to by several names including tradable 
permits, transferable licenses and marketable permits. The principal 
objective of this essay is to outline the nature of the work which has 
been completed on tradable permits and, in so doing, point out areas 
of research which might be of some benefit in assessing both the 
feasibility and relative merits of a marketable permit scheme.
Before discussing the details involved in the tradable permit 
approach, it is useful to consider what objectives we should place 
importance on in designing an environmental policy. At a minimum, it 
would seem reasonable to design a program which would meet the
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prescribed environmental quality objectives, or at least allow for 
meeting objectives in a timely manner. A second desirable feature of 
an environmental strategy is that it use a minimum amount of resources 
in achieving its goals, where resources are defined broadly to include 
both administrative costs and direct expenditures on abatement. If 
possible, such a policy should not stand in the way of economic 
progress. Finally, to be more than an intellectual curiosity, the 
approach should have some possibility of appealing to politicians or 
regulators who are responsible for developing environmental policy.
The traditional standards approach to regulation is clearly a 
political favorite, but does not seem to fare well in terms of 
efficiency. In the case of uniform standards, it is usually possible 
to achieve significant cost savings by redistributing the burden of 
cleaning up so that firms for whom it is cheaper will abate more than 
firms who have very high abatement costs. Even in the case where 
standards are designed to approximate a least-cost solution, it is 
quite likely that the regulator will lack the information to identify 
the solution. In particular, one would expect that several industries 
possess information on process modifications useful for abatement 
which are proprietary, and hence, typically not available to the 
regulator. It would be desirable to develop a mechanism for inducing 
industry to actively pursue these abatement options when they are 
cost-effective.
Another more serious flaw of the standards approach is that 
firms have no reason to abate more than the standard. In the most 
idyllic of worlds, where standards are treated as a given, firms may
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have an incentive to search for lower cost alternatives for meeting 
the standard; however, this will not always be the case since some 
standards are technology-based. If instead of a standards approach, 
some pricing mechanism were used to reduce pollution, then, at least 
in theory, firms would have a continuous incentive to innovate —  not 
only to find lower cost methods of achieving a given standard, but 
also to search for ways to reduce emissions.
Three general approaches for providing continuous incentives 
for searching for new pollution abatement methods are taxes, subsidies 
and marketable permits. The virtues of emissions taxes are well 
known. If firms are cost minimizers, Baumol and Oates (1975) have 
shown that imposing such taxes can lead to a cost-minimizing solution. 
However, taxes are not without their problems. One difficulty is that 
it is virtually impossible to predict the level of emissions which 
would result upon imposing a tax. To partially circumvent this 
problem, some people have suggested that taxes could be adjusted until 
the desired outcome is attained. There are three basic problems with 
this suggestion: First, it may be quite expensive for firms to adjust 
to wide fluctuations in taxes; second, it is unlikely that the 
regulatory authority would be given that much discretion in adjusting 
the tax; and third, firms are likely to respond strategically if their 
response affects how taxes would be adjusted.
A more serious problem with emissions taxes would seem to be 
their widespread unpopularity among industry. While they confer 
benefits on the general public, they force firms to foot both the 
abatement costs and the tax bill. The extent to which firms pay taxes
out of profits depends on whether the increase in taxes can be passed 
along to consumers. Nevertheless, for the case in which total 
emissions are similar, it is usually in industry's interest to oppose 
taxes in comparison with standards because the latter avoid the tax.
Providing subsidies for reducing emissions is yet another way 
to deal with pollution. Subsidies have the advantage that they have 
met with considerably less political resistance than taxes. In fact, 
this instrument has been widely used m  the construction of municipal 
sewage treatment plants. Aside from the advantage of political 
feasiblity, however, subsidies have few good points. Their most 
serious drawback is that they usually fail to provide an incentive to 
keep expenditures on abatement down. Like taxes, subsidies also have 
the problem that tne level of resulting emissions is very uncertain.
Marketable permits suffer few of the drawbacks of the other 
tools discussed thus far while enjoying many if not all of the 
advantages. The idea was popularized by Dales (1968) who argues that 
a market approach has the potential to meet environmental quality 
objectives at the lowest possible cost while allowing for economic 
growth. Dales envisioned a hypothetical pollution control board 
specifying the total number ot permits, and hence, the overall level 
of emissions allowed in a given region. Rights of different duration 
could be bought and sold through the board by anyone who wished to 
participate. To accommodate growth some permits might be withheld 
initially. A critical question is whether the idea of marketable 
permits could ever win favor in the political arena. One potential 
advantage that permits have over taxes is that they can avoid net
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payments to the government if they are initially given away rather 
than auctioned. If permits were given away to industry, then at least 
some firms might favor marketable permits over the conventional 
standards approach because of the wealth transfer they would receive 
in the form of valuable permits.
Dales offers a very general discussion of how a market in 
tradable permits would work. A more rigorous analysis of the issue is 
contained in Montgomery (1972), who shows conditions under which 
tradable permits will be an efficient mechanism for attaining a least- 
cost solution. Montgomery raises an important problem in defining a 
permit by drawing a distinction between emissions and ambient 
pollutant concentrations. Defining permits in terms of emissions may 
not be tne cost-minimizing strategy for achieving a given air quality 
target. The reason is that the same amount of emissions may have a 
different effect on ambient air quality if emitted at different 
locations. It so, charging firms the same price for a "unit" of 
emissions will typically imply that the marginal cost of improving the 
level ot air quality will differ across firms. This result holds 
because firms are being charged a uniform price for emissions and not 
for pollution.
In theory, permits could be defined in terms of ambient air 
quality at different receptors, but to ensure an efficient solution, 
this would require the creation of several permit markets in a given 
air quality region. The extent to which such fine tuning is justified 
on a purely economic basis is an open question. Initial research 
indicates that savings could be quite large. However, in my opinion,
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the likelihood of instituting several markets to deal with a single 
pollutant in a given airshed is next to nil. Rather than search for 
the optimum, it would perhaps be more fruitful to consider the effects 
of a single market with some trading restrictions, or the effects of 
defining two or three markets within a geographical region.
Applied research on marketable permits has followed two lines 
of inquiry. The first focuses on problems encountered in market 
design and the definition of a permit. One difficult problem is what 
to do in the event the equilibrium price of a permit is much higher 
than anticipated. Firms could conceivably balk at paying such high 
prices, or even be put on the verge of bankruptcy, in which case the 
marketable permit scheme might be terminated. To deal with such a 
contingency, Robens and Spence (1976) suggest the use of a mixed 
system of permits and fees, where the quantity of pollution would be 
fixed, unless the equilibrium permit price exceeds a certain level.
In the latter case, firms would be charged a fee for emissions not 
accounted for by existing permits. The fee would provide firms with a 
continuous incentive to reduce emissions until the overall emissions 
objective was met. The use of such a mixed system makes sense in 
theory, but in practice it might be difficult to implement because it 
explicitly raises the issue of taxing, and it may be too complex for 
the political process to digest. A more workable alternative would be 
to adjust the level of permits over time by issuing at least some 
permits ot limited duration, and giving the regulatory authority some 
discretion over the number of permits issued over time.
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Another problem which has received little attention in the 
literature is whether it makes sense to have firms with vastly 
different degrees of market power participate in tne same market. Mar 
(1971), in designing a system of water rights, suggests using two 
separate markets —  one for large institutions and one for individuals 
or small institutions. The rationale for this approach is unclear. 
There are several commodity and stock markets currently in existence 
which manage to accommodate both large and small investors. It a few 
firms are expected to dominate a market in tradable permits, then 
there are two options. One is to abandon the marketable permit 
approach. The second is to design institutional safeguards which 
guard against contingencies such as thin markets and cornering. While 
several authors have recognized the possibility of a market which is 
not competitive, little effort has been devoted to addressing the 
issue in a concrete policy application.
The second general approach to analyzing the market for 
tradable permits is simulation of the equilibrium permit price using 
mathematical programming techniques. DeLucia (1974) analyzes the case 
of eight Mohawk river municipalities and concludes that a marketable 
permit approach is a viable alternative for achieving significant cost 
savings in water pollution. Even in the case where one of the firms 
can exert control over market price, DeLucia finds that the effect on 
tne price and distribution of permits is minimal. This result is due 
to the shape of the treatment cost functions. DeLucia's general 
systems approach of considering the technical, legal and economic 
dimensions of the problem represents a quantum leap over previous
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efforts to demonstrate the viability of a permit scheme.
Nevertheless, the analysis is less than convincing on one crucial 
point —  why it is reasonable to assume that municipalities will run 
their waste treatment facilities in a cost-minimizing mode.
Other studies of permit markets in the early seventies are 
similar in approach, but narrower in scope. For example, Taylor 
(1975) uses a 1 inear programming model to appraise a regional market 
in fertilizer rights aimed at reducing water pollution. Mackintosh 
(1973) considers a hypothetical air rights market in New Orleans and 
develops a simulation model to illustrate the effect it has on a local 
petroleum refinery. He concludes that marketable permits are an 
attractive alternative for meeting environmental quality objectives.
The early studies which simulate the workings of a market in 
tradable permits generally define a right in terms of emissions. As 
noted above, it would be useful to know if significant savings result 
from defining permits in terms of ambient concentrations. Atkinson 
and Lewis (1974) attack this problem from a slightly different 
perspective for the case of airborne particulate matter in the St. 
Louis Air Quality Region. Using a linear program which minimizes 
control costs, the authors found that exploiting the difference in 
contributions to ambient concentrations from different sources can 
lead to a 50 percent savings over a strategy which treats all 
emissions alike. While the potential savings are great, according to 
the model, nine markets (corresponding to the different receptors) 
would be needed to realize the full cost savings.
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The most comprehensive study to date on the feasibility of 
marketable permits was completed by Anderson et al. (1979). The 
analysis examines alternative policies for attaining a short-term N0£ 
standard in Chicago, and concludes that marketable permits present the 
most attractive alternative. A calculation similar to the one done by 
Atkinson and Lewis reveals that cost savings on the order of 90 
percent could be obtained by using source-specific charges instead of 
a uniform emissions tax. Even if charges were based on source 
categories, the authors estimate savings in the neighborhood of 50 
percent. While differential charges may lead to a lower cost 
solution, it is also quite probable that they would lead to 
unnecessary regulatory delay resulting from differences of opinion 
over the appropriate charge. In any event, it is unlikely the 
political system would accept such a complex pricing scheme.
From the perspective of the policymaker, a serious omission in 
the analysis by Anderson et al. is that the air quality modeling of 
NO2 formation does not incorporate what is currently understood about 
atmospheric processes. For example, their model does not adequately 
describe the highly nonlinear chemical conversion processes which lead 
to NO^ formation. When coupled with the fact that the pollutant 
dispersion model is designed primarily for applications involving 
nonreactive pollutants, their air quality results require careful 
scrutiny. If further modeling studies are to be performed which may 
have an impact on policy, they should reflect the current 
understanding of atmospheric processes as well as a reasoned analysis 
of the key economic and political questions.
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CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and state and local 
environmental regulatory agencies are increasingly being confronted 
with the harsh reality that the current standards system is not 
working very well. Not only are critics pointing to the whopping 
price tags on many projected investments designed to curb pollution, 
but in some instances, it can also be shown that environmental quality 
is deteriorating. While the environmental regulatory agencies are 
hardly to blame for this alleged state of affairs, they are in the 
unenviable position of having to take the political flak.
As the debate intensifies, it appears that agencies at both
the federal and state level are willing to experiment with alternative
modes of environmental regulation. In some cases, such as the
Connecticut plan, the regulation is designed primarily to ensure that
standards will be met.'*’ Other tools, such as bubbles and offsets are
aimed at both reducing environmental control costs while making
marginal strides in the direction of improving environmental quality.
The bubble focuses on a single firm with one or several plants with
several emissions sources. It is designed to allow the firm to
increase emissions beyond the current standard at one location if it
makes a greater reduction in emissions somewhere else. Offsets are
similar, but typically apply to more than one firm. They allow a firm
to add new emissions if it pays for a greater reduction in emissions
2somewhere else in the same area.
With the stepped-up search for viable alternatives, the time 
would seem ripe for a detailed evaluation of the feasibility of a
tradable permit scheme for a particular pollution problem in a well 
defined region. A careful comprehensive analysis will require several 
components drawing on different disciplines. In the case of air 
pollution, a model needs to be used which links emissions and 
resulting air quality both spatially and temporally. For an actual 
application, it is imperative that the model be validated. All past 
studies which I have seen give scant attention to this issue. This is 
actually somewhat ironic given the amount of effort devoted to 
demonstrating the increased gains from exploiting the emissions-air 
quality relationship. If the model is not validated, there is no way 
of guessing the errors associated with estimates of potential cost 
savings.
The air quality model must be linked with abatement cost data
to determine the quantity of permits to be issued and the appropriate
definition. To be relevant, practical issues such as monitoring,
enforcement, and administrative costs must be considered. The study
by Anderson et al. (1979) exemplifies the type of work that needs to
be done in these areas. The issue of ensuring a competitive market or
at least a workable market must be carefully assessed. To date little
work has been done which examines how different types of trading rules
may serve to promote a viable market. Several authors do not see
competition as a problem. For example, Teitenberg (1980), in his
survey of the literature, asserts "anti-competitive effects of a TDP
[transferable discharge permit] system are not likely to be very
3important in general." Be that as it may, this is a very real 
concern to most policymakers which should be given adequate
consideration.
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The current mode of environmental regulation is rather crude. 
Loosely, it can be viewed as a give-and-take process where regulators 
attempt to clamp down tighter on source emissions as new technologies 
become available. It would be naive to presume that this system will 
be replaced with a finely tuned complex market mechanism which is 
cost-effective. It would be more realistic to strive for a system 
which redirects incentives away from large legal expenditures aimed at 
fostering regulatory delay, and towards a system which enlists the aid 
of polluting industries in searching for less expensive ways to meet 
prescribed environmental quality objectives. To move industry in this 
direction, it is incumbent upon the researcher to not only outline 
desirable economic alternatives, but also to outline proposals which 
will receive the backing of a majority of the participants. Such 
proposals should be easy to understand and give careful consideration 
to how the spoils will be distributed.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Clark (1978) for a summary of the Connecticut plan.
2. Payment is not formally required, and sometimes offsets are given 
away by local or state governments in an attempt to induce firms 
to locate there. Liroff (1980) provides a more precise definition 
of these terms along with a discussion of how these policy tools 
evolved.
3. Teitenberg (1980), p. 414.
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APPENDIX B
MARKETABLE PERMITS: WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?
Robert W. Hahn
ABSTRACT
While the theoretical case for applying market mechanisms 
to control pollution is persuasive, there are several stumbling 
blocks which arise in their application. This paper examines some 
of the key implementation issues which must be addressed in 
designing a marketable permit scheme. The issues are brought 
into focus by considering a particular example— the control of 
sulfur oxides emissions in Los Angeles.
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Recently, both state and federal pollution control agencies have 
begun to direct their attention towards more economical alternatives 
which would meet environmental objectives.'*' While it has been shown 
that schemes which offer firms greater choice in selecting abatement 
alternatives have the potential to significantly reduce the overall 
cost of meeting prescribed environmental goals, the response of indus­
try, the public and even regulators has been, at best, lukewarm. What 
might be the cause of this less-than-overwhelming response to new 
approaches for controlling pollution such as bubbles, offsets or mark­
etable permits? There would appear to be two key reasons for the cool 
reception. The first results from a lack of familiarity with the new 
regimes. The "command and control" technique currently employed is a 
well-seasoned approach which industry, regulators, and the public have 
dealt with on many occasions. It is possible that, in moving to an 
incentive-based approach, significant transitional costs would be 
incurred. A second reason for not adopting such schemes is that dis­
tributional issues may take precedence over efficiency considerations 
for many of the key industrial participants. This paper examines prob­
lem of implementation for one particular alternative for dealing with 
pollution problems— marketable permits. The first part of the essay 
develops a simple framework for identifying implementation problems and 
points out several potential problem areas which need to be addressed. 
The second part of the essay addresses these issues using the specific 
example of setting up a market for controlling sulfur oxides emissions 
(SO^) in a well defined air quality region.
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I. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK
As a starting point it is useful to construct a situation in 
which all firms would prefer a marketable permit scheme to a standards 
regime. The next step is to examine how real world considerations are 
at variance with the assumptions used to construct the example.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between levels of abatement 
and control cost for a composite variable called "air pollution".
Figure 1
The curve passing through points B and C represents the minimum total 
cost of achieving a given level of abatement. Because of the difficul­
ties in obtaining information on the nature of the least cost solution, 
it is typically thought that regulation leaves us at an inefficient 
point such as A. Since pollution associated with the existing situa­
tion usually exceeds the prescribed standard, let point C correspond to 
the target level of air pollution.
ABATEMENT COST OPTIONS
AIR
POLLUTION
CONTROL COST
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We wish to consider whether it is possible to devise a marketable 
permit scheme which allows us to move from point A to point C, and 
which would be preferred by all industrial participants. First con­
sider the simpler problem of moving to a marketable permit scheme at 
the current level of pollution. This is represented by a move from A 
to B in the diagram. If transitional and administrative costs could be 
ignored, then it would be possible to move to a transferable rights 
scheme by issuing each firm an amount of permits which just equals 
their current level of emissions. This system of "grandfathering" the 
rights would be at least as good as the outcome under standards for 
some firms and unambiguously better for at least one firm (since the 
move from A to B implies that the overall level of abatement expendi­
tures would be reduced).
The analysis of the situation in which the target air quality 
standard is more stringent (e.g., moving from A to C) is essentially 
similar to the argument given above, but requires one further assump­
tion. We must assume that the distribution of rights under the stan­
dards approach is known for the level of pollution associated with C. 
With this assumption, it is sufficient to grandfather the rights in 
amounts which equal what they would have been under the standards 
regime. Under such a market scheme, all firms could be made at least 
as well off as they would be under a standards regime in which the 
rights to emit are nonnegotiable, since in the latter case, the air 
quality standard would be reached at a higher cost such as point D.
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Two important factors ignored in the above analysis are the 
implications of uncertainty surrounding the rules to be promulgated by 
the agency, and the possibility that interested groups could influence 
the outcome. When these features are considered, the case for convinc­
ing industry that it is in their interest to adopt a permit scheme is 
considerably weakened.
For the case in which the level of air pollution remains 
unchanged and rights are grandfathered, industry might balk at the 
marketable permit idea for several reasons. One reason mentioned ear­
lier is that use of a market to reach environmental goals is vastly 
different from the standards approach. Another possible objection is 
that grandfathering the rights is unfair because it tends to penalize 
those groups who have worked hardest to reduce their emissions.
Finally, industry might argue that restrictions on trading combined
with regulatory delay might lead to a system no better than the present
2situation, just different.
If a marketable permit system is used to improve air quality over 
current levels, this introduces additional grounds for objecting to 
such a system. For example, industry might feel that the pollution 
associated with points C and D might never be met under a standards 
approach or that it would take a much longer time to reach the target. 
In either case, the discounted present value of staying at inefficient 
point A, with perhaps some chance of moving to inefficient point D in 
the future, could be less than the cost of immediately moving to C. 
Decreasing the level of pollution also makes the initial distribution
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problem that much more difficult, since it is virtually impossible to 
know how firms would have fared if standards had remained in place.
Movement to a marketable permit scheme also raises significant 
issues for regulators and the public. The regulatory agency must be 
capable of making the transition. Resistance to change can be 
expected. The agency may have to augment its monitoring and enforce­
ment staff to obtain more accurate measurements of emissions which 
could stand up in court. The economic tradeoff which must be con­
sidered is whether the increased administrative costs would be offset
3by the expected cost savings m  abatement. For the market to work, 
the agency would have to develop trading rules which are comprehensible 
and allow several firms to participate.
The preceding list of objections might lead to the conclusion 
that the prospects for adopting this alternative in the near future are 
bleak. On the contrary, the prospects for adopting this alternative 
are very good indeed. This is especially true for pollutants which are 
not heavily regulated. A case in point would be nonaerosol chloro- 
fluorocarbons
The basic reason for the growing possibility of actually experi­
menting with marketable permits is the increasingly widespread dissa­
tisfaction among environmentalists, industry and regulators with the 
existing standards regime— that is, if point A is bad enough, the 
objections can be overcome. Industry finds the red tape and uncer­
tainty very costly while regulators and environmentalists are
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dissatisfied with the progress in abating pollution. Since marketable 
permits are known to possess desirable properties in theory and appear 
to be workable for several practical applications, experimentation with 
this approach may be just around the corner. In fact, the offset pol­
icy and bubble policy currently being used by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency are almost identical conceptually to a marketable 
permit scheme. The bubble policy, as it currently operates, is merely 
a smaller version of the permit schemes which are envisioned. The 
offset policy differs from a transferable rights scheme in two 
respects: first, the firm purchasing an offset must reduce its emis­
sions to the lowest achievable level,^ and second, the transaction 
costs in finding offsets and negotiating a price are excessive. A 
well-organized market could substantially reduce such costs, thus 
inducing more trading.
The federal experience to date with bubbles, banking and offsets 
has not been a success for two reasons: uncertainty and regulatory 
delay. The principal areas of uncertainty concern who has the property 
rights and for how long. The regulatory delay is primarily caused by 
the cumbersome State Implementation Plan review process. If an incen­
tive based mechanism is to work effectively, both of these issues must 
be squarely addressed. By providing firms with some minimum guarantees 
on the duration for which their rights are negotiable, it is likely 
that trades would increase significantly. Similarly, if the review 
process could be expedited and trading rules could be clarified, all 
involved would benefit. Not surprisingly, the problems which befuddle
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the current incentive-based approaches could just as easily arise under 
a marketable permit scheme.
The preceding analysis provides some insights into the implemen­
tation problems which can be expected to arise in setting up an artifi­
cial market to control emissions. The next section takes a detailed 
look at one particular pollution problem— sulfur oxides emissions in 
Los Angeles.
II. A POTENTIAL APPLICATION
To demonstrate the viability of marketable permits without actu­
ally implementing the alternative requires selecting a specific pollu­
tant, identifying the key implementation problems, and then designing a 
market which will address these issues. As an example, the problem of 
controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region was 
selected.^ This problem was chosen because it appeared to be a likely 
candidate for marketable permits. The scientific aspects of the prob­
lem are well understood. Data on sulfur oxides abatement costs are 
available or can be constructed for most of the key sources, and moni­
toring and enforcement problems appear tractable.
The question at hand is whether such a market could actually 
work. First, the criteria for measuring the success of a market need 
to be specified. For this specific case we would like to design a 
market that will meet air quality goals in a more cost-effective manner 
than the current system of source-specific standards, that will 
encourage investment in finding new abatement technologies for the
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future, and that will be legally acceptable and politically feasible. 
Legal feasibility means that the market must meet the requirements of 
relevant constitutional and statutory constraints. Political feasibil­
ity means that the regulatory agency should be capable of administering 
the program and that the approach has a reasonable chance of being 
acceptable enough to industry, the public and regulators that it stands 
a chance of being enacted by political officials.
To meet air quality goals requires a good technical understanding 
of the problem. The particulate sulfate problem in Los Angeles is 
caused primarily by the combustion of sulfur-bearing energy products. 
Particulate sulfates are an important concern because they tend to 
reduce visibility, acidify rainwater, and may also have harmful health 
effects. The conversion of sulfur oxides emissions to sulfates in Los 
Angeles can be thought of as proceeding in three stages. First, sulfur 
enters the air basin. Virtually, all of the sulfur which man uses in 
the Los Angeles area enters in a barrel of crude oil. Second, when oil 
products are refined or burned, some of the sulfur contained in them is 
converted to SO^ and SO^ which is released to the atmosphere. Finally, 
the SO^ compounds react to form sulfates through a series of atmos­
pheric chemical processes. Cass (1978) has shown that the relation 
between sulfur oxides emissions and sulfate air quality in Los Angeles 
is approximately linear and, in addition, can be modeled as if it were 
largely independent of the level of other key pollutants. Given a sul­
fate air quality objective, it will be possible to use an environmental 
model to compute the corresponding level of permissible emissions.^
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The current approach towards controlling sulfur oxides emissions 
relies on standards and an offset policy. New sources of pollution 
must trade off the uncontrolled portion of their emissions by effecting 
further reductions at existing sources in the Los Angeles Basin. The 
owner of an existing source is thus vested with a valuable property 
right which can be sold in whole or in part to new source owners. The 
owner also has the option of holding onto his current abatement possi­
bilities to facilitate subsequent expansion.
The offset policy is one limited form of a market in transferable 
licenses to emit air pollutants. Its principal drawbacks are that the 
costs of negotiation are excessive and the number of trades which can 
be made by new sources are limited. Negotiation costs are high because 
new entrants must first identify existing sources of pollution where 
emissions reductions are feasible, then try to estimate a reasonable 
charge for the offset, and finally perhaps have to purchase the entire 
business operations of some polluter. Purchases of offsets by new 
firms are limited by the requirement that new firms must reduce emis­
sions to the lowest achievable level before being allowed to enter the 
offset market. Presumably, in a full-blown marketable permit scheme, 
all specific source by source restrictions on burning sulfur would be 
lifted. This would tend to increase the number of mutually beneficial 
trades. In addition, the market obviates the need for bilateral bar­
gaining, which is cumbersome and unnecessary. By conveying a uniform 
price for a right to pollute, the market also ensures that rights will
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go to the highest bidder, and the marginal value of a right owned by a 
firm will approximate the market price.
While the market in licenses can attain a least cost solution, 
this cannot be assumed. In constructing a market in sulfur oxides 
emissions licenses for Los Angeles, care has to be taken to ensure that 
a few firms will not be able to dominate. Table 1 gives some indica­
tion of the relative market shares of sulfur oxides emissions in 1973 
and projected shares for 1980 under a low natural gas scenario.
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TABLE 1
Past and Projected "Market Shares" for Sulfur Oxides Emissions 
by Source Type for the South Coast Air Basin
1973 Emissions
Source % of Total
Type Emissions^
1980s Projection - low natural gas 
scenario and 1977 emissions 
control regulations
Source
Type
% of Total
Emissions^
Utility 28 
Mobile Sources 16 
Utility 11 
Oil Company 8 
Steel Company 7 
Oil Company 3 
Coke Calcining Company 3 
Oil Company 3 
Oil Company 2 
Oil Company 2
Utility 31 
Mobile Sources 27 
Utility 10 
Oil Company 4 
Coke Calcining Company 4 
Oil Company 3 
Steel Company 3 
Oil Company 3 
Oil Company 2 
Oil Company 2
aThese figures are based on sources located within the 1974 
definition of geographic boundaries of the South Coast Air Basin 
(which was subsequently revised).
^Emissions are rounded to the nearest percent.
Source: Based on author's calculations from data used to compile
Cass (1978) and Cass (1979).
The low natural gas scenario is essentially a worst case because the 
absence of natural gas means that fuel with higher sulfur content will 
be burned. If this pattern of emissions is accurate, the electric 
utilities can be expected to account for the largest share of emis­
sions. Note that mobile sources account for more than one-fourth of 
the total in the 1980s scenario. To force all mobile sources to parti­
cipate in the market would, needless to say, be quite expensive.
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Fortunately, it may be possible to transfer this responsibility to 
local oil companies since they make the gasoline, diesel oil, jet fuel, 
and bunker fuel burned by mobile sources.
While a transition to a market in tradable licenses will almost 
certainly imply different market shares from those presented above, the 
electric utilities can still be expected to have the largest share of 
the market. This presents some difficulties because even if the utili­
ties act as cost minimizers their interaction with the public utilities 
commission rate-setting process might provide incentives towards 
investing in licenses which differ from more conventional privately- 
held firms. The problem of predicting utility behavior in a license 
market is currently being investigated by examining how other durable 
assets, such as real estate, are treated, and by observing utility 
behavior under the current system of offsets and banking.
Given that competition in such a market is not a foregone conclu­
sion, it is important to ask what happens if some of the safeguards 
don't work and some of the firms successfully manipulate the price of a 
license. While this would certainly affect the distribution of income 
and should be avoided if possible, it by no means renders the system a 
complete failure. In fact, so long as the market provides greater 
flexibility for firms wishing to locate in Los Angeles while maintain­
ing the current level of air quality, this will be a big step forward 
over current policy.
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Some critics fear the market may not have a sufficient number of 
trades to be competitive. In the jargon of the economist, this is the 
problem of "thin" markets. The extreme case of a thin market is when 
no trading occurs. From a practical point of view, this lack of trad­
ing would be a concern even if firms in the area were at an equilibrium 
which minimized aggregate abatement costs. The concern stems from the 
observation that new firms wishing to enter the area would receive lit­
tle information on the cost of entry. The solution to this problem is 
to devise a system which will give potential entrants a price signal 
when the market becomes too thin. One alternative whose properties are 
currently being investigated, is to have existing firms put a small 
percentage of their permits up for sale. Anyone wishing to bid on 
these licenses, including existing participants, would be encouraged to 
do so. Under such a scheme, new entrants would have a better idea of 
the cost of emitting sulfur oxides in Los Angeles.
While questions of efficiency are important, distributional 
issues must also be addressed if the market is to become a politically 
viable entity. One important concern in moving to a market to control 
sulfur oxides air pollutants is the transitional costs which firms will 
face. Some firms or industries may be forced to shut down. For exam­
ple, if a firm competes in a national market and faces an elastic 
demand for its product, it may be the case that the costs of entering a 
license market could force it to move to another area where environmen­
tal regulations are less costly. Estimates of the likelihood of firm 
closings obtained so far indicate that plant closure will not be a
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problem in this specific case. If the policy maker wishes to avoid 
plant closings, this issue can be addressed through a suitable initial 
distribution of licenses.
To gain some perspective on the distribution problem, it is use­
ful to have a qualitative estimate of the size of the "pie." Prelim­
inary estimates of the total annual value of emissions (i.e., the price
of a license multiplied by the quantity issued) are in the neighborhood
9of 200 million dollars per year. Assuming there are roughly 10 million 
people in the South Coast Air Basin implies that each person could 
receive 20 dollars per year if the licenses were auctioned and the 
proceeds were distributed to the public. Some critics have argued that 
the magnitude of the potential wealth transfers involved does not bode 
well for marketable permits in the political arena. While problems 
with distribution can be viewed as a barrier to implementation, there 
is an alternative view that control over the distribution of permits 
makes it that much more likely that a politically acceptable solution 
can be found.
What is really at issue here is who will be given the property 
rights to the air, and for how long. It is quite likely that a large 
part of the resistance to emissions tax proposals is related to the 
realization that under most taxation schemes, emissions rights will 
revert back to the public domain.^ This is, in essence, the nature of 
the excess burden or double taxation argument which states that it is 
unfair for industry to have to pay the tax and pay to clean up as well. 
The alleged inequity of the excess burden can be directly addressed in
8
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marketable permit scheme. In the extreme case, all licenses could be 
distributed to industry if that were deemed fair or necessary to enlist 
industrys' cooperation. Alternatively, some of the proceeds could go 
directly to the public or could be used to finance administrative 
costs. The basic point is that adopting a marketable permits approach 
provides a great deal of flexibility in addressing distributional 
issues.
The final question which needs to be addressed is whether the
infrastructure exists to handle a marketable permits scheme. There is
currently a nominal emissions fee system in place for the South Coast
Air Basin. Each firm is required to complete a form analogous to an
income tax form which gives annual emissions for air contaminants which
are subject to the fee. The principal purpose of the fee system is to
cover a part of the operating cost of the South Coast Air Quality
Management District (AQMD). For example, during the 1980-81 fiscal
year, fees can be expected to cover about 30 percent of the projected
20 million dollar budget.^ Sulfur oxides emissions are one of five
air pollutants which come under the fee system. The charge for emit-
12ting a ton of sulfur oxides is $21. This can be compared with a 
license price which is estimated to be in the neighborhood of $1,000 
per ton for the case in which sulfur oxides emissions remain at their 
present levels. Though the AQMD currently handles all disputes over 
emissions fees within the agency, when the price of emissions increases 
by one or two orders of magnitude, it is quite likely that the courts 
will play some role in settling disputes.
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The problem is to figure out how to minimize the role of the 
courts. One way is by carefully defining a license in terms which can 
be monitored. Two obvious choices are to define a license in terms of 
a short-term maximum emissions rate such as a pound per hour, or in 
terms of a cumulative measure of emissions over a longer time interval. 
For the case of sulfur oxides emissions it would probably be preferable 
to define a license in terms of cumulative emissions over a time inter­
val such as a week or a month, but the problem is that integrated stack 
monitors do not exist which would provide the necessary information to 
demonstrate that a violation had actually occurred. On the other hand, 
the technology for determining whether a source has violated a short­
term maximum emission rate does exist. This can be accomplished by a 
team of 4 or 5 technicians performing a source test.
The monitoring and enforcement of a marketable permit scheme to 
control sulfur oxides emissions is well within the grasp of the AQMD.
It is a relatively straightforward manner to monitor cumulative emis­
sions for utilities and the majority of industrial sources who do not 
use any abatement equipment for reducing sulfur oxides emissions. The 
only information that is required to estimate emissions is the quantity 
of fuel burned and the sulfur content of the fuel. For those sources 
who do not route all of the sulfur input into the air, the task is less 
straightforward. The major sources in this category include the oil 
refiners, coke calciners, glass manufacturers and steel manufacturers. 
There are two basic approaches which can be used to monitor stack emis­
sions. One is the source test performed by technicians. The second is
to install monitoring equipment which indicates the concentration of
sulfur within a small area in the stack. Unfortunately, without some
estimate of the flow rate, it is impossible to know the cumulative
emissions. While the use of stack monitors for measuring SO is stillx
in its infancy and the estimates are not always reliable, they may be 
used as a continuous check to determine when a firm's emissions appear 
to be exceeding its permits.
There are currently about 20 stack monitors in place and 100 are
expected to be in place by the end of the year in the South Coast Air 
13Basin. One possibility for enforcing the SO^ permit scheme is to 
sample firms at random to see if they are in violation. This random 
sampling approach could be augmented by a program which uses the infor­
mation provided by the continuous monitoring system installed in many 
of the larger sources.
It is likely that the current monitoring and enforcement staff, 
which has a little less than 200 members, would have to be increased if 
a SO^ marketable permit scheme were implemented. The size of the 
required increase is not certain, and depends on an assessment of how 
well the current system works. By all accounts of people interviewed, 
both in and outside the AQMD, the system for monitoring S0x emissions 
works well now, so I feel that, at most, it would cost the agency an 
additional million dollars annually to monitor.^ This amount is 
easily offset by the expected cost saving to be derived from using 
marketable permits.
B-35
There are some legal problems which need to be addressed in the 
implementation phase. For example, it is not clear whether under 
current law the AQMD can penalize violators by fining them in accord 
with the severity of the violation. It would be desirable to have a 
system of fines which could be administratively imposed, again, to 
minimize the role of the courts. In addition, the question of who 
should be given the burden of proof needs to be addressed. The current 
reporting system for emissions is analogous to federal income tax 
reporting with the polluter responsible for substantiating his claims 
when the AQMD estimates differ with those submitted by the polluter.
The exact form of the fine raises some interesting issues.
First, consider the objectives in designing a penalty system. The 
basic objective is to provide firms with a strong incentive to play by 
the rules so the air quality target will be met. But, how strong an 
incentive? Clearly, if the penalties were made high enough and there 
were some probability of getting caught, all firms would play by the 
rules. There is a question, however, both from a legal and an adminis­
trative perspective, as to how high you can make the penalties and 
still have them be workable. If the penalties far exceed the estimated 
damages, the courts are not likely to uphold them and the regulators 
might be reluctant to impose them. Such might be the case if all vio­
lations were to be punished by closing down the plant. Thus, in addi­
tion to providing an incentive for firms not to exceed their allowed 
emissions, a penalty scheme should be enforceable.
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There are no magic formulas for determining a penalty scheme. The 
basic theoretical approach is to try to maximize the difference between 
social benefits and social costs. Operationally, this is not very 
helpful. If the firm's violation is viewed as marginal, then a less 
grandiose objective might be to equate the firm's marginal benefit from 
the violation with the marginal cost to society of allowing such a vio­
lation. The firm's marginal benefit can be estimated by members of the 
firm, but, in all likelihood, is not public information. The marginal 
physical damage to society of such a violation is anybody's guess, but 
can usefully be separated into two components: the probability of get­
ting caught, p, given that a firm is in violation, and the damage due 
to a violation, D, which is detected. We shall then define the 
expected marginal physical damage to society of a violation D, which is 
detected as (D/p). The problem is to operationalize this notion by 
defining physical damages more precisely and converting them to mone­
tary damages.
Quantification of damages is always difficult. For illustrative 
purposes suppose that damages are a function, f, of the size of the 
difference between monitored emissions and permits currently held by 
the firm. Call this difference x so that damages are represented by 
D=f(x). Let F be the size of the fine in dollars and let £ be the 
price of a marketable permit. Equation (1) represents a preliminary 
attempt to link the fine to damages, the probability of getting caught 
when in violation and the existing price for polluting, i.
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(1)
The numerator of equation (1) represents an estimate of the monetary 
value of damages. Dividing through by p gives a measure of expected 
damages. Thus, the firm is supposed to compare its expected marginal 
benefits with expected damages.
Though there is nothing wrong with equation (1) conceptually, it 
suffers from one serious flaw. Such a penalty system can be circum­
vented by driving the price of a permit to zero. This situation could 
easily arise if a sufficiently large number of firms chose not to par­
ticipate in the market. Equation (1) is easily modified to deal with 
this issue. Let 'a' be a parameter set by the regulator which could 
reflect the expected market price of a permit if all firms were to par­
ticipate in the market. This gives rise to equation (2) which captures 
the spirit of (1), but does not fall prey to manipulation as easily.
In Equation (2), "Max" denotes the maximum of a and £. Thus, at a 
minimum, a firm caught in violation would have to pay f(x)a/p.
The nature of the damage function, f(x), needs to be spelled out. 
If the objective is to keep firms close to their permit levels, then it 
makes sense to increase the marginal cost when the size of the
(2)
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violation increases. This is easily accomplished by letting f(x) = Kx11 
where K is an arbitrary constant and n exceeds unity. Substitution 
into (2) yields:
(3)
Equation (3) is offered merely as one possibility for designing a 
penalty scheme. It has the virtue that it is simple, and all the 
parameters can be estimated, at least roughly. Furthermore, it crudely 
relates benefits to costs, and also would appear to be consistent with 
the postulated objectives for a penalty system.
The point of going through this exercise of designing a fee was 
to demonstrate a general approach to the problem as well as noting some 
of the difficulties in moving from theory to practice. The above for­
mulation is simplistic. It assumes away many of the measurement prob­
lems. For example, there is obviously some uncertainty in measuring x. 
Nevertheless, it is our belief that source tests are sufficiently accu­
rate to warrant a penalty design which assesses fines which are commen­
surate with the size of the violation. Another problem is that p is 
really an endogenous variable, which depends on the penalty scheme 
actually adopted, making it difficult to estimate before implementation 
begins. In addition, the probability of detection may vary with the
size of the violation.
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The detailed design of a penalty system will require further distinc­
tions not made here. For example, firms who report violations should 
be subject to less severe penalties than firms who do not. In the 
above model, p could be set equal to unity for firms reporting viola­
tions. In actuality, firms caught cheating on their reported emissions 
could be subject to other civil or criminal sanctions, similar to those 
imposed by the Internal Revenue Service.
The first objective in designing a penalty scheme was to induce 
firms not to exceed the allowable level of emissions most of the time. 
However, it was recognized that there may be unforeseen circumstances, 
such as an equipment failure, when a firm might violate its emission 
limit for a short time. Just as it is important to identify extenuat­
ing circumstances for the individual firm, it is also important to 
identify situations where a marketable permit scheme may be inappropri­
ate. For the case of S0x emissions in Los Angeles, these are two types 
of uncertainty which can be expected to strain the system. The first 
is the unpredictability of the natural gas supply. The permit scheme 
can handle this uncertainty in two ways: either by forcing industry to 
deal with this uncertainty or providing some relief in the form of 
issuing temporary permits should a crisis situation arise. The second 
major area of uncertainty is the problem of air pollution episodes 
which require dramatic action on the part of all participants. Because 
such events are very difficult to predict in advance, the best way of 
handling these situations is probably to suspend the permit system and 
invoke tighter regulations during these brief periods.
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The preceding discussion indicates that it will be possible to 
design a market in tradable S0x emission licenses for Los Angeles. 
Monitoring and enforcement capabilities currently exist, but will prob­
ably have to be expanded. A fee system needs to be worked out in 
detail which will induce firms not to exceed their allowed level of 
emissions. In addition, the problem of obtaining revenues to admin­
ister the market must be addressed. One simple solution is to set a
nominal fee on SO emissions analogous to the 21 dollar/ton fee which x
is applied now. Such a fee could be expected to lower the permit price 
by the discounted value of the fee.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In a world not beset by uncertainty, but befuddled by pollution 
problems, it was possible to construct an example in which marketable 
permits were preferable to standards. In the real world in which we 
live, the comparison is less straightforward. There are transitional 
costs in moving to a new system. Not all firms will necessarily be 
winners in moving to a permit scheme. It is possible that firms may 
face higher abatement costs than under standards for the simple reason 
that the air quality goals may be reached more quickly.
Despite these objections, there appears to be an increasing wil­
lingness on the part of all groups to experiment with new kinds of 
environmental regulation. This enthusiasm is derived, in part, from 
the observation that the command and control approach is not working 
for many problems. It is burdensome administratively, and even though
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industry can sometimes foster delays in enacting regulations, the 
attendant uncertainties can be very expensive for firms who have long­
term planning horizons. It might be the case that coalitions can be 
formed which are willing to consider alternatives such as marketable 
permits which can provide greater certainty.
If regulatory agencies decide to experiment with marketable per­
mits, it is of paramount importance that some assurances be placed on 
the minimum duration of a permit. In addition, trading rules need to 
be spelled out clearly. If environmental agencies adopt a marketable 
permits approach and change the rules capriciously, they run the risk 
of losing support for a tool which can be a most-effective means of 
controlling pollution problems.
The importance of selecting the right problem cannot be overem­
phasized. It is helpful to have an understanding of the relationship 
between emissions and pollution so the target can be attained without 
having to iterate frequently. A monitoring and enforcement capability 
is imperative. Many environmental regulatory agencies currently do not 
have the resources or the expertise to successfully monitor and imple­
ment a marketable permit scheme. The final element necessary to assess 
the viability of the marketable permit alternative is an estimate of 
what it will cost industry to clean up the problem. This information 
can be used to identify implementation problems and design a market
which will address these issues.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Krier and Bell (1980) provide an insightful discussion on the 
relationship between some of the new approaches being proposed 
such as bubbles, offsets and marketable permits, and the 
traditional approaches to environmental regulation.
2. A summary of industrys' skeptical perspective on the bubble 
policy which supports this view is contained in Environment 
Reporter (1980).
3. Both the study by MATHTECH and the study by Rand indicate that 
expected cost savings are much greater than any expected increase 
in administrative costs.
4. This is the subject of the Rand study prepared for the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
5. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1980), p. 8.
6. The Los Angeles region refers to the South Coast Air Basin and 
a part of Ventura County. The current definition of the South 
Coast Air Basin includes all of Orange County, the majority of 
Los Angeles County and parts of San Bernardino and Riverside 
County. See Air Report (1980) for a more precise 
definition.
7. See Cass (1978) for a description of the model and the validation 
procedure.
8. There are two possible exceptions to this conclusion— a large steel 
manufacturer which may close down before the system could get 
underway, and the glass manufacturers who account for less than
1% of current emissions, but have very high abatement costs. It 
appears that both of these problems could easily be handled through 
a distribution scheme that is politically acceptable.
9. These calculations will be spelled out in more detail in 
Chapter 3 of Hahn (1981).
10. This point may need further clarification for readers with a legal 
perspective on the issue. In a legal sense, it may be true that the 
public has a claim on such rights. The point made here is that 
regardless of who has the claim, industry is, de facto, exercising 
the right whenever it spews forth emissions which are sanctioned
by law.
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11. Based on interview with Eric Lemke (1980).
12. Small emitters as defined in Rule 301 of the Rules and Regulations 
are exempted. S0x is measured in equivalent tons of SO2 *
13. Based on interview with Eric Lemke (1980).
14. This upper bound estimate is based on the assumption that up to 
25 or 30 more technicians might need to be hired.
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APPENDIX C
*
MARKET POWER AND TRANSFERABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Robert W. Hahn
ABSTRACT
The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce 
resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will 
approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone 
conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might 
manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the 
issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable 
property rights. First, a model is developed which explains how a 
single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is 
followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular 
policy problem— the control of particulate sulfates in the Los Angeies
region.
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1. Introduction
The idea of implementing a market to ration a given quantity of 
resources is by no means novel. Working examples include markets for 
taxi medallions and liquor licenses. Suggested applications for the 
use of a market approach abound in the economics literature, especially 
in the fields of air and water pollution.^ Why has the idea of setting 
up a market in transferable property rights received so much attention? 
One key reason, and the reason which motivates this paper, is that such 
markets have the potential to achieve a given objective in a cost- 
effective manner. Whether this potential is realized depends, among 
other things, on the design of the market and the extent to which 
individual firms can exert a significant influence on the market.
The purpose of this paper will be to explore how the initial 
distribution of property rights can lead to inefficiencies. Section 2 
develops the basic model for the case in which one firm can influence 
the market. Section 3 considers a potential application of the model. 
The results of the theoretical analysis are then compared with the 
conventional wisdom and directions for future research are discussed in 
Section 4.
For analytical purposes, firms are divided into two categories.
A firm will be said to have market power if it realizes it has an
C-47
influence on price. A firm will not have market power if it acts as a 
price taker. The question for analysis, then, is how a single firm 
with market power might influence the market by affecting the price at 
which a commodity sells. More precisely, this essay examines how the 
pricing strategy of a firm with market power varies with changes in the 
initial distribution of property rights.
In the static models developed below, all transactions take place 
at a single price. Restricting the model in this way permits analysis 
of a range of inefficient outcomes. This is in contrast to the 
approach taken by Coase (1960) in his seminal article, who does not 
restrict the bargaining space and, consequently, emphasizes the range 
of efficient outcomes that can result, irrespective of the initial 
endowment of property rights.
The principal result is that the degree of inefficiency observed 
in the market is systematically related to the distribution of permits. 
For the case of one firm with market power, the results have 6ome 
intuitive appeal. If a firm with market power would elect to buy 
permits in a competitive market (i.e., where all firms act as if they 
were price takers), then it follows a strategy resembling that of a 
monopsonist. If it would choose to sell permits in a competitive 
market, then the firm with market power follows a strategy resembling 
that of a monopolist. These results are formalized in the next
section.
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2. The Basic Model
A critical assumption underlying the competitive model is that 
firms act as if they were price takers. In the model developed below, 
it will be assumed that all firms except one are price takers. The 
basic question to be answered is how (and whether) the equilibrium 
price and quantities will vary as a function of the initial 
distribution of permits among firms.
Consider the case of m firms with firm 1 designated as the firm 
with market power. A total of L permits are distributed to the firms, 
with the ith firm receiving Q? permits. Firms are allowed to trade 
permits in a market which lasts for one period. The number of permits 
which the ith firm has after trading will be denoted by Q^. All firms 
except the market power firm are assumed to have downward sloping 
inverse demand functions for permits of the form P^(Q^) over the region 
[0,L]. represents firm i's willingness to pay. All trades in the 
market are constrained to take place at a single equilibrium price, P. 
For concreteness, we shall consider the case of a classical pollution 
externality. All price-taking firms attempt to minimize the sum of 
abatement costs and permit costs. For the case of pollution, the 
assumption of downward sloping demand curves is equivalent to the 
assumption that marginal abatement costs are increasing. Let C^(Q^) be 
the abatement cost associated with emitting units. Marginal 
abatement costs, -CC, are assumed to be positive and increasing, which 
implies C? < 0 and CC' > 0 for i = 2,...,m. Price takers solve the 
following optimization problem:
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(1)
The f i r s t  order c o n d it io n  fo r  an in t e r io r  s o lu t io n  i s :
Th is  merely says that p r ice  takers  w i l l  ad ju st  the q u an t ity  used, Q^,
. . .  . 2
u n t i l  the m arg ina l abatement cost equals the eq u i l ib r iu m  p r ic e ,  P. 
Equation  (2) im p l i c i t l y  de fines a demand fu n c t ion  Q^(P) which i s  
downward s lo p in g  on [0,L] fo r  i= 2 , . . . ,m .  Furthermore, note that the 
number o f perm its the i t h  p r ic e - t a k in g  f irm  w i l l  use i s  independent of 
i t s  i n i t i a l  a l lo c a t io n  of perm its.
(2)
(3)
The a n a ly s i s  o f the f irm  w ith  market power i s  le s s  
s tra ig h t fo rw a rd .  Begin by d e f in in g  an abatement cost fu n c t ion  C^(Q^) 
where C^ < 0 and C^ ' > 0 .  Th is  says that  the f irm  w ith  market power 
faces in c re a s in g  m arg ina l abatement c o s t s .  Firm 1 has the power to 
p ic k  a p r ice  which w i l l  minimize i t s  expenditure on abatement co s ts  and 
permits subject to the c o n s tra in t  that the market c le a r s .  Form ally ,  
the problem i s  to :
S u b s t i tu t in g  the c o n s tra in t  in to  the ob je c t ive  fu n c t ion  and 
d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  y ie ld  the fo l lo w in g  f i r s t - o r d e r  co n d it ion  fo r  an 
i n t e r io r  minimum:
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Equation  (4) re v e a ls  that the on ly  case in  which the m arg ina l co st of 
abatement, - C ' ,  w i l l  equal the eq u i l ib r iu m  p r ice  i s  when f irm  l ' s  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of perm its ju s t  equals the amount i t  chooses to use. In  
e f fe c t ,  t h i s  says that the on ly  way to achieve a c o s t -e f fe c t iv e  
s o lu t io n ,  where m arg ina l abatement co s ts  are equal fo r  a l l  f i rm s ,  i s  to  
p ick  an i n i t i a l  d i s t r ib u t io n  of permits fo r  f irm  1 which co in c ide s  with  
the co st-m in im iz ing  s o lu t io n .
Th is  g iv e s  r i s e  to the fo l lo w in g  r e s u l t :
P ro p o s it io n  1: Suppose there i s  one f irm  w ith  market power.
I f  i t  does not rece ive  an amount o f permits  
equal to the number which i t  e le c t s  to use,  
then the t o t a l  expenditure on abatement w i l l  
exceed the co st-m in im iz in g  s o lu t io n .
The key po in t  to be gleaned from the a n a ly s i s  i s  that the d i s t r ib u t io n
of permits m atters,  w ith  regard not on ly  to equ ity  co n s id e ra t io n s  but
a lso  to c o s t .  T r a d i t io n a l  models of such markets view problems of
3
permit d i s t r i b u t i o n  as be ing s t r i c t l y  an equ ity  i s su e .  With the 
in tro d u c t io n  of market power, i t  was shown that the d i s t r ib u t io n  of 
permits may a ls o  impinge on e f f ic ie n c y  c o n s id e ra t io n s .
The next l o g i c a l  quest ion  to explore i s  how the market 
e q u i l ib r iu m  w i l l  vary  as a fu n c t ion  of f irm  l ' s  i n i t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
perm its .  Doing the necessary  comparative s t a t i c s  y ie ld s :
(4)
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(5 )
The exp re ssion  fo r  the denominator i s  the second order co n d it io n  fo r  
the cost m in im ization  and w i l l  be p o s it iv e  i f  the second-order 
s u f f ic ie n c y  co n d it io n  fo r  a minimum o b ta in s .  For example, in  the case 
o f l in e a r  demand curves ( i . e . ,  Q^' = 0 ),  the exp re ssion  w i l l  be 
p o s it iv e .  Thus, fo r  the case when a re g u la r  in te r io r  minimum e x is t s ,  a 
t r a n s fe r  o f perm its from any o f the p r ice  takers to  the f irm  w ith  
market power w i l l  r e s u lt  in  an increase  in  the e q u ilib r iu m  p r ic e .  An 
immediate c o r o lla r y  to  t h is  r e s u lt  i s  th a t the number o f perm its th at  
the firm  w ith  market power uses w i l l  in crease  as i t s  i n i t i a l  a l lo c a t io n  
o f perm its i s  in crease d . Form ally , the problem i s  to  show 
(9Q^/9Q°) > 0 .  By the chain  ru le ,
(6)
(7)
One question  which a r is e s  in  t h is  model i s  whether there i s  any 
system atic  r e la t io n s h ip  between the d is t r ib u t io n  o f perm its to  the firm  
w ith  market power and the degree o f in e f f ic ie n c y .  I f  in e f f ic ie n c y  i s
I t  s u f f ic e s  to show (9Q^/9P) i s  p o s i t iv e .  By d ire c t  s u b s t itu t io n  fo r  
Qi ’
The exp re ssion  on the r igh t-h a n d  s id e  o f (7 ) equals which i s
p o s i t iv e ,  because demand curves are presumed to be n e g a t iv e ly  sloped.
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measured by the extent to which abatement c o s t s  exceed the minimum 
required to reach a s ta ted  ta r g e t ,  then i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to show the 
fo l lo w in g  r e s u l t :
*
P ro p o s it io n  2: Let Q. denote the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of permits
fo r  tne case when permit d i s t r ib u t io n  equals  
permit use fo r  the f irm  w ith  market power.
Then in e f f ic ie n c y * in c r e a s e s oboth as 
increase s  above Q. and as Q. decreases  
below 0^.
The p ro p o s i t io n  i s  v e r i f i e d  by determining how t o t a l  c o s t ,  TC, v a r ie s
The efficient solution is  derived from the following
minimization:
( 8 )
F irst order conditions imply:
( 9 )
Differentiation of tota l cost with respect to Q° yields:
as a fu n c t ion  of
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Equation  (11) i s  obta ined by d i f fe r e n t ia t in g  (9 ) w ith  respect to Q°. 
S u b s t itu t in g  equation  (11) in to  (10) y ie ld s :
Equation  (12) im p lie s:
(12)
(13)
Combining (13) w ith  equation  (4 ) y ie ld s  the r e s u lt  that t o t a l  cost
*
ach ieves a minimum at and w i l l  in crease  as the perm it d is t r ib u t io n  
★
d e v ia te s  from in  e ith e r  d ire c t io n .
In  a d d it io n  to  determ in ing how in e f f ic ie n c y  v a r ie s  w ith  the 
i n i t i a l  d is t r ib u t io n  o f p e rm its, i t  i s  a lso  of some in te re s t  to know
( 10 )
( 11 )
The above expression can be simplified by noting:
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when the level of inefficiency can be related to observable variables 
such as the quantity of permits which are exchanged. If there is a 
single firm with market power and this firm is known, then placing 
restrictions on the demand for permits by price takers yields the 
following result:
Proposition 3: The degree of inefficiency will increase as
the amount the firm with market power decides 
to buy or sell increases, provided the demand 
for permits by price takers is linear.
To see this result, first note that any price not equal to the 
competitive equilibrium price will cause efficiency losses. Second, 
note that as the deviation between the competitive equilibrium and the 
observed price increases, the degree of inefficiency increases. This 
result follows immediately from the assumption that all firms face 
increasing marginal abatement costs. It remains to be shown that 
trading increases as the size of the deviation between the actual price 
and the competitive equilibrium price increases.
The size of the deviation between the actual price and the 
competitive price is governed by the initial distribution of permits to 
the firm with market power, Q°. The amount of net buying, (Q^- Q°), is
also governed by Q°. At the competitive equilibrium, the firm with
o . . .  *
market power does not trade —  Q^= —  and a com petitive  p r ic e ,  P ,
will prevail. The deviation between the actual price and the
^ Q
competitive price, (P-P ), is an increasing function of . To see 
this, it suffices to show 9P/9Q° > 0 (since P is constant). The 
assumption of linear demand implies QC' *= 0 for all price takers. 
Inspection of equation (5) reveals 9P/9Q° > 0 for this case. This
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im p lie s  that  the abso lu te  d e v ia t io n  in  p r ic e s
★  o o
above , and as f a l l s  below .
o
increase s  as r i s e s
. . . o *
I f  i t  can be shown that s e l l i n g  increase s  as r i s e s  above
and buying increases as Q° f a l l s  below , then P ro p o s it io n  3 w i l l  have
been v e r i f i e d .  For then, increases in  s e l l i n g  and increase s  in  buying
w i l l  be a s soc ia te d  w ith  la r g e r  abso lu te  p r ice  d e v ia t io n s  and hence,
h igher degrees of in e f f ic ie n c y .  Form ally ,  the problem i s  to  show
3(Q^- Q°)/3Qj < 0. The r e la t io n s h ip  between net buying and permit
d i s t r ib u t io n  i s  derived below:
(14)
The second e q u a l it y  i s  based on s u b s t i t u t io n  of equations (5) through
(7 ) .  Based on the s ig n s  of QC and C C ',  i t  fo l lo w s  that  3Q^/3Q° < 1 fo r
4t h i s  case, which immediately y ie ld s  the de sired  r e s u l t .
Other a n a ly s t s  have considered the p o s s i b i l i t y  of market power, 
but g e n e ra l ly  r e s t r i c t  themselves to a s p e c ia l  case. For example, 
Ackerman et a l .  (1974) cons ider  the problem fo r  a s p e c i f i c  hypo the t ica l  
case, but do not deal e x p l i c i t l y  w ith  the e f fe c t  of permit 
d i s t r ib u t io n . ^  DeLucia (1974) cons iders  a numerical example in  a 
s im u la t io n  of a water r i g h t s  market in  which the r i g h t s  are auctioned.  
The f irm  w ith  market power p la y s  the ro le  of a m onopsonist, r e s t r i c t i n g  
i t s  demand fo r  permits in  an e f f o r t  to keep the permit p r ice  low. The
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situation analyzed by DeLucia corresponds to the case when the firm 
with market power receives no permits initially.
While concern that a firm or group of firms can influence such a 
market has been expressed, relatively little thought appears to have 
been given to exactly what i6 meant by market power and how to devise 
institutions which would yield a desirable set of outcomes. The simple 
model developed above reveals two essential points. First, just 
because a firm may have a large share of the permits, this does not 
necessarily mean it can influence the outcome in the permit market. 
Second, if a firm does have market power in the permit market, its 
effect on price (assuming there is one firm with market power) varies 
with its excess demand for permits. That is to say, once the potential 
for market power has been ascertained, it is a flow —  excess demand of 
the firm with market power —  which determines the equilibrium.
The importance of the flow has immediate implications for market 
design. In particular, with full knowledge of demand functions, a 
central authority could effectively pick the quantity of permits it 
wanted the market power firm to use through a suitable initial 
allocation. The limits to the discretion of the authority would be 
dictated by two extreme cases: pure monopsony in which all permits are 
distributed to the price takers, and pure monopoly in which all permits 
are distributed to the firm with market power.
Of course, the more realistic situation is one in which the 
authority has, at most, only a crude estimate of the demand functions.
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In this case the basic model can be applied to assess the possibilities 
for exerting market influence. The sensitivity of the results could be 
checked by varying the demand functions and the initial distribution of 
permits. This would allow the policymaker to determine if the type of 
market influence considered here is likely to pose a problem in a given 
application.
3 . A Potential Application
In order to apply the basic model described in Section 2, it is 
necessary to develop an operational test for identifying a firm with 
market power. How this might be done is beyond the scope of this 
paper. In the application discussed below, the firm holding the 
largest share of permits under a competitive market simulation is 
designated as the market power firm.
To demonstrate how the basic model can be applied, the problem of 
controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region was 
selected. This problem was chosen because it appeared to be a likely 
candidate for a transferable property rights scheme, and because the 
problem of market power could conceivably arise. Market simulations 
based on the assumption that firms are price takers indicate that the 
largest emitter of sulfur oxides, an electric utility, could account 
for as much as half of the total emissions, and an even higher 
proportion of emissions for which abatement technologies are known—  
i.e., controllable emissions.^
The extent of market power will in general, vary with the level 
of allowable emissions, the shape of the marginal abatement cost 
schedule for the market power firm, and the marginal abatement costs 
faced by all other firms. For this particular example, a permit will 
be defined as the right to emit one ton of 6ulfur oxides emissions per 
day for one day. Based on this definition, Figure 1 shows the marginal 
costs of abatement for the firm designated as the market power firm.^ 
Two curves are drawn in Figure 1, a discrete step function (based on 
the data in Hahn (1981b)), and a continuous approximation which has the 
following functional form:
-C: = 88,300 Q',S66 (15)
Actually, for the case of the market power firm, a continuous 
approximation is probably more reasonable because the abatement 
strategy under consideration is the desulfurization of fuel oil or the 
purchase of lower sulfur residual fuel oil.
A similar graph for all other firms is shown in Figure 2 which 
illustrates the derived demand for permits at any given price. The 
continuous approximation to the discrete case takes the following form: 
m
£  Q- 0?) = 73 + 154,000/P. (16)
i=2 1
The demand curve is based on some discrete technologies such as 
scrubbers as well as some continuous abatement strategies such as the 
one mentioned above. The continuous approximation will be used for 
purposes of illustration. Note that the particular form used in (16)
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FIGURE 1
Marginal Abatement Costs for Market Power Firm
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FIGURE 2
Derived Demand for Permits by All Other Firms
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implies that emissions by others will be at least 73 tons per day for 
all positive permit prices.
To compute how the initial distribution of permits affects 
prices, quantities and overall abatement, it is first necessary to 
select a value for the total number of permits. In this example the 
parameter L was set equal to 149 tons/day, an amount which will ensure 
that both state and federal standards related to sulfur oxides 
emissions and particulate sulfates will be met. Having chosen a value 
for L, it is possible to examine how permit use varies with initial 
distribution by substituting equations (15) and (16) into equation (4) 
and solving. The graphical solution to the problem is shown in 
Figure 3. Note that increases as a function of Q° until a corner 
solution is approached. This point corresponds to a permit 
distribution where all other firms receive an amount of permits that 
just equals their uncontrollable emissions. If all other firms receive 
an amount of permits that falls short of their uncontrollable 
emissions, then the relationship between and Q° is not unique. In 
this latter case, the market power firm can reap infinite rewards by
g
exploiting the perfectly inelastic part of the demand curve.
Prices vary widely as a function of the initial distribution of 
permits. The monopsony price is approximately 3200 dollars/ton while 
the competitive price, associated with = 36, is about 3900 
dollars/ton. When all other firms receive permits corresponding to 
their uncontrollable emissions, the price of a permit jumps to 
approximately 21,000 dollars/ton. The monopoly price, i.e., when
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FIGURE 3
Permit Use vs. Permit Distribution— Market Power
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Q° *= L, is not well defined both in theory and in practice— in theory, 
because (16) is a hyperbola with an asymptote, and in practice, because 
of insufficient information on the value of firms and possible 
technologies that might be available for controlling so-called 
uncontrollable emissions.
Given permit use as a function of the initial distribution of 
permits, it is then possible to estimate the total annual costs of 
abatement by integrating equations (15) and (16). The relationship 
between total annual abatement expenditures and the initial 
distribution of permits is shown in Figure 4. Note that abatement 
expenditures remain relatively constant (in the neighborhood of 490 
million dollars annually) until the market power firm is able to exert 
some monopoly power when it receives permits in excess of 60 tons/day 
or so.
If the primary objective in setting up a market is to minimize 
total abatement costs, Figure 4 indicates that the policymaker should 
try to avoid a situation where the firm with market power can act as a 
monopolist. However, because of the uncertainty associated with the 
cost data, it makes sense to try to minimize the likelihood that a firm 
or group of firms will be able to induce a price-quantity equilibrium 
which departs from the competitive result in either direction. 
Alematives for dealing with this issue are discussed in Hahn and Noll 
(1982). The theory developed in this paper indicates that the expected 
excess demand of each firm may be a critical variable over which the 
policymaker can exercise control.
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FIGURE 4
Total Annual Abatement Cost vs. Initial Distribution
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4. Conclusions
The formal analysis in sections 2 and 3 indicates the range of 
potential outcomes that might arise when firms can exert rather 
specific types of influence in markets which ration a fixed supply of 
intermediate or final goods. There are clearly other strategies which 
large firms might pursue, particularly when the market is just getting 
under way. For example, it is quite likely that the total number of 
permits issued and the pattern of distribution could be affected by the 
behavior of such firms. In the case of pollution rights, some firms 
might refuse to play the game if they do not care for the new set of 
rules. Such actions are difficult to model explicitly, which is why 
the focus here has been on the potential for gain within a well-defined 
set of rules. Even within this setting, further research is warranted.
One avenue for further research would be to extend the basic 
model to the case where two or more firms have market power. Hahn 
(1981a) has examined this issue for the case of two firms with market 
power. The result on cost minimization and permit distribution 
(Proposition 1) was shown to generalize. A second potentially fruitlul 
area of research would be to extend the model to more than one period 
along the lines of Stokey (1981), who considers a durable goods 
monopolist. Finally, it might be useful to test the theory of the 
basic model in a small-group expermental setting and determine when, 
and under what types of institutions, it is supported.
C-66
The key result obtained here, that it Is the pattern of excess 
demands that ultimately determines the extent to which any firm can 
influence the market, does not appear to be widely recognized. One 
reason is that many people feel that manipulation of such markets will 
not be a problem. For example, Teitenberg (19801, in surveying the 
literature on air rights markets, expresses the view that "the anti­
competitive effects of a TDP [transferable discharge permit] system are 
not likely to be very important in general."  ^ For several 
applications such as the one considered by DeLucia (1974) and the one 
considered by Hahn (1981a), the assumption that the market will 
approximate the competitive solution would appear to depend critically 
on how the institutions are designed. Because there is a very real 
possibility that several markets in transferable property rights could 
be subject to different kinds of systematic manipulation, there is a 
need to further explore the ramifications of such problems in theory 
and applications.
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Footnotes
*  I  would l i k e  to thank Jim Q uirk, Roger N o l l  and Jen n ife r  Reinganum 
fo r  p ro v id in g  u se fu l  input to t h i s  e f f o r t .  Any remaining e rro rs  
are s o le ly  the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  of the author.
1. Te itenberg (1980) prov ides a comprehensive survey of the 
a p p l ic a t io n  of marketable perm its to the co n tro l  o f s ta t io n a ry  
source a i r  p o l lu t io n .  A genera l l i s t  o f references to p o te n t ia l  
a p p l ic a t io n s  in  a i r  and water p o l lu t io n  i s  provided in  the study by 
Anderson et a l .  (1979).
2. The assumption of in c re a s in g  m arg ina l abatement co s t s  im p lie s  that  
the f irm  a t t a in s  a re g u la r  minimum in  s o lv in g  the problem (6 .1 ) .
3. The a n a ly s i s  by Montgomery (1972) i s  one such example. In  t h i s  
a n a ly s i s ,  f irm s  are assumed to be p r ice  ta k e rs .  For the case of 
one p o l lu ta n t ,  one market and a l in e a r  r e la t io n s h ip  between source  
em issions and environmental q u a l i t y ,  Montgomery f in d s  that the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f perm its w i l l  have no e f fe c t  on ach iev ing  the ta rge t  
in  a c o s t -e f fe c t iv e  manner.
4. P ro p o s it io n  3 w i l l  a l s o  hold  i f  (Qj-Q°) >.(<.) 0 and Q ^ "  >.(<.) 0.
5. See Ackerman et a l .  (1974), p. 279.
6. A more d e ta i le d  d is c u s s io n  of the market power quest ion  can be 
found in  Hahn (1981a), and Hahn and N o l l  (1982).
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7. Further assumptions underlying the development of this data, such 
as the availability of natural gas, are discussed in Hahn (1981a).
8. In practice, such rewards would be limited by the decision of other
firms to shut down operations.
9. All prices and costs are given in 1977 dollars.
10. Teitenberg (1980), p. 414.
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APPENDIX D
DESIGNING A MARKET IN TRANSFERABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS:
A REVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Robert W. Hahn
A basic theme of the economics literature in the field of 
environmental regulation is that competition will work wonders. If 
firms can be induced to minimize pollution costs in the same way they 
naturally try to minimize the costs of using other inputs in the 
production process, tne hope is that prescribed levels of 
environmental quality can be met using fewer resources than are 
employed currently. Whether or not this hope becomes a reality 
depends crucially on how the market or "institution" for controlling 
pollution is designed.
This paper reviews the available evidence on designing markets 
in transferable property rights. The first section offers a set of 
characteristics that we would like an institution to exhibit. The 
second section reviews the evidence on the design of institutions for 
dealing with related problems. The third section concludes with a 
brief discussion of one possible market design that looks promising.
1. Objectives
One of the critical problems in current trading schemes aimed 
at controlling pollution is that relatively little trading is taking 
place. One reason for this may be that the property right is not well 
defined. A second reason is that there may be a great deal of 
uncertainty about a "reasonable" price for the commodity. A
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consequence of the lack of trading is that information on prices is 
not readily available to participants in the market and potential 
entrants. This has the effect of raising the transactions costs 
associated with trading between parties. Indeed, this may be one of 
the reasons that, to date, more trades has occurred within individual 
firms than between firms.'*'
If a market is to be effective in promoting trading, it is 
important that a price signal be established at the outset. However, 
establishing a price signal is not, in itself, sufficient to warrant 
establishing a market. It is also necessary that the price be close 
to the competitive equilibrium so that the potential gains from 
efficiency can be reaped.
In establishing a market, issues of practicality also need to 
be addressed. One critical issue is the problem of potential wealth 
transfers. It is important that the institution under consideration 
be able to address questions of equity that are likely to arise.
To summarize, there are three basic objectives that will be 
considered in the initial design of an institution:
1. Establishing a price signal;
2. Approximating the least-cost solution over time;
3. Allowing for equity considerations.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Other issues such as 
the speed at which the price signal converges to an equilibrium and 
the robustness of the institution will need to be considered before 
informed policy recommendations can be developed.
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2. The Evidence
Fortunately, there has been a large body of work devoted to 
the examination of how subjects actually behave under different 
institutions. This section reviews the empirical evidence which is 
pertinent to the design of a market in transferable property rights 
with the objectives set forth in Section 1. Before undertaking this 
task, it is useful to summarize the state of existing theory on the 
subj ect.
In theory, it is generally accepted that instruments such as 
taxes and marketable permits will lead to a cost-minimizing solution 
provided firms act as if they were price takers. A formal statement 
of the conditions under which the result holds is given by Baumol and 
Oates (1975). However, if firms do not act as if they were price 
takers, problems can arise. Implications of relaxing the price-taking 
assumption in the context of markets for transferable property rights 
have been explored by Hahn (1981).
While theory may be helpful as a guide in predicting behavior, 
it often arrives at different conclusions depending on the assumptions 
which are employed. Moreover, most theory in economics fails to 
provide a reasonable prediction of how markets will actually arrive at 
a particular equilibrium. Thus, it is useful to explore the workings 
of particular market institutions in practice.
There are two basic approaches that economists usually take in 
studying market phenomena. One is to examine historical data on the 
operation of markets which are similar to the institutions under 
consideration. In this regard, the study by Vivian and Hall (1981)
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and the recent study by the General Accounting Office (1982) provide 
useful information on attempts to move from command and control 
regulation to a market based approach in the field of air pollution. 
Unfortunately, however, one of the principal findings of both these 
studies is that, at present, such markets are not working very well. 
This leaves the task of trying to design an institution that might 
remedy some of the problems which have arisen.
The second approach that is taken to studying market phenomena 
is to examine institutions in a controlled experimental setting. In 
this approach, human subjects participate in an experiment with well 
defined rules and payoffs. Subjects are paid in cash. Smith (1976) 
provides the theoretical basis for this approach. Laboratory 
experiments attempt to capture the essence of the institution under 
study. Of necessity, they tend to simplify reality. Nonetheless, 
they can provide a useful check on the workings of different 
institutions. For if an institution does not meet its prescribed 
objectives in a simplified setting, it can hardly be expected to 
perform well in more complicated environments.
The experimental literature reveals important insights for 
designing a tradable permits scheme. The contributions fall into 
three areas: testing the theory of externalities, testing the theory 
of derived demand and identifying institutions which may be 
susceptible to manipulation.
Plott (1977) has tested the theory of externalities in the 
context of using both taxes and marketable permits. A key finding was 
that markets behave in accord with the competitive model. Applying a
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tax reduced the equilibrium price and quantity while using a 
marketable permit approach had a similar effect. Both markets 
exhibited high levels of efficiency.
The above study by Plott and another study conducted by Plott 
and Uhl (1981) provide a test of the theory of derived demand. In the 
externalities study, the transferable rights experiment is conducted 
with a primary market and a secondary market for licenses. Agents 
desiring to own units in the primary market must also cover themselves 
in the license market. In the study by Plott and Uhl, the authors 
examine how middlemen between buyers and sellers affect the 
equilibrium that is achieved. The middlemen may be viewed as 
entrepreneurs who operate in a market for inputs as well as a market 
for outputs. This theory is relevant to the case of marketable 
permits because pollution can be viewed as an input to the production 
process. The demand for any input is based on the demand for the 
product it produces, and in that sense it is a derived demand. Both 
studies found that the prices and quantities converged to the results 
predicted by the competitive model.
The preceding experiments lend support to the view that 
externalities such as pollution can be controlled using market 
mechanisms. However, the specific structure of the market needs to be 
considered. The above results were based on the use of a double-oral 
auction similar to the one used on the New York Stock Exchange. It 
will be useful to know the type of situations where the market is 
likely to perform poorly. This question is very relevant to several 
potential markets in transferable discharge permits because of
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problems with market thinness and market concentration. The key 
results on market power are summarized below.
o Experiments involving one seller and five buyers do 
not achieve the monopoly equilibrium; however, in some 
cases the competitive equilibrium is achieved (Smith 
(1981)).
o Groups that conspire often make less than competitive 
profits. Prices and quantities do not seem to 
converge to the monopoly, monopsony or the competitive 
equilibrium (Smith (1981)).
o In some markets, buyers can post bids on a take-it-or- 
leave-it basis. Smith (1981) has examined this 
institution for one seller and five buyers. He found 
that this institution can serve to limit monopoly 
power, but at the expense of achieving the competitive 
equilibrium.
o Plott (1981) examined the posted pricing institution 
and found that, in general, it can induce higher 
prices.
The above findings on market power reveal two essential 
points. The first is that there are situations —  in this case with 
one buyers and five sellers —  that the market does not reach the 
competitive equilibrium. The second point is that the choice of 
institutions may be crucial in determining the type of equilibrium 
that is reached.
3. Market Design Issues
Having reviewed the relevant theory and experimental 
literature we are now in a position to address the problem of 
designing a market in transferable property rights for the particular 
problem at hand —  the control of sulfur oxides emissions in the Los 
Angeles airshed. Recall that the basic objectives are to design a
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market that will elicit a price signal, induce efficient abatement 
decisions and satisfy considerations of equity. One approach to the 
problem might be to distribute the permits to firms in some prescribed 
manner (e.g., grandfathering) and let them trade the permits as they 
see fit. The basic problem with this approach is that there is no 
guarantee that a quick price signal will be generated because firms 
might be hesitant to trade. A second problem with this approach is 
that grandfathering of permits could result in a situation where one 
firm would be the principal purchaser of permits while most remaining 
firms would be sellers of permits.
Hahn and Noll (1982) suggest one possible approach for dealing 
with these problems. Initially, each firm would receive a provisional 
allocation of permits, presumably based on considerations of equity. 
All sources would be required to offer their entire allocation for 
sale. An auction would then be held, where firms would report their 
demand curve for permits. The sum of the demand curves would be used 
to calculate the market-clearing price for a permit, and the final 
allocation of permits to firms. Firms would make a gross payment to 
the state equal to the market price times their final allocation, and 
would receive a gross revenue from the state equal to the market price 
times their initial allocation. This auction mechanism ensures that 
the proceeds from the auction are completely redistributed to the 
participants so that the net financial effect on all firms taken 
together is zero.
The idea of returning some or all of the proceeds of an 
auction to the participants in the auction has been tried in several
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settings. For example, Plott (1977) uses a lump-sum transfer in 
testing the tax mechanism in his externalities paper. What is new, to 
our knowledge, is the proposed mechanism for redistributing revenues. 
This is why some further experimentation is in order.
Whether such an auction will work in practice remains to be 
seen. However, there is some reason to be optimistic. For example, 
Miller and Plott (1980) examined a multiple unit first price auction 
and found that the result converged to the competitive equilibrium and 
was demand revealing. However, the Miller and Plott result did not 
use provisional allocations. Further research will be necessary to 
determine if the use of provisional allocations induces firms to 
manipulate the market.
4. The Experimental Design
To test the properties of an auction that returns the proceeds 
to the buyers, a small group experiment was designed that captures its 
essential features. The instructions to the subjects are included at 
the end of this paper, and provide a complete explanation of how it 
works. In this experiment, subjects are given a list of possible 
equilibrium prices, and are asked to write down the quantity demanded 
of a fictitious commodity at each price. The fictitious commodity is 
then redeemable from the experimenters according to a schedule of 
payoffs that is provided to the subject. By varying the schedule of 
payoffs, different market structures can be created. This enables the 
experimenter to test the conditions under which the experimental 
institution produces a competitive equilibrium.
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The experimental institution differs from one that would be 
used in practice in only one major detail. In the real world, 
participants in the auction would write down their demand curves 
(e.g., price and quantity pairs of their own choosing), not only 
quantities on a schedule of predetermined alternative prices. The 
reason for this design change is that instructing subjects in how to 
express demand functions —  that is, how price and quantity vary 
together —  is considerably more difficult and time consuming than the 
procedure followed in the experiment. Although there is no reason to 
believe that this change in the procedures would affect the outcome of 
the institution, it is conceivable that it might: strange things do 
occasionally emerge in experimental markets that lead experimenters to 
revise their definitions of equivalent institutional forms.
The experiment described in the instructions has been tested 
in pilot trials, with payoffs structured to produce both monopsonistic 
and competitive outcomes. In the former case, four subjects were 
used, but one accounted for more than eighty-five percent of the 
market and was the only net buyer of permits. This did not produce 
the competitive result, but a price that was considerably below it.
The experiment was discontinued after six rounds and there was no 
price convergence.
In the second pilot, eight subjects participated in an 
experiment which lasted ten periods. Each subject received the same 
redemption value schedule. The horizontal aggregation of these 
schedules is shown in Figure 1 along with the vertical supply 
constraint. The competitive equilibrium price was 500. The only
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parameter which differed across subjects was the initial allocation. 
Four subjects received an initial allocation of 100 units and four 
received 150 units. By design, the total initial holdings of 1000 
just equaled the quantity for sale in each period.
The results of the auction are summarized in Figure 2 and 
Table 1. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium time path of prices. Price 
is equal to the competitive equilibrium in seven of the ten periods.
In periods 5 and 6, price falls below the competitive equilibrium.
This fall is largely a result of the decision of one subject to submit 
purchase commitments of zero over a range of prices.
Table 1 provides a measure of the efficiency of the auction. 
The measure used is the total earnings divided by the total possible 
earnings. The ratio is constrained to be greater than or equal to 
zero and less than or equal to one. It would equal one in the case 
that all subjects truthfully reveal their demand. Table 1 reveals 
that the efficiencies are greater than or equal to .94 in all periods.
These preliminary results are encouraging. In future 
experiments, we plan to test the robustness of the institution by 
varying demands and initial allocations, and by using the actual data 
from the estimation of the derived demand for sulfur oxides emissions 
in the Los Angeles airshed.
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TABLE 1
EFFICIENCY RESULTS
Figures rounded to nearest hundreth.
Period: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Efficiency .96a 1.00 1.00 .96 .94 .95 .99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Figure 1
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Figure 2
Equilibrium Time Path of Prices
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FOOTNOTES
1. Current issues faced in the trading of air pollution emission
reduction credits are spelled out clearly in the recent GAO report 
(1982). One approach to dealing with the problem of insufficient 
trading has been suggested by Foster and Weiss (1981).
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INSTRUCTIONS
GENERAL
This is an experiment in the operation of markets. Various research 
foundations, government agencies and corporations have provided funds for 
this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them 
carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of 
money. Your earnings in the experiment will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment.
In this experiment you will be given the opportunity to earn money in two 
ways. First, you will be given the opportunity to purchase a product that 
is redeemable in cash at the end of the experiment. Second, you will be 
given an initial holding of the same product which also will be redeemed in 
cash. The market will be repeated several times in a sequence of trading 
periods.
Your earnings will be calculated on the basis of your personal information 
sheets. The sheets may differ among the participants in the experiment. 
Your sheet contains your own personal, private information. You must not 
reveal this informat ion to anyone .
YOUR PROFITS
During each trading period you can earn profits from your participation. 
These profits will be the sum of the following: your earnings from 
purchases and your income from selling your initial holdings. That is:
Profits = Earnings from Purchases + Sales of Initial Holdings
Each of the sources of profits is described below.
Earnings from Purchases
During each trading period you may make commitments to buy an amount of the 
product at each of several possible final prices. How you make these 
purchasing commitments is described below. The earnings from each purchase 
(which are yours to keep) are the difference between the redemption value 
and the purchase price of the purchased unit. In each period all of the 
units that you purchase will have the same price, but they may have 
different redemption values. For each unit that you purchase, your net 
earnings will be calculated as:
Earnings = Redemption Value - Purchase Price.
Your total earnings for a trading period will be the sum of the net earnings 
for all units that you purchase.
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Table 1 shows the redemption value of your units for each period. To see 
how Table 1 is used, consider the illustrative case shown on the board. The 
first unit purchased can be redeemed for $3; the second unit and the third 
unit can be redeemed for $2 each; and the fourth unit for $1.
Suppose that you buy two units at a price of $1.50. Your earnings are:
Earnings from 1st unit = 3.00 - 1.50 = $1.50 
Earnings from 2nd unit = 2.00 - 1.50 = $ .50
Total earnings = $1.50 + $ .50 = $2.00
Sales of Initial Holdings
You will also receive an initial holding of the product that is being sold 
in the market. At the end of each trading period, your initial holding will 
be redeemed for cash. Each unit of the initial holding will be redeemed at 
the final market price of the product. For example, if your initial holding 
were three units and the final market price for the product were $1.50, your 
sales of initial holdings at the end of the period would be 3 x 1.50 =
$4.50. Your initial holdings for each trading period are shown in Row (1) 
of Table 2.
Recording Your Profits
Table 2 is for recording your profits and your transactions in the market. 
When the final price and your purchase commitment are determined, write them 
on Row (2) and Row (3) of Table 2.
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. Table 3 will 
assist you in determining your earnings from purchases for various 
combinations of market price and quantity purchased. At the end of the 
period record your earnings from purchases on Row (4) of Table 1.
To compute your sales of initial holdings, multiply your initial holding 
shown in Row (1) by the price of a unit in Row (2). This figure is entered 
on Row (5). Profits are computed by adding Row (4) and Row (5). This 
figure is then entered on Row (6).
MARKET OPERATIONS
The market in which you will participate will be operated as follows. At 
the beginning of the trading period, the total amount of the product that is 
being offered for sale will be announced. The amount sold will exactly 
equal the total initial holdings of all of the participants in the market. 
Each participant, as described below, will submit commitments to purchase 
amounts of the product at each of several possible final prices. On the 
basis of these commitments, a final price will be calculated. This will be 
the lowest possible price at which the purchase commitments of all the 
participants exactly equal the amount being offered for sale. Each 
participant will then receive a quantity of the product equal to the amount 
he or she committed to buy at that price. The profits of all the 
participants will then be calculated.
Table 4 of your information sheet is your Commitment Sheet. On it you will 
record your purchase commitments. The first column of this form contains a 
list of several possible final prices for the product. Each succeeding 
column corresponds to your purchase commitment for a trading period. For 
example, in the first period, you would make your purchase commitments in 
the column marked period 1. You would do this by writing down the amount of 
the product that you wish to buy at each possible price shown in the first 
column. When you have completed the column, you will have a complete record 
of your purchase commitments for the trading period. At each price, you may 
commit to purchase any quantity of the product that you wish as long as the 
commitment does not cause you to have profits that are less than zero. That 
is, if you wish to pay more for the product than its redemption value, you 
must be able to pay for these losses from the sales of your initial holdings 
of the product. Table 5 shows your total profits for various combinations 
of market price and quantity purchased. Cells in the table that are left 
blank correspond to cases where total profit is negative. Table 5 will 
allow you to check to make sure your purchase commitments do not result in a 
situation where your profits could be less than zero.
When you have finished calculating your purchase commitments, you will then 
submit them on the small cards provided with your information sheet. Your 
buyer number and trading period number will be shown at the top of each 
card. For each price shown on your Commitment Sheet, you will fill out a 
separate card showing your purchase commitment at that price. Make sure 
that the purchase commitment that you write on the card is the same as the 
commitment that you have recorded next to the same price on your Commitment 
Sheet.
When all of the commitment cards have been collected, the results of the 
market will be calculated. The final market price will be one of those 
listed on the Commitment Sheet. It will be the lowest possible price at 
which the sum of the purchase commitments from all the participants exactly 
equals the total amount of the product that can be sold. You will be told 
the final market price and the quantity that you have purchased according to 
your commitment card for that price. You will then calculate your profits 
for that round as described above, and enter the results on Table 2.
It is possible that your final quantity purchased will be slightly less than 
your purchase commitment. This will occur if total purchase commitments at 
the final price exceed the total amount for sale, but at the next higher 
price total purchase commitments are less than the total amount to be sold. 
Should this situation arise, your final quantity purchased will be your 
commitment at the next higher price plus a proportional share of the amount 
of the product that remains after everyone is given the amount of their 
commitment at the next higher price.
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At the end of the last trading period you will present your personal record 
forms to the experimenter. Your personal profit calculations will be 
verified, and you will be paid in cash the profits that you have earned.
You are not to reveal your bids or profits to any other buyer, nor are you 
to talk to other buyers during the experiment. Are there any questions?
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Table 1
Redemption V a lu es, Buyer No. ______
Redemption Values fo r  ALL Trad ing Periods
U n its Redemption Value ( in  $2.4 x 10 ^ )/u n it
1-20
21-50
51-70
71-100
101-120
121-150
151-170
171-200
201-220
221-250
1000/unit
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
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Table 1
Redemption Values, Buyer No. ______
Redemption Values for ALL Trading Periods
Units Redemption Value (in $1.8 x 10 "U/unit
1-20
21-50
51-70
71-100
101-120
121-150
151-170
171-200
201-220
221-250
1000/unit
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
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TABLE 2
Market Record, Buyer No. 1
TRADING PERIOD 
NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 INITIALHOLDINGS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2 FINALPRICE
3 QUANTITYPURCHASED
4 EARNINGS FROM PURCHASES
5 SALES OFINITIAL HOLDINGS
6 PROFITS
($2.4xl0~5)
Name________________________________________________ Social Security No.____________________
Address ______________________________________________________________ ______________
Total Payment_____________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 2
Market Record, Buyer No. ^
TRADING PERIOD 
NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 INITIALHOLDINGS
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
2 FINALPRICE
3 QUANTITYPURCHASED
4 EARNINGS FROM PURCHASES
5 SALES OFINITIAL HOLDINGS
6 PROFITS
($1.8xlCf5)
Name________________________________________________ Social Security No.____________________
Address____________________________________________________________________________________
Total Payment______________________________________________________________________________
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Earnings from Purchases for 
Selected Prices and Quantities, Buyer No.
TABLE 3
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Commitment Sheet* Buyer No. _____
TABLE 4
""'''TRADING PERIOD 
" \ NUMBER
PRICES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
You may only bid for units at the prices stated on the Commitment Sheet.
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Total Profits* for
Selected Prices and Quantities, Buyer No.
TABLE 5
Total Profits = Earnings from Purchases + Sales of Initial Holdings. Cells that are 
left blank correspond to profits that are less than zero.
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T o t a l  P r o f i t s *  f o r
S e le c te d  P r i c e s  and Q u a n t i t i e s ,  B uyer No.
TABLE 5
* T o t a l  P r o f i t s  = E a r n in g s  from  Purchases +  S a le s  o f  I n i t i a l  H o l d i n g s .  C e l l s  t h a t  are  
l e f t  b la n k  c o rre sp o n d  to  p r o f i t s  t h a t  a re  l e s s  th a n  z e r o .
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APPENDIX E
THE SULFUR OXIDES EMISSIONS POTENTIAL OF THE 
SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN IN THE EARLY 1980s
Glen R. Cass
El.1 Introduction
This appendix provides an estimate of the potential for sulfur 
oxides emissions from sources located in the central portion of the 
South Coast Air Basin in the early 1980s. That inventory will serve 
as the base case against which emission control strategies for improving 
sulfate air quality in that airshed will be tested.
The approach taken here is not to try to predict the actual SOX
emission rate for a particular future year. The actual level of sulfur 
oxides emissions in the Los Angeles area in any given year is a strong 
function of the level of natural gas supply. When natural gas is plenti­
ful, most stationary combustion sources burn gas rather than sulfur­
bearing fuel oil, and SO emissions are relatively low. Conversely, in
X
years with a poor natural gas supply, several hundred additional tons
per day of SO2 are emitted from residual and distillate oil combustion.
Natural gas supplies have been observed to fluctuate widely in response
to Federal regulations that are beyond the control of state and local
pollution abatement authorities. Hence the actual level of SO emissionsx
in any particular year is not readily forecast, and any abatement plan 
that is inflexible to the point of requiring a firm emissions forecast 
is liable to fail dramatically.
Instead, the approach taken here is to develop a spatially and 
temporally resolved inventory of the potential for sulfur oxides emissions
as they would occur under conditions of low natural gas supply. This
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inventory forms a realistic estimate of the upper limit on SO^ emissions 
in Los Angeles in the early 1980s. From this base case, emissions rates 
that would prevail in the presence of any arbitrary level of natural gas 
supply can be quickly constructed by attenuating the SO emissions from 
fuel burning sources in proportion to the additional gas supply contemplated.
Computations in this appendix will proceed under the assumption 
that fuel combustion trends and SO^ emissions control practices appar­
ent in 1977 were continued unaltered into the future. As should be 
surmised from the above discussion, we do not expect that this, in 
fact, will occur. In particular, additional sulfur oxides emissions 
control measures are under active consideration at the present time 
(South Coast Air Quality Management District, 1978a). Some of these 
control measures undoubtedly will be adopted while others will be 
modified as the public hearing and review processes proceed. Instead 
of trying to anticipate the eventual outcome of that debate, we will 
attempt to adopt a format for emissions projection which will permit 
an easy cross-reference between this study and other concurrent efforts.
A basic starting point will be taken which is similar to that 
assumed by the South Coast Air Quality Management District (1978a) 
emissions forecast. New emission control measures agreed upon or 
adopted prior to January 1978 will be assumed to be implemented in 
future years. Emissions from all other sources not affected by recent 
changes in regulations will be projected into the early 1980s assuming 
that trends apparent in 1977 remain unchanged into the near future.
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El.2 Methodology
Appendix A2 of the study by Cass (1978) presented a spatially and 
temporally resolved S0X emissions inventory for the central portion of 
the South Coast Air Basin during each month of the years 1972, 1973, and 
1974. That emissions inventory was projected into early 1980s, while 
maintaining nearly the same organization of sources into groups of like 
equipment. Major point sources and dispersed area-wide sources of 
sulfur oxides were assigned to appropriate locations within the 50-by- 
50 mile square grid shown in Figure El.l. Major equipment items 
located beyond that grid system were itemized separately, while small 
off-grid area sources were neglected as before.
A base case level of natural gas supply to Southern California 
was selected, based on an analysis of utility system forecasts and 
other stated assumptions. Then electricity generation plans were 
obtained on a unit-by-unit basis from major electric utilities in the 
air basin. Fuel use needed to generate those quantities of electrcity 
were computed. From that fuel use estimate, electric utility SO
X
emissions estimates were derived.
A forecast of total thermal energy consumption by refinery and 
industrial fuel burners next was made on a spatially resolved basis 
for the early 1980s. Then the natural gas supply forecast was used 
to estimate the level of fuel oil and refinery gas consumption required 
to meet that industrial energy demand under conditions of low natural 
gas supply, SO emissions were then computed from fuel use as before.
X
Figure El.l
The Central Portion of the South Coast Air Basin 
Showing the Grid System Used
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Industrial process SO emissions estimates for the early 1980sx
were obtained by personal interview with South Coast Air Quality Man­
agement District engineers. An equipment list compiled from the histor­
ical emissions inventory of Appendix A2 of the study by Cass (1978) was 
used as a check list for this interview procedure. Each item of equip­
ment emitting over 25 tons of S0V annually was reviewed to determine if 
it was still in operation, if its emissions were expected to be impact­
ed by regulations or consent agreements adopted prior to January 1978, 
or if an improved estimate of future emissions could be made.
Finally, mobile source emissions data were updated. A freeway 
and surface street traffic growth survey was used to forecast 1980 
traffic volumes on a spatially resolved basis. Then highway traffic 
was subdivided into catalyst-equipped and non catalyst-equipped gasoline- 
fueled vehicles, plus diesel trucks and buses. Fuel combustion esti­
mates for railroads, ships, and aircraft were projected to the early 
1980's based upon conversations with transportation industry personnel.
Thirty-six consecutive monthly emissions estimates were made for 
each source type of interest for each month of three test years. These 
three years of projected emissions data will later be matched with three 
different years of meteorological data so that a range of air quality 
possibilities can be examined using the air quality simulation model of 
Chapters 3 and 5 of the study by Cass (1978). Meteorological data taken 
from the years 1972 through 1974 form an attractive set of test condi­
tions. Those years contain two instances of typical weather conditions
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leading to high summer sulfates and low winter sulfates (as in 1973 
and 1974) , plus one counter example yielding high winter sulfates with 
low summer sulfates (as in 1972). In order to capture the interplay 
between weather conditions and fuel use, the seasonal variation in 
energy consumption observed in those years was factored into the 
following emissions projections when appropriate.
El.3 The Anticipated Level of Natural Gas Supply
The principal source of sulfur oxides emissions in the United
States is from the combustion of sulfur bearing fossil fuels (U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 1974). Historically, the cornerstone
of the South Coast Air Basin sulfur oxides emission control strategy
has rested on desulfurization of refinery gas, plus provision of a
high level of natural gas supply to industry and electric utilities.
Low sulfur oil was to be used only in the event that cleaner burning
gaseous fuels became unavailable. This policy of promoting gaseous
fuel use was so successful that in 1970, only about 21% of Los Angeles
County SO emissions were derived from stationary source fuel com- x
bustion (Southern California Air Pollution Control District, 1976).
Since about the year 1970, natural gas deliveries to Southern 
California have steadily declined under the combined effects of 
interstate natural gas price regulations imposed by the Federal 
government, plus regulation-aggrevated declines in both gas 
exploration and new gas reserve accumulation. While the amount 
of energy needed to run the economy of the South Coast Air Basin
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might be projected from data given in the energy and sulfur balance por­
tion of the study by Cass (1978; Appendix A3), emissions of sulfur oxides 
cannot be forecast without knowing the combination of gas and oil that 
will be available to meet that energy requirement. In order to address 
that issue with reasonable accuracy, reliable information must exist on 
whether the natural gas supply will continue to deteriorate or will 
improve.
Forecasts of future natural gas deliveries to southern California 
customers are prepared annually by the utility systems serving California 
(for example, see the 1977 California Gas Report). The Pacific Lighting 
Companies act as the largest purchasing agent for natural gas sold in 
southern California, and as such should be in the best position to know 
their distribution capabilities, customers' requests for service, and the 
supply of gas available to them from producer's around the world 
(including LNG). If they cannot forecast their own level of natural gas 
purchase more than a year or so in advance, then it would be unwise for 
us to place much faith in our ability to second guess their behavior 
more than a few years hence under the assumption that trends apparent 
in 1977 continued into the future.^
Figure El.2 provides a comparison of forecast natural gas deliver-
2ies to southern California prepared by California utilities at three
"*"This problem is distinct from our ability to assess the opportunities 
for natural gas supply. While we might be able to make rather strong 
statements about what gas supplies could be made available in future 
years, we might not be able to forecast what will happen if events are 
left to unfold along their present course.
Not the South Coast Air Basin, but rather all of California south of 
the Pacific Gas and Electric service area.
2
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA NATURAL GAS SUPPLY FORECASTS
COMPARISON OF UTILITY INDUSTRY NATURAL GAS 
DELIVERY FORECASTS MADE DURING THE I970's
SOURCE: CALIFORNIA GAS REPORT 1970, 1974, and 1977 Editions
Figure El.2
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different times during the 1970s (California Gas Report, 1970, 1974, 
and 1977 editions). The 1970 forecast contained a prediction for 
steady growth in natural gas deliveries, reaching a level of greater 
than 1.6 trillion cubic feet per year in 1979. Instead, actual gas 
deliveries began an almost immediate decline. The 1974 forecast 
tended to show a short-term decline followed by a subsequent recovery 
of gas supply to 1974 levels. By 1977, however, the forecast for a 
quick recovery was abandoned in favor of continued decline in gas 
deliveries until at least 1980. From 1980 forward, two forecasts 
diverge. The "new supply" case which anticipates completion of 
several international supply projects shows recovery to 1974 levels by 
1985, while the "no new supply" case projects a continued decline into 
the future. About the only trend common to more than one of these 
forecasts is that a lower bound to gas supply is provided by the exten­
sion of the 1970 through 1976 actual delivery line through to the 1977 
"no new supply" case. A crosssection taken through all forecasts at 
the year 1979 indicates a divergence between forecasts made at seven-
year intervals which is larger than the amount of gas now expected
3actually to be delivered in 1979. The inference must be that any seven- 
year forecast prepared in this manner should be treated as a possibility
3That is, a 1970 forecast of greater than 1.6 trillion cubic feet 
delivered in 1979, a 1974 forecast for about 1.0 trillion cubic feet 
in 1979, and a 1977 forecast for less than 0.7 trillion cubic feet 
in 1979.
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to be encouraged or discouraged as one sees fit, but should not be 
relied upon as a given. On the other hand, the utility forecaster's 
track record over a two-to-three year time period following the date 
of a particular forecast is not too bad.
With the above discussion in mind, natural gas supply conditions 
in Southern California during the early 1980s will be represented not 
by a forecast that one expects will actually happen but rather by a 
case which falls within the range of the forecasts shown in Figure El.2, 
and which has public policy implications so important that that 
case should be examined closely. The level of gas service chosen 
for study corresponds to a gas delivery rate of 0.655 Tcf per year to 
Southern California. At that level of service in 1980, all high priority 
gas customers with no capability to use alternate fuels (California 
Public Utilities Commission priority groups 1 and 2A, plus underground 
injection) would receive service equal to 100% of their natural gas 
requirements. All other industries and electric utilities with alter­
nate fuel capability would have their service almost completely cur­
tailed (1977 California Gas Report, Table lb-sc).
That level of natural gas service is chosen as the base case for 
our study for several important reasons. First, it corresponds to 
utility estimates for natural gas supply in the early 1980s at a 
time when the "new supply" and "no new supply" cases are nearly 
identical. Secondly, it represents an approximate average between 
the "new supply" and "no new supply" forecasts during the remainder of
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the first half of the 1980s. Most importantly, it represents the 
maximum amount of natural gas curtailment possible before small 
customers and thus the local economy would become seriously damaged 
financially. As such, it represents the point at which the California 
Public Utilities Commission would probably intervene to protect small 
customers by transferring gas from Northern to Southern California.
In that case, the supply forecast is reinforced on its lower 
bound.
An air pollution control strategy predicated on this low level of 
natural gas supply in the early 1980s need not be inconsistent with 
actions that would be taken if the more optimistic "new supply" fore­
cast in Figure El.2 were to come to pass. Instead, the opportunity 
for new gas supplies should be viewed as a control strategy alterna­
tive. Determination of the air quality consequences in the absence 
of new gas supplies may well improve the chances that new supply 
projects will be completed.
El.4 Stationary Source Fuel Combustion Estimates for Individual 
Sources Under Conditions of Low Natural Gas Supply *•
The source classes used to represent stationary source fuel 
combustion are:
• Electric Utility Steam Generators (residual oil fired)
• Electric Utility Combustion Turbines and Combined Cycle 
Generators (distillate oil fired)
• Petroleum Refineries
• Other Low Priority Natural Gas Customers (Priorities 
2B, 3, and 4)
• High Priority Natural Gas Customers (Priorities 1 and 2A).
E-110
El.4.1 Electric Utility Residual Fuel Oil Combustion
Eighteen separately inventoried electric generating stations 
within the South Coast Air Basin are listed in Table El.l. Thirteen 
of these plant sites are located within the 50-by-50 mile square grid, 
while the remainder are off-grid sources whose emissions still will be 
entered into the air quality modeling calculations.
The Southern California Edison Company and the Los Angeles Depart­
ment of Water and Power were contacted to determine the electrical 
generation load expected to be placed on South Coast Air Basin conven­
tional steam plants in the year 1980. Utility personnel responded 
by furnishing expected capacity factors for each generating unit in 
the basin. Capacity factors represent the average percentage utiliza­
tion of each generating unit's net electrical generation capability 
in a given year. In Tables El.2 and El.3, capacity factor forecasts 
are presented, and expected electrical generation at each location is 
computed from a knowledge of the size of each generating unit.
Information on the thermal efficiency of a given generating unit 
is stated in terms of its "heat rate." A plant's heat rate averaged 
over a year could be computed from the total number of BTU's of fuel 
consumed divided by net kwh of electricity produced. Table El.4 pro­
vides heat rate data for South Coast Air Basin generating stations 
based upon 1976 actual performance. In general, the newest and largest 
generating stations show the lowest heat rates and thus the highest
thermal efficiency,
TABLE El.l
South Coast Air Basin Electric Generating Stations
Grid Square 
Location
East/West North/South Identification County
I J
O N - G R I D  . . .............. 13
the
E l e c t r i c  G e n e r a t i n g  S t a t i o n s  w i t h i n  
: 5 0  b y  5 0  m i l e  g r i d
7 12 S C E <'b ') El S e g u n d o  P o w e r  P l a n t L o s A n g e l e s
8 10 S C E R e d o n d o  P o w e r  P l a n t L o s A n g e l e s
12 7 S C E L o n g  B e a c h  P o w e r  P l a n t L o s A n g e l e s
16 7 S C E A l a m i t o s  P o w e r  P l a n t L o s A n g e l e s
19 3 S C E H u n t i n g t o n  B e a c h  P o w e r  P l a n t O r a n g e
7 13 ■ L A D W P ^ S c a t t e r g o o d  P o w e r  P l a n t ,  El S e g u n d o L o s  A n g e l e s
8 24 L A D W P V a l l e y  P o w e r  P l a n t ,  S u n  V a l l e y L o s A n g e l e s
11 7 L A D W P H a r b o r  P o w e r  P l a n t ,  W i l m i n g t o n L o s A n g e l e s
16 7 L A D W P H a y n e s  P o w e r  P l a n t ,  L o s  A l a m i t o s L o s A n g e l e s
10 22 C i t y  o f B u r b a n k  P o w e r  P l a n t s L o s A n g e l e s
11 21 C i t y  o f G l e n d a l e  P o w e r  P l a n t L o s A n g e l e s
15 2 0 C i t y  of P a s a d e n a  - G l e n a r m L o s A n g e l e s
15 2 0 C i t y  o f P a s a d e n a  - B r o a d w a y L o s A n g e l e s
O F F  G R I D  . ,
b e y o n d  t h e  5 0  b y  5 0  m i l e  g r i d
- 1 5 2 0 S C E O r m o n d  B e a c h V e n t u r a
-17 23 SCE M a n d a l a y V e n t u r a
32 19 S C E E t i w a n d a S a n B e r n a r d i n o
38 16 S C E H i g h g r o v e S a n B e r n a r d i n o
41 18 S C E S a n  B e r n a r d i n o S a n B e r n a r d i n o
E-lll
E-112
TABLE El.2
Mid-1977 Projection of 1980 Electrical Generation by 
Southern California Edison Company Conventional Oil- 
Fired Steam Plants in the South Costa Air Basin
Plant Unit Capacity Capacity Estimated Electrical
(Megawatts) Factor Production
(a) (h) (10 kwh/365 day year)
Alamitos 1 175 24.3 372.75
2 175 24.3 372.75
3 320 64.3 1,807.40
4 320 64.3 1,807.40
5 480 71.6 3,018.89
6 480 71.6 3,018.89
El Segundo 1 175 24.3 372.75
2 175 24.3 372.75
3 335 64.3 1,892.12
4 335 64.3 1,892.12
Etiwanda 1 132 8.5 98.56
2 132 8.5 98.56
3 320 64.3 1,807.40
4 320 64.3 1,807.40
Highgrove 1 32.5 8.5 24.27
2 32.5 8.5 24.27
3 44.5 8.5 33.23
4 44.5 8.5 33.23
HuntingtonBeach 1 215 58.6 1,106.70
2 215 58.6 1,106.70
3 215 58.6 1,106.70
4 225 58.6 1,158.17
Long Beach (a) 100 8.5 74.5
Mandalay 1 215 58.6 1,106.70
2 215 58.6 1,106.70
Ormond Beach 1 750 69.2 4,558.90
2 750 69.2 4,558.90
Redondo Beach 1 74 8.5 55.25
2 74 8.5 55.25
3 70 8.5 55.25
4 74 8.5 55.25
5 175 24.3 372.75
6 175 24.3 372.75
7 480 71.6 3,018.89
8 480 71.6 3,018.89
San Bernardino 1 63 8.5 47.04
2 63 8.5 47.04
Notes:
(a) Cluster of old units
(b) Reference: Southern California Edison Company (1976)
(c) Reference: Southern California Edison Company (1977)
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TABLE El. 3
Mid-1977 Projection of 1980-81 Electrical Generation by 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power Conventional 
Steam Plants in the South Coast Air Basin
Estimated Electricity
Plant Unit
Capacity
(Megawatts)
Capacity
Factor
, Production 
(10 kwh/365 day year)
Haynes 1 222 50.22 977.6
2 232 67.37 1,370.3
3 220 66.41 1,279.8
4 227 70.43 1,398.5
5 344 69.91 2,109.6
6 344 77.90 2,350.5
Scattergood 1 179 31.01 485.9
2 179 33.70 528.0
3 309 76.14 2,060.3
Harbor 1 78.5 0 0
2 78.5 0 0
3 92 0.92 7.4
4 92 2.14 17.3
5 94 1.61 13.3
Valley 1 101 4.73 41.9
2 101 3.27 28.9
3 171 9.41 141.0
4 160 29.43 412.5
Total 3,224 46.84 13,222.7
Reference: Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (1977).
TABLE E l .  4
1976 Average Heat Rates for Southern California Edison and 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power Conventional Steam 
Generating Stations in the South Coast Air Basin
1976
Actual, , 
Heat Rate 3 
(BTU /kwh)
1976
Oil Burned 
(10° BTU/Yr)
1976
Natural Gas 
(10° BTU/Yr)
Heat Rate Adjusted,, . 
to All Oil Operation 
(BTU/kwh)
Southern California Edison 
Alamitos 9,868 68,197,613 8,850,727 9,830
El Segundo 10,022 30,204,169 10,354,953 9,936
Ediwanda 10,101 30,862,690 9,529,807 10,020
Highgrove 13,997 383,999 287 ,543 13,794
Huntington Beach 9,974 21,832,079 10,374,217 9,865
Mandalay 9,815 13,351,131 4,322,416 9,734
Ormond Beach 9,754 56,764,209 1,245,721 9,747
Redondo Beach 10,235 48,373,537 9,681,465 10,177
San Bernardino 10,268 3,419,742 4,373,825 10,073
Los Angeles Dept, of Water 
Haynes
& Power
9,564 62,211,510 4,900,723 9,540
Scattergood 10,129 6,632,475 10,204,564 9,919
Harbor 12,801 393,242 922,494 12,668
Valley 11,299 3,800,348 4,271,610 11,116
Notes: (a) Heat rate: total BTU's of fuel heating value consumed
net kwh of electricity produced
(b) Electrical generation using oil is estimated to be 3.5% more thermally efficient than using natural gas.
References: Southern California Edison (1976)
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (1976).
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Our chosen level of natural gas supply anticipates the case in 
which electric utilities receive negligible amounts of natural gas for 
boiler fuel. Therefore, the electrical generation forecasts of 
Tables El.2 and El.3 were converted into equivalent barrels of fuel 
oil burned annually using the heat rate data for all oil operation from 
Table El.4, plus a knowledge of the energy content of utility fuel oil.
The results of these fuel oil combustion calculations are shown 
in Tables El.5 and El.6. Residual fuel oil consumption expected by the 
smaller municipal utilities of the Cities of Glendale, Burbank, and 
Pasadena are given in Table El.7. A total of nearly 92 million 
barrels of residual fuel oil combustion is expected annually under 
these conditions. That figure compares closely with the South Coast 
Air Quality Management District's 1980 forecast of 93.6 million barrels 
of residual oil to be burned by electric utilities in Los Angeles,
San Bernardino, Orange, and Ventura Counties (South Coast Air Quality 
Management District, 1978a).
Annual fuel burning estimates at each utility plant site were 
converted to average daily fuel use for each month of a three-year 
test period based upon the seasonal variation in total power plant fuel 
use observed during each of the years 1972 through 1974. That seasonal 
variation was computed from data given in Table A2.3 of Appendix A2 to 
the study by Cass (1978).
During the year 1973, utility residual fuel oil sulfur content was 
limited to 0.5% sulfur by weight, and utilities were observed to con­
sume fuel oil with an average sulfur content of 0.44% sulfur by weight.
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TABLE El.5
Early 1980's Projected Residual Fuel Oil Use 
by Southern California Edison Conventional Steam 
Generating Stations in the South Coast Air Basin
Notes: (a) Heat rate for the older Long Beach conventional
generating units assumed to be 12,668 BTU/kwh 
based upon data from small, old units at the LADWP 
Harbor Plant.
(b) SCE residual fuel oil energy content given as 
6,121,080 BTU/bbl.
Plant Unit Residual Fuel 
Oil Consumption. 
(Barrels/Year)
Alamitos 1 598,608
2 598,608
3 2,902,550
4 2,902,550
5 4,848,114
6 4,848,114
El Segundo 1 605,064
2 605,064
3 3,071,371
4 3,071,371
Etiwanda 1 161,605
2 161,605
3 2,963,521
4 2,963,521
Highgrove 1 54,693
2 54,693
3 74,885
4 74,885
Huntington Beach 1 1,783,606
2 1,783,606
3 1,783,606
4 1,866,557
Long Beach 154,183(a)
Mandalay 1 1,759,921
2 1,759,921
Ormond Beach 1 7,259,437
2 7,259,437
Redondo Beach 1 91,859
2 91,859
3 91,859
4 91,859
5 619,740
6 619,740
7 5,019,252
8 5,019,252
San Bernardino 1 77,410
2 77,410
Total 67,771,336
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TABLE El.6
Early 1980's Projected Residual Fuel Oil Use 
by Los Angeles Department of Water and Power Conventional 
Steam Generating Stations in the South Coast Air Basin
Plant Unit Residual Oil 
Consumption 
(Barrels/year)
Haynes 1 1,524,192
2 2,136,458
3 1,995,358
4 2,180,425
5 3,289,113
6 3,664,548
Scattergood 1 787,671
2 855,918
3 3,339,863
Harbor 1 0
2 0
3 15,320
4 35,817
5 27,535
Valley 1 76,119
2 52,502
3 256,152
4 749,381
Total 20,986,372
Notes: (a) LADWP Residual Fuel Oil energy content 
given as 6,118,849 BTU/bbl
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TABLE El.7
Early 1980's Projected Residual Fuel Oil Use by 
Glendale, Burbank, and Pasadena Conventional
Steam Generating Stations
Plant Site Residual Fuel Oil 
Consumption 
(barrels/year)
Pasadena 1,327,870
Glendale 817,600
Burbank 1,009,225
Total 3,154,695
Reference: McCrackin (1976)
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In late 1977, the South Coast Air Quality Management District adopted 
Rule 431.2 which reduced the allowable sulfur content of utility fuel 
to 0.25% sulfur by weight. In order to maintain a safe margin for 
compliance with that regulation, we expect that fuel oil actually 
burned in the early 1980's would average 0.22% sulfur by weight.
Sulfur oxides emissions were estimated on a spatially resolved 
basis using the plant-by-plant fuel burning estimates of Tables El.5 
through El.7, plus the following fuel oil properties:
Residual fuel oil gravity ................. 24° API
Residual fuel oil sulfur content ..........0.22% by weight
Emission factor (lbs SOx/barrel) ..........6.384 times % sulfur
Projected sulfur oxides emissions from residual fuel oil use by elec­
tric utilities located within the 50-by-50 mile square are shown in 
Figures El.2 and El.3 for a typical summer month and typical winter 
month.
El.4.2 Electric Utility Distillate Fuel Oil Combustion
Light distillate fuel oils are used to power peaking turbines 
and combined cycle generators. Table El.8 shows capacity utilization 
and electric generation forecasts for Southern California Edison 
Company (SCE) distillate-fired generating equipment. While SCE's 
peaking turbine capacity is nearly as large as its Long Beach combined 
cycle plant, utilization of the peaking turbines is so intermittent that 
they are minor emission sources compared to the combined cycle facilities.
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Figure E1 .2
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Figure E1.3
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TABLE El. 8
Mid-1977 Projection of 1980 Electrical Generation 
by Southern California Edison Company Combined Cycle and 
Peaking Turbine Generators in the South Coast Air Basin
Plant and Type Capacity
(Megawatts)
Combined Cycle
Long Beach 581
Combustion Turbine
Alamitos 121
Etiwanda 121
Huntington Beach 121
Mandalay 121
Capacity
Factor
Electricity Production 
(10^ kwh/365 day year)
54.12 2,754.5
1.11 11.77
1.11 11.77
1.11 11.77
1.11 11.77
Notes: (a) Fuel use at Ellwood neglected
(b) Fuel use at Garden State included with industrial 
fuel inventory.
Reference: Capacity Factors from Southern California Edison (1977).
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The electricity generation forecasts of Table El,8 were converted 
into annual fuel burning estimates using heat rate data for those 
plants provided by the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
(Zwiacher, 1978). Estimated distillate fuel oil use by Edison Company 
facilities is given in Table El.9.
Distillate fuel oil consumption estimates for the municipal 
utilities of the Cities of Glendale, Burbank, and Pasadena are diffi­
cult to confirm. The fuel use projections for these utilities given in 
Table El.9 are based upon data furnished to the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District in 1976 (McCrackin, 1976) and may well be obsolete 
by now. However, fuel use at the Long Beach Combined Cycle Plant is 
seen to account for 82% of the estimated combustion of distillate oil 
by utilities. While fuel use estimates for the municipal utilities of 
Glendale, Burbank, and Pasadena are uncertain, the overall air quality 
impact of uncertainties in those emissions estimates is minor.
During 1977, the sulfur content of utility distillate fuel oil 
was subject to a legal limit of 0.5% sulfur by weight. However, most 
distillate turbine fuels have properties similar to kerosene-type jet 
fuel which has traditionally shown a sulfur content closer to 0.05% sul­
fur by weight (see Table A3.10 of Cass,1978). Since the Long Beach 
Combined Cycle Plant clearly dominates utility distillate oil use, 
characterization of utility distillate fuel oils will be based in large 
part on observed behavior at the Long Beach generating station. Accord­
ing to Southern California Edison Company personnel (Bagwell, 1978), 
fuel oil specifications at the Long Beach Combined Cycle Plant call for
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TABLE El.9
Early 1980's Projected Distillate Fuel Oil Use 
by South Coast Air Basin Combined Cycle and 
Peaking Turbine Generators
Plant and Type Electricity 
Production 
(10 kwh/yr)
_____L$L)____
Heat
Rate
(BTU/kwh) 
__ Led___
Distillate 
Fuel Oil
Consumption
(bbl/yr)
Southern California Edison
Combined Cycle
Long Beach 2,754.5 9,144 4,442,178
Combustion Turbine
Alamitos 11.7 14,100 29,269
Etiwanda 11.7 14,100 29,269
Huntington Beach 11.7 14,100 29,269
Mandalay 11.7 14,100 29,269
Glendale 817,600
Burbank 4,380
Pasadena 47,815
(a)
(a)
(a)
(a)
(a)
(b) 
(b) 
(b)
Total 5,429,049
Notes: (a) Computed from generating load forecast assuming that
distillate oil used is similar to kerosine-type jet 
fuel, at 5,670 x 103 BTU/bbl.
(b) From McCrackin (1976).
(c) Data on LADWP distillate oil use unavailable
(d) From Table El.8
(e) From Zwiacher (1978).
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TABLE El.10
Sulfur Content of Fuel Oil at the 
Long Beach Combined Cycle Plant
Month Sulfur Content
(weight percent)
1977 1978
January — 0.04
February 0.06 0.04
March 0.06 0.04
April 0.06 0.04
May 0.06 0.04
June 0.06 0.04
July 0.04
August 0.03
September 0.03
October 0.03
November 0.04
December 0.04
Reference: Bagwell (1978)
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a maximum limit of 0.08% sulfur in distillate fuel oil. That low 
level of fuel sulfur is needed to assure compliance with the parti­
culate emissions limitation placed on that facility. Actual fuel 
sulfur content never reaches that limit as shown by the time series 
data of Table El.10. The average sulfur content of distillate fuel 
at Long Beach during 1977 was 0.046 percent, while fuel sulfur content 
during 1977 was 0.046 percent, while fuel sulfur content during the 
first half of 1978 averaged 0.04% sulfur. Peaking turbines at other 
locations in early 1977 burned distillate fuels approximating 0.13% 
sulfur by weight (Bagwell, 1978), while data for those facilities 
during 1973 averaged about 0.05% sulfur by weight.
Based upon the history of jet turbine fuel sulfur content of 
Table A3.10 of Cass (1978), plus recently observed fuel properties at 
the Long Beach Generating Station, a weighted average of utility dis­
tillate fuel oil sulfur contents is expected to fall at about 0.05% 
sulfur by weight. It is understood, however, that the actual sulfur 
content of fuel burned at any site in a particular month could deviate 
from that expected value by several fold without encountering a legally 
binding limit on fuel sulfur content.
Sulfur oxides emissions from utility distillate fuel oil combus­
tion were estimated on a spatially resolved basis using the plant- 
specific fuel burning estimates of Table El.9, plus the following
fuel oil properties:
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Distillate turbine fuel sulfur content ....  0.05%
Distillate turbine fuel gravity ............ 41.5° API
Emission factor (lbs SO^/barrel) ..........  5.737 times % sulfur
Projected sulfur oxides emissions from utility distillate fuel 
oil combustion are shown on a spatially resolved basis in Figure El.4.
Sulfur oxides emissions projections for residual, plus distillate 
oil combustion at on-grid power plants are compared to total emissions 
forecast within the 50-by-50 mile square grid in Figure El.5. Pro­
jected utility emissions average 131.42 tons per day during the early 
1980's within the 50-by-50 mile square. Off-grid emissions from 
electric utilities are projected to average 47.54 tons per day under 
our stated assumptions about fuel quality.
El.4.3 Refinery Fuel Burning
South Coast Air Basin refinery capacity in the year 1977 is 
shown in Table El.11. By comparison with data from 1973 given in 
Table A2.4 of the study by Cass (1978) it is seen that refinery capa­
city has grown by 31% from 1,006,200 barrels per stream day in 1973 
to 1,320,148 barrels per stream day in 1977.
Refinery fuel use during the 1970's is summarized in Table El.12. 
In spite of substantial refinery capacity expansion over that period 
of time, total refinery fuel use has been held nearly constant. In 
effect, refiners have increased the thermal efficiency of their 
facilities about one third on a per-barrel-of-capacity basis since the 
Arab oil embargo. A second trend which is apparent is a general
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U T I L I T Y  D IS T I L L A T E  SOX EMISS IONS IN THE EARLY  1980' S: TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .4
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SOX EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY FUEL BURNING ( SHADED) 
VS. TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1.5
TABLE E1 .11
1977 Refinery Capacity in the South Coast Air Basin
1977 1977
Crude Oil Crude Oil
Capacity Capacity
Idenfication Location (bbl/stream day) (bbl/calendar day)
Chevron U .S .A. El Segundo 426,316 405,000
Atlantic Richfield Carson 186,000 175,000
Mobil Oil Torrance 131,100 123,500
Union Oil Wilmington 111,000 108,000
Shell Oil Wilmington 93,000 90,000
Texaco Wilmington 78,947 75,000
Gulf Oil Santa Fe Springs 53,800 51,500
Douglas Oil Paramount 48,000 46,500
Powerine Oil Santa Fe Springs 46,000 44,120
Champ1in Petroleum Wilmington 31,500 30,600
Edgington Oil Long Beach 31,053 29,500
Fletcher Oil & Refining Carson 20,000 19,200
USA Petrochem Corp. Ventura 16,000 15,000
Golden Eagle Refining Carson 13,000 12,350
Macmillan Ring-Free Oil Signal Hill 12,200 11,590
Newhall Refining Newhall 11,500 10,925
Lunday-Thagard Oil South Gate 8,100 8,500
Oxnard Refinery Oxnard 2,632 2,500
1,320,148 1,258,785
Reference: Cantrell (1977)
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TABLE E1.12
Refinery Fuel Use in Los Angeles County 
(1970 through 1977)
Year Fuel Oil 
(millions of 
barrels/year)
Ngtural Gas 
(10 equivalent 
barrels/year)
Refinery Gas 
(10 equivalent 
barrels/year)
Tgtal
(10 equiva­
lent barrels 
year)
1970 0.65 12.07 18.10 30.82
1971 0.94 11.56 17.91 30.41
1972 1.27 8.31 19.83 29.41
1973 1.75 7.36 22.76 31.87
1974 2.29 6.92 20.45 29.66
1975 2.60 5.08 21.25 28.93
1976 1.91 5.39 22.94 30.24
1977 0.85 6.39 23.69 30.93
Sources: (a) Years 1970 through 1975 from Southern California
Air Pollution Control District (1976) .
(b) Years 1976 and 1977 f rom South Coast Air Quality 
Management District (1978b).
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increase in the level of refinery gas combustion, at a rate approxi­
mately equal to the rate of refinery expansion. The decline in natural 
gas availability during the 1970's has been offset by this increased 
refinery gas use, combined with a strong energy conservation effort 
which limited the growth in total energy demand.
Total refinery fuel use in the early 1980's will be assumed to 
remain at the 1977 level of 30.93 million fuel oil equivalent barrels 
annually (an apparent dynamic balance between refinery expansion and 
energy conservation). From discussions with oil company personnel 
(O'Hare, 1978), it is thought that large increases in refinery gas 
production are unlikely to occur in the near future. Therefore, early 
1980's refinery gas availability will be held constant at a 1977 level 
of 23.69 million fuel oil equivalent barrels per year. Subtracting 
refinery gas consumption from total energy demand yields a potential 
demand for auxilliary fuel (fuel oil plus natural gas) of 7.24 million 
equivalent barrels annually.
Under our assumed conditions of low natural gas supply, the 
auxiliary fuel needs of all refinery equipment having an alternate 
fuel capability (falling into California Public Utilities Commission 
priority groups 2B, 3 and 4) would be met by burning fuel oil. Small 
equipment items with no alternate fuel capability (in PUC priority 
block 1) would continue to receive a steady natural gas supply. Refinery 
auxiliary fuel demand classification into natural gas priority blocks 
can be estimated (roughly) using the exchange gas "requirements" of 
the Pacific Lighting Service Company, plus the assumption that most
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exchange gas is destined for petroleum industry use. From Table 1-b 
PLS of the 1977 California Gas Report, it is found that only 2.4% 
of those exchange gas "requirements" in 1978 were expected to fall into 
the essentially uninterruptible Priority 1 category. While this pro­
vides only an indirect estimate for local refiners, indications are 
that under conditions of low natural gas supply or a natural gas price 
exceeding the price of a "legal" grade of low sulfur fuel oil, virtually 
all refinery auxiliary fuel needs could be met by burning oil. Our 
emissions projection will attempt to examine the case in which such 
a switch to fuel oil occurs.
Baseline fuel combustion data for each refinery within the 50-by- 
50 mile grid were acquired for the year 1977 from the South Coast 
Air Quality Management District (1978b), as summarized in Table El.13. 
Sulfur oxides emissions for each plant site were also obtained for each 
type of fuel used in that year. Then the average sulfur content of 
each refinery's fuel oil and refinery gas supplies used in that year 
were calculated by relating the stated emissions to the quantities of 
fuel burned, assuming:
Residual Fuel Oil Emission Factor (lbs. SO /bbl.) = 6.59 times
X % sulfur
Refinery Gas Energy Content = 1,300 BTU/scf.
A
Fuel Oil Energy Content = 6.3 x 10 BTU/bbl.
The resulting sulfur content estimates for refinery gas and fuel oil 
also are given in Table El.13.
TABLE E1.13
1977 Fuel Use at 15 Refineries Within the 50 by 50 Mile Square
R efinery  Locatio n Fuel Consumption S u l f u r  Oxides Emissions
W ith in  the G r id  System (E q u iv a le n t  B a r r e ls / Y e a r ) (Tons/Years as S O 2 ) Fuel S u lf u r Content
Fuel R e fin e ry Na tu ra l A l l s o x s o x s o x T o t a l Fuel O i l R ef ine ry  Gas
East/West North/South O i l Gas Gas Fuels O i l R ef ine ry Na tu ra l s o x (w t .  % S) (G r a i n s / 100c f )
I J Gas Gas
2 9 .0 0 2 4 .0 0 2 8 1 3 7 6 .0 0 5 43 1 9 7 8 .0 0 1 17 6 0 3 0 .0 0 6 8 8 9 3 8 4 .0 0 3 1 2 .0 8 3 7 .8 8 2 .9 4 3 5 2 .90 0 .3 4 2 .0 2
3 4 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 0 1 1 .0 0 2 87 2 5 1 9 .0 0 5 2 8 9 6 4 .0 0 3 4 6 1 4 94 .00 6 2 .5 2 4 6 .6 7 1 .3 2 1 1 0 .5 1 0 .3 2 4 .7 0
3 7 .0 0 1 5 .0 0 5 9 0 0 1 .0 0 2 64 3 4 6 4 .0 0 1 3 8 3 9 8 1 .0 0 4 0 8 6 4 4 6 .0 0 5 8 .3 8 9 6 .7 0 3 .4 6 1 5 8 .54 0 . 3 0 1 0 .5 9
3 7 .0 0 1 7 .0 0 5 1 .0 0 3 6 5 2 4 8 .0 0 7 8 0 6 .0 0 3 7 3 1 0 5 .0 0 0 .0 7 4 6 .8 3 0 .0 2 4 6 .9 2 0 .4 2 3 7 .1 2
3 7 .0 0 1 9 .0 0 3 7 4 .0 0 6 1 2 4 4 .0 0 7 86 8 6 .0 0 1 4 0 3 0 4 .0 0 0 .2 9 * 0 . 2 0 0 .4 9 0 .2 4 **
3 9 .0 0 1 9 .0 0 1 6 2 5 2 .0 0 9 4 7 5 7 8 .0 0 3 0 9 8 0 0 .0 0 1 2 7 3 6 3 0 .0 0 2 1 .9 9 5 1 .74 0 .7 7 7 4 .5 0 0 .4 1 1 5 .8 1
4 0 .0 0 1 9 .0 0 1 0 2 5 .0 0 1 39 5 2 2 4 .0 0 4 2 1 1 9 1 .0 0 1 8 1 7 4 4 0 .0 0 1 .5 2 3 9 .1 4 1 .0 5 4 1 .7 1 0 .4 5 8 .1 2
4 0 .0 0 1 5 .0 0 0 .0 0 5 1 7 3 7 1 .0 0 2 5 9 6 .0 0 5 1 9 9 6 7 .0 0 0.0 3 1 .0 2 0 .0 1 3 1 .0 3 0 .4 0 1 7 .3 6
4 0 .0 0 1 6 .0 0 5 3 4 7 0 .0 0 2 65 2 4 6 0 .0 0 4 1 1 3 8 0 .0 0 3 1 1 7 3 1 0 .0 0 4 6 .7 3 2 1 2 .89 1 .0 3 2 6 0 .6 5 0 .2 7 2 3 .2 4
4 0 .0 0 1 7 .0 0 2 5 7 5 9 0 .0 0 4 3 6 9 2 0 5 .0 0 1 2 6 9 6 4 8 .0 0 5 8 9 6 4 4 3 .0 0 3 8 6 .0 2 4 0 7 .8 3 3 .1 8 7 9 7 .0 3 0 .4 5 2 7 .0 2
4 3 .0 0 1 6 .0 0 0 . 0 0 * 9 2 7 5 3 .0 0 9 2 7 5 3 .0 0 0.0 * 0 . 2 3 0 .8 3 0 .4 0 * *
4 4 .0 0 2 2 .0 0 2 1 5 2 8 .0 0 0 .0 0 2 9 6 0 7 0 .0 0 3 1 7 5 9 8 .0 0 2 5 .5 2 0.0 0 .7 4 2 6 .2 6 0 .3 6 * *
4 5 .0 0 2 3 .0 0 2 0 4 1 2 .0 0 7 7 8 2 4 5 .0 0 2 1 8 3 7 5 .0 0 1 0 1 7 0 3 2 .0 0 2 5 .8 3 4 3 .4 8 0 .5 5 6 9 .8 6 0 .3 8 1 6 .1 7
4 9 .0 0 2 6 .0 0 5 23 3 6 .0 0 7 7 3 8 4 3 .0 0 2 9 4 0 4 8 .0 0 1 1 2 0 2 2 7 .0 0 8 3 .2 9 3 .6 5 0 . 7 3 8 7 .6 7 0 .4 8 1 .3 7
5 1 .0 0 2 4 .0 0 1 89 5 1 .0 0 5 8 4 1 2 8 .0 0 1 9 1 9 3 6 .0 0 7 9 5 0 1 5 .0 0 1 3 .82 2 6 .9 9 0 .4 8 4 1 .2 9 0 .2 2 1 3 .3 8
T o t a l 8 4 2 3 7 7 .0 0 2 3 3 9 2 4 9 6 .0 0 6 6 8 3 2 6 4 .0 0 3 09 18 1 4 4 .0 0 1 03 8 .0 6 1 0 4 5 .4 2 1 6 .7 1 2 10 0 .1 9 0 .3 7 1 2 .9 4
Average
*
Very small
*
Not A p p l ic a b le
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An energy use and emissions projection for the early 1980's under 
conditions of 1977 emissions control regulations, plus low natural gas 
supply was constructed for each plant site by:
• Holding total energy use constant at the level observed in 1977.
• Holding refinery gas quantity and sulfur content constant at 1977 
levels at each refinery.
e Reducing natural gas use at each refinery to 2.4% of 1977 levels 
while increasing fuel oil consumption by an energy equivalent 
amount.
• Re-estimating the fuel oil combustion SO^ emissions at that 
increased level of oil use while holding the sulfur content of 
oil burned at the 1977 level observed at each plant. At those 
facilities where no fuel oil was burned in 1977, a fuel oil sulfur 
content of 0.40 percent by weight was assumed to reflect behavior 
under emission control regulations prevailing in 1977.
Energy use, fuel quality, and SO^ emissions constructed for each 
refinery under these conditions are summarized in Table El.14. A total 
of 27 tons of SO^ per average day would be emitted to the atmosphere at 
locations as shown in Figure El.6. The seasonal variation in total 
refinery fuel use is slight, as can be seen from monthly data for 1973 
and 1974 presented in Table A2.5 of Appendix A2 to the study by Cass 
(1978). Under conditions of low natural gas supply and negligible sea­
sonal switching from natural gas to oil, daily refinery fuel burning SO
emissions should be reasonably approximated by the annual average daily 
behavior shown in Figure El.6.
X
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R EFIN ER Y  FUEL SOX EM ISSIONS IN THE E AR LY  1 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN  TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .6
TABLE El.14
1980 Fuel Use Projection for 15 Refineries Within the 50 by 50 Mile Square
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k
Very smal l
■k k
Not A ppl i c ab l e
Ref i ner y  
Wi t h i n  the
Locat i on 
Gr i d  System
Fuel  Consumption 
( E q u i va l e n t  Bar r el s/Yea r )
S u l f u r  Oxides 
( Tons/Years
Emissions 
as SO2) Fuel S u l f u r  Content
Fuel Ref i ner y Na t u r a l A l l SOx s o x s o x T o t a l Fuel  O i l Ref i ner y  Gas
East/West
I
North/South
J
O i l Gas Gas Fuels O i l Ref i ner y
Gas
Natural
Gas
SO
X
( w t . % S) ( G r a i n s / l OO c f )
29.00 24.00 1429180.00 5431978.00 28224.69 6889382.00 1585.13 37.88 0.07 1623.08 0.34 2.02
34.00 20.00 576279.63 2872519.00 12695.12 3461493.00 600.37 46.67 0.03 647.07 0.32 4. 70
37.00 15.00 1409765.00 2643464.00 33215.51 4086444.00 1394.92 96.70 0.08 1491.71 0. 30 10.59
37.00 17.00 7669.00 365248.00 187.34 373104.00 10.53 46.83 0.00 57.36 0.42 37.12
37.00 19.00 77171.50 61244.00 1888.46 140303.94 59.84 * 0. 00 59.84 0.24 kk
39.00 19.00 318616.63 947578.00 7435.19 1273629.00 431.11 51.74 0.02 482.87 0.41 15.81
40.00 19.00 412107.19 1395224.00 10108.57 1817439.00 611.12 39.14 0.03 650.29 0.45 8.12
40.00 15.00 2533.70 517371.00 62.30 519966.94 3.34 31.02 0.00 34.36 0.40 17.36
40.00 16.00 454976.69 2652460.00 9873.11 3117309.00 397.63 212.89 0.02 610.54 0.27 23.24
40.00 17.00 1496765.00 4369205.00 30471.52 5896441.00 2243.02 407.83 0.08 2650.93 0.45 27.02
43.00 16.00 90526.88 k 2226.07 92752.94 119.31 k 0.01 119.92 0.40 **
44.00 22.00 310492.19 0. 00 7105.67 317597.81 368.07 0.0 0.02 368.08 0.36 * *
45.00 23.00 233545.88 778245.00 5240.99 1017031.81 295.54 43.48 0.01 339.03 0.38 16.17
49.00 26.00 339326.69 773843.00 7057.14 1120226.00 540.02 3.65 0.02 543.69 0.48 1.37
51.00 24.00 206280.44 584128.00 4606.46 795014.88 150.43 26.99 0.01 177.43 0.22 13.38
T o t a l
Average
7365237.00 23392496.00 160398.13 30918128.00 8810.38 1045.42 0. 40 9856.20 0.36 12.94
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El.4.4 Other Low Priority Natural Gas Customers
In Section A2.2.3 of Appendix A2 to the study by Cass (1978), a 
mathematical model was developed and validated which is capable of simu­
lating the SO emissions impact of natural gas curtailment on the basis
X
of an industrial customer's known priority for obtaining natural gas. 
That model will be used to project the SO emissions impact of non-
X
refinery industrial fuel burning activities under conditions of low 
natural gas supply.
An estimate of total low priority industrial demand for fossil 
fuel in the early 1980's first will be made. That information is 
needed in order to scale energy use at each source from the 1974 
levels used to calibrate the fuel switching model forward to levels 
expected to prevail in future years.
Natural gas historically has been priced below fuel oil or LPG.
Thus total potential natural gas demand is nearly equal to total 
demand for fossil fuel. Natural gas "requirements" forecast for the 
early 1980's in the 1977 California Gas Report provide an indication 
of total low priority industrial demand for natural gas in the absence 
of any curtailment of gas deliveries. A comparison of forecast gas 
requirements to historical natural gas requirements given for 1974 in 
that report will serve as a basis for assessing the growth in demand 
for industrial fossil fuel.
Comparison of historical gas demand to future projections is 
complicated by the fact that the California Public Utilities
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Commission and the State's gas utilities have changed their data 
reporting format and gas curtailment procedures in recent years.
Details of the two accounting systems used are indicated in Table 
El.15. Historical data on gas demand for 1974 are given in terms of 
the firm, interruptible and exchange gas categories in the left-hand 
column of that table. Forecasts of potential gas demand in the early 
1980's are classified into priority groups 1, 2A, 2B, 3, 4, and 5. While 
our interest is in identifying the rate of growth of nonrefinery fuel use 
in priority groups 2B, 3, and 4, there is clearly no way to isolate just 
those data in comparable fashion from 1974 and 1980 in the California 
Gas Report. Instead, a higher level of aggregation must be used.
The closest match that can be made is to compare the 1974 gas 
demands of "industrial interruptible", plus "oil company exchange 
and payback" customers to 1980 forecasts of gas demand by priority 
groups 2A, 2B, 3, and 4. That comparison, shown in Table El.16, 
indicates that total industrial interruptible-type demand for natural 
gas in the early 1980's is expected to be equal to that in 1974 to 
within our ability to reconcile the two accounting systems being used. 
Therefore, natural gas curtailment calculations for each month of 
three test years in the early 1980's will be assembled under the 
assumption that the quantity of fossil fuel energy consumed at each 
source during the years 1972 through 1974 remains a good representation 
of the level of heat input at each source during the same season of 
future test years. The combination of fuels used to meet that energy
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TABLE E l . 15
D e s c r i p t io n  of the N a tu ra l  Gas Customer C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  Scheme Used P r i o r  to 1976 to the 
End Use P r i o r i t y  System Used at  Present
H i s t o r i c a l  System— P r i o r  to  1976
#  FIRM -  S e r v ic e  not n o rm a lly  s u b je c t  to c u r ta i lm e n t
•  RETAIL SALES -  In c lud es  f i r m  sale s to Domestic, 
Commercial, F irm  I n d u s t r i a l  and Gas Engine 
c a t e g o r i e s .
•  SPECIAL PRODUCER EXCHANGE -  Requirement f o r  
exchange d e l i v e r y  to C a l i f o r n i a  producers under 
s p e c i a l  c o n t r a c t s .  (An exchange d e l i v e r y  i s  defined 
as d e l i v e r y  of gas by one p a r t y  to another  and the 
d e l i v e r y  of an e q u iv a le n t  q u a n t i t y  by the second 
p a r t y  to the f i r s t .  Such t ra n s a c t io n s  u s u a l ly  
i n v o l v e  d i f f e r e n t  p o in ts  o f  d e l i v e r y  and may or  
may not be c o n c u r r e n t . )
•  EXCHANGE WITH OTHER U T I L I T I E S  (see d e f i n i t i o n  of 
exchange above)
•  WHOLESALE -  F irm  sale s to customers having t h e i r  
own gas d i s t r i b u t i o n  system.
•  SYSTEM USES AND LOSSES
(a )  UNACCOUNTED FOR AND NET INVENTORY CHANGE -  
In c lu d e s  l i n e  losses  and measurement d i f fe re n c e s  
which r e s u l t  i n  a d i f f e r e n c e  between the volume 
of gas taken by respondent and the volume d e l i ­
vered to loads and net  changes i n  l i n e  pack and 
h o ld e r  i n v e n t o r i e s .
(b )  COMPANY INCIDENTAL AND COMPRESSOR FUEL -  
Such uses as gas f o r  Company b u i l d i n g  h e a t ,  
meter t e s t i n g  and compressor f u e l .
•  STORAGE AND INJECTION -  Net volume o f  n a t u r a l  gas 
i n j e c t e d  i n t o  underground sto rage f a c i l i t i e s  and 
volume of n a t u r a l  gas l i q u e f i e d  and s to r e d .  Does 
not i n c lu d e  gas i n t o  b u r ie d  high  pressure pipe 
s torage.
End Use P r i o r i t y  System— 1976 and F o l lo w in g  Years 
PRIORITY DESCRIPTION
1 A l l  r e s i d e n t i a l  use re g a r d le s s  o f  s iz e
A l l  o th e r  use w i t h  peak-day demands of 
100 Mcf/d or  le ss
2 -A  A l l  s e r v i c e  where p r im a ry  use i s  as a
feedsto ck w i t h  no a l t e r n a t i v e
A l l  former f i r m  n o n - r e s i d e n t i a l  use 
w ith  peak-day demands g r e a te r  than 100 
Mcf/d. I f  c on ve rs ion  to a l t e r n a t e  fue l  
i s  f e a s i b l e ,  t h i s  use w i l l  be t ra n s ­
f e r r e d  to a lower p r i o r i t y  by December 
1977 .
E l e c t r i c  u t i l i t i e s  s t a r t - u p  and i g n i t e r  
f u e l .
2 -B  A l l  customers w ith  LPG or oth er  gaseous
f u e l  standby f a c i l i t i e s  and peak day 
demands g r e a t e r  than 100 Mcf/d where 
c on ve rs ion  to a l t e r n a t e  fu e l  i s  not 
f e a s i b l e .
Other customers w i t h  C a l i f o r n i a  P u b l ic  
U t i l i t i e s  Commission approved d e v ia ­
t i o n  from requirem ents f o r  standby 
f a c i l i t i e s .
3 A l l  use not inc lu ded i n  an other p r i o r i t y
4 B o i l e r  f u e l  use w i t h  pe ak-day demand
g r e a te r  than 750 Mcf/d.
A l l  use i n  cement p l a n t  k i l n s .
5 A l l  u t i l i t y  s t e a m - e l e c t r i c  g e ne ra tion
p l a n ts  and u t i l i t y  gas t u r b i n e s ,  ex­
c lu d i n g  s t a r t - u p  and i g n i t e r  f u e l .
#  INTERRUPTIBLE -  S e r v ic e  s u b je c t  to i n t e r r u p t i o n  or  
c u r t a i l m e n t .
•  INDUSTRIAL -  commercial and i n d u s t r i a l  i n t e r r u p t i b l e  
loads s u p p l ie d .  T h i s  group i s  f u r t h e r  subd iv ide d
by s iz e  i n t o  c u r t a i l m e n t  bloc k s  A, B, C, D, and E. 
Block A customers are  the l a r g e s t  and would be 
in t e r r u p t e d  f i r s t .
#  O IL  COMPANY EXCHANGE -  Fuel  requirem ent  of 
C a l i f o r n i a  producers to be s u p p lie d  by exchange.
#  STEAM ELECTRIC PLANTS -  I n t e r r u p t i b l e  sa le s  to e l e c ­
t r i c  g e n e ra tin g  s t a t i o n s
•  WHOLESALE -  I n t e r r u p t i b l e  sa le s  to customers 
h aving t h e i r  own gas d i s t r i b u t i o n  system.
TABLE E l . 16
Comparison of 1974 H i s t o r i c a l  N a tu ra l  Gas Consumption to tha t  Forecast f o r  1980
( i n  mmcf/yr)
Source:  1977 C a l i f o r n i a  Gas Report
T o t a l  SCAB
Approximate Approxima te Low P r i o r i t y
T o t a l  So. N o n - P a c i f i c  L i g h t i n g  Co. P a c i f i c  L i g h t i n g  Company South Coast A i r  Basin Refine ry
C a l i f o r n i a Components of tha t  Demand Uses and Requirements Other Than Requirements Other Than I n d u s t r i a l  And
N a tu ra l  Gas fo r  Na tu ra l  Gas Losses Wholesale and System Wholesale and System Feedstock Demand
Requirements San Diego G&E Long Beach Use and I n j e c t i o n Use and I n j e c t i o n Comparison
1980 Forecast
P r i o r i t y  1 503,785 51,674 12,370 23,542 416,199 386,949
P r i o r i t y  2A 55,399 982 1,131 53,286 49 ,088^
P r i o r i t y  2B 22,200 598 210 21,392 17,323 t
P r i o r i t y  3 129,434 3,411 3,439 122,584 101,506 |
P r i o r i t y  4 71,205 2,296 1,555 67,354 55,4 38J
P r i o r i t y  5 672,150 95,910 14,640 561,600 527,063
Storage and 89,123 715 0
I n j e c t i o n
TOTAL 1,543,296 155,586 33,345 1,330,823 1,137,3 67
1974 H i s t o r i c a l
Firm 473,999 41,952 11,821 420,226 391,296
R e t a i l  Sales 1,712 1,712
S p e cia l  Producer  Exchange 5,029
Wholesale 0
System Uses & Losses 33,609 1,899 353 31,357
Storage and I n j e c t i o n 78,844 639
I n t e r r u p t i b l e
I n d u s t r i a l 237,276 7,262 5,729 224,285 185,1571 216,161
O i l  Co. Exchange 39,755 0 38,755 31,004j
Steam E l e c t r i c  Plants 476,429 74,572 3,052 398,805 387,105
Wholesale 5 5
TOTAL 1,346,658 126,329 20,955 1,083,783 994,562
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demand in the future, however, may differ significantly from the 
natural gas-dominated mix observed during 1972, 1973, and 1974.
Having set the level of energy use at each industrial facility,
the fuel switching simulation model can be used to project SO emis-x
sions under low natural gas supply conditions, provided that detailed 
correspondence between the old and new curtailment procedures can be 
established. The situation of interest to us involves complete 
curtailment of natural gas priority groups 2B, 3, and 4. From Table 
El.15 we note that these priority classes include virtually all of 
the former "industrial interruptible" sources with the exception of 
feedstock users. Since our simulation model included nonrefinery 
industrial interruptible combustion sources only, it would appear 
that complete curtailment of nonrefinery customers in priority groups 
2B, 3, and 4 can be simulated by substituting the appropriate alternate 
fuels for natural gas at all class A, B, C, D, E, and exchange cus­
tomers included within the fuel switching simulation model's data bank. 
This was accomplished by first calculating total energy consumption at 
each source in each month of interest. Then the type of standby fuel 
maintained by each source in the comparable month of the years 1972 
through 1974 was sensed. The appropriate combination of LPG or fuel 
oil with a sulfur content equal to that historically consumed by 
each source was then substituted for the lost natural gas on a BTU- 
equivalent basis. Sulfur oxides emissions were then calculated from 
the fuel used as described in Appendix A2 of the study by Cass (1978).
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Calculations for facilities located within the 50-by-50 mile square are 
summarized in Table El.17. Total industrial heat input inferred from the 
1977 California Gas Report and the fuel switching models of the present 
study is compared in Table El.18. Agreement is quite close.
Total non-refinery fuel burning SO^ emissions under conditions of 
low natural gas supply are given on a spatially resolved basis for a typi­
cal summer month and a typical winter month in Figures El.7 and El.8. In 
the absence of natural gas, fuel burning SO emissions from these sourcesX
within our grid system would total approximately 44 tons per day, up from 
only about 2.3 tons per day in 1973. The greatest increase in emissions 
would be concentrated in an industrial section just south of downtown 
Los Angeles (squares I 12-13 by J 14-16), and to a lesser extent in the 
Long Beach Harbor area.
El.4.5 High Priority Natural Gas Customers
High priority gas customers residing in priority groups 1 and 
2A are not expected to burn any fuel oil under our assumed natural gas 
supply conditions. Much of the natural gas demand by priority 2A sources 
is for feedstock use. Thus growth in gas combustion between 1974 and 
1980 may be assessed (roughly) by comparing expected 1980 sales to 
Priority 1 customers to 1974 historical data on "firm" retail gas sales. 
From Table El.16, we note that growth in high priority gas demand has been 
small. Since sulfur oxides emissions from natural gas combustion are 
negligible, it will suffice to use the 1972 through 1974 firm customer 
natural gas emissions inventory of Section A2.24 of Appendix A2 to the 
study by Cass (1978) to represent emissions by high priority gas customers 
in each month of our three test years in the early 1980's.
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YEAR
Te st  
Year 1
Test  
Year 2
Test  
Year 3
TABLE El.17
Fuel Burn in g S im u la t io n R es ults  f o r  L o w - P r i o r i t y  N a tu ra l Gas Customers
W i t h i n  the 50--b y -5 0  M i le  G r id —  E a r l y  1980's  Under Low N a tu r a l  Gas Supply Co nd it ions
Heat In p u t  by Fuel  Type ( i n  10^ B TU 's  f o r each month)
MONTH NATURAL GAS FUEL OILS L IQ U IFIE D  PETROLEUM GAS HEAT INPUT TONS TONS/DAY
JAN 0 .0 9908.01 1447.33 11355.34 1531.81 49.41
FEB 0 .0 9491.27 1413.12 10904.39 1458.00 50.28
MAR 0 .0 9832.12 1271.23 11103.35 1511.40 48.75
APR 0.0 9780.88 1329.03 11109.91 1499.32 49.98
MAY 0.0 9709.23 1246.08 10955.30 1484.64 47.89
JUN 0.0 9494.36 1194.81 10689.18 1453.24 48.44
JUL 0 .0 9108.05 827.94 9935.99 1383.97 44.64
AUG 0 .0 9176.28 911.86 10088.14 1415.88 45.67
SEP 0 .0 9370.73 1117.11 10487.85 1439.57 47.99
OCT 0 .0 9444.50 1291.38 10735.88 1449.41 46.76
NOV 0 .0 9520.39 1542.41 11062.80 1448.68 48.29
DEC 0 .0 9389.54 1436.94 10826.48 1407.09 45.39
TOTAL 0 .0 114,225.31 15,029.26 129,254.63 17 ,483.00 47.77
JAN 0.0 10435.27 1585.55 12020.82 1540.27 49.69
FEB 0.0 9477.63 1331.28 10808.90 1406.46 50.23
MAR 0.0 9458.01 1488.12 10946.13 1399.82 45.16
APR 0 .0 9766.48 1298.58 11065.06 1444.95 48.16
MAY 0.0 9624.25 1322.44 10946.69 1421.42 45.85
JUN 0 .0 9084.02 1193.04 10277.06 1343.10 44.77
JUL 0 .0 9050.56 979.34 10029.89 1345.78 43.41
AUG 0 .0 8891.82 846.64 9738.45 1329.23 42.88
SEP 0 .0 9121.16 1088.13 10209.29 1354.99 45.17
OCT 0.0 9161.16 1207.87 10369.03 1375.90 44.38
NOV 0.0 9095.42 1239.32 10334.73 1355.81 45.19
DEC 0 .0 8879.00 948.24 9827.24 1324.66 42.73
TOTAL 0.0 112,044.75 14,528.55 126,573.25 16,642.39 45.60
JAN 0 .0 8794.02 1108.81 9902.83 1343.66 43.34
FEB 0 .0 8952.13 971.84 9923.97 1361.83 48.64
MAR 0 .0 8932.60 997.53 9930.13 1365.75 44.06
APR 0 .0 8813.48 868.19 9681.67 1348.30 44.94
MAY 0 .0 8750.52 825.79 9576.30 1336.89 43.13
JUN 0 .0 8646.16 790.15 9436.31 1326.65 44.22
JUL 0 .0 8507.88 745.14 9253.02 1284.65 41.44
AUG 0.0 8533.55 900.25 9433.80 1301.28 41.98
SEP 0 .0 8871.71 1053.80 9925.51 1345.50 44.85
OCT 0.0 8881.53 1172.64 10054.17 1349.29 43.53
NOV 0 .0 9114.30 1128.06 10242.36 1384.88 46.16
DEC 0 .0 8859.24 917.60 9776.84 1314.07 42.39
TOTAL 0 .0 105,657.06 11,479.80 117,136.88 16,062.74 44.01
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TABLE El.18
Comparison of 1980 South Coast Air Basin Industrial Fuel Requirements 
Inferred from the 1977 California Gas Report vs the Results of the Fuel 
Switching Models Used in the Present Study
1977 California Gas Report
Industrial "Requirements" Inferred in Categories 
P4, P3, and P2B (as derived in Table El.l)
Natural Gas Energy
"Requirement" 
(mmcf/yr)
Equivalent 
(109 BTU/yr)
P4 55,438 58,764
P3 101,506 107,596
P2B 17,323 18,362
184,722
Fuel Switching Projection (Present Study)
q
On Grid Energy Use (10 BTU/yr)
Refinery Auxiliary 
Fuel
Non-Refinery Low 
Priority Industrial Fuel 
(Test Year 1)
46,30s1 
129,2552
Off Grid
Kaiser Steel Auxiliary .
Fuel 6,514
182,074
Notes: (1) Includes fuel oil plus natural gas only; excludes refinery
gas, coke oven gas, process gas and other fuel sources 
which do not represent a "requirement" for natural gas 
supply planning purposes.
(2) From Table El.17.
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OTHER LOW PRIORITY GAS CUSTOMER SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY 1980'S: JAN OF TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .7
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OTHER LOW PRIORITY GAS CUSTOMER SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY 1980'S JULY OF TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .8
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El.4.6 Total Non-Utility Fuel Combustion Emissions 
Sulfur oxides emissions estimates from fuel burning at refineries, 
industrial, plus commercial and residential sources are combined and 
compared to total SO emissions within the 50-by-50 mile grid inX
Figure El.9. Under conditions of low natural gas supply, those
sources would emit about 73 tons of SO^ per average day at locations
shown in Figure El.10. That would represent an emission increase from
these sources of more than sixty tons per average day above levels
4
prevailing in 1973.
El.5 Chemical Plant Emissions
Emissions estimates for the early 1980's were made for two 
major chemical plant categories:
• Sulfur Recovery Plants
• Sulfuric Acid Plants
Emissions from these sources are compared to total SO emissionsx
within the 50-by-50 mile square in Figure El.11. Other smaller fugi­
tive chemical plant emissions sources will be included within the 
miscellaneous stationary source category to be defined later.
El.5.1 Sulfur Recovery Plants
With one exception, sulfur recovery plant emissions projected 
for the early 1980's were based upon the South Coast Air Quality
^See Table A2.15a and Figure A2.12 of the study by Cass (1978).
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SOX EMISSIONS FROM INDUSTRIAL. COMMERCIAL ANO RESIDENTIAL FUEL BURNING (SHAOEO) 
VS. TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE 
UNOER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1 .9
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EARLY 1980'S INDUSTRIAL, RESIDENTIAL & COMMERCIAL FUEL SOX EMISSIONS: YEAR 2 IN CASE Of LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY, TONS/DAY
Figure E1.10
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SOX EMISSIONS FROM CHEMICAL PLANTS ( SHADED)
VS. TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1.11
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Management District's 1976 sulfur balance on these facilities (South 
Coast Air Quality Management District, 1977a). One refinery whose 
tail gas unit was out of order in 1976 will be assumed to have been 
returned to complaince by the target date for our forecast. Projected 
sulfur recovery plant SO emissions for the early 1980's total 3.51X
tons per day as shown in Figure El. 12, down from 93.53 tons per day 
in 1972. This emissions reduction is due to enforcement of the 
Los Angeles APCD's Rule 53.2 (now South Coast Air Quality Management 
District Rule 468).
El.5.2 Sulfuric Acid Plants
Projected sulfuric acid plant SO^ emissions in the early 
1980's are detailed in Figure El.13. These emissions estimates were 
based upon the South Coast Air Quality Management District's 1976 
sulfur balance on these facilities (South Coast Air Quality Management 
District, 1977a). Emissions from sulfuric acid plants in the early 
1980's are expected to total about 3.08 tons per day, down from 25 
tons per day in 1972. This emissions reduction was achieved by 
adding demisters and process modifications in accordance with 
Los Angeles APCD Rule 53.3.
El.6 Emissions from Petroleum Refining and Production
Projected SO emissions from petroleum refining and productionX
are compared to total SO^ emissions within the 50-by-50 mile square
in Figure El.14. The geographic distribution of emissions for a
E-153
SULFUR RECOVERY SOX EMISS ICKS  IN THE EARLY  19 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/OAY AS SO2
Figure E1.12
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SULFUR IC  ACID  PLANT SOX EM ISSION S IN THE EARLY I 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR  2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .13
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SOX EMISSIONS FROM PETROLEUM REFINING AND PRODUCTION ( SHADED) 
VS. TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE
UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1 .14
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day in the early 1980's is shown in Figure El.15. For the purposes 
of this discussion, the source classes used to represent SO emis-X
sions from petroleum refining and production are:
• Fluid Catalytic Crackers
• Other Refinery Process Equipment
• Oil Field Production Operations
El.6.1 Fluid Catalytic Crackers
Fluid Catalytic Cracker emissions anticipated in the early 
1980's were based upon the South Coast Air Quality Management District's 
1976 sulfur balance on local refineries (South Coast. Air Quality Manage­
ment District, 1977b). A total of 44.95 tons per day of SO^ were 
released from cracking operations in that year at locations as shown 
in Figure El.16.
El.6.2 Other Refinery Process Equipment
Other refinery process equipment SO^ emissions are modest by 
comparison to emissions from fluid catalytic cracking and sulfur 
recovery operations. The South Coast Air Quality Management District's
1976 sulfur balance on local refineries indicates SO emissions fromx
other process units of 1.79 tons per day. Slightly over 1 ton per day
of SO emissions is due to water treatment facilities, as shown inx
Figure El.17. The remaining miscellaneous process unit emissions are 
from caustic regeneration and SO^ treating, at locations as shown in 
Figure El.18. All delayed cokers are now said to be connected to 
sulfur recovery plants during all phases of the coking cycle
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PETROLEUM PROCESSING SOX EMISS IONS IN THE EARLY  1 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/CAY AS SO2
Figure E1.15
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REF INERY  CAT CRACKER SOX EMISS IONS IN THE EARLY  I 9 8 0 ‘ S: TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/CAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .16
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SOUR WATER STR IP PER  SUX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY  1 980 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .17
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MIS C . REF INERY  UNIT SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY  1 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/OAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .18
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(Chatfield, 1978). Delayed coker blow-down unit emissions listed in 
the 1972 through 1974 historical emissions inventory of Appendix A2 of 
the study by Cass (1978) are now assumed to be fully controlled.
El.6.3 Oil Field Production Operations
Under current regulations, sulfur oxides emissions from oil 
field fire flooding operations in Southern Orange County are expected 
to continue into the foreseeable future. 1977 source tests on these 
facilities indicate an emissions rate of 4.33 tons per day (Kaye, 1978), 
as shown in Figure El.19. That emissions rate was assumed to represent 
conditions likely to prevail in the early 1980's.
El.7 Miscellaneous Stationary Sources *•
The miscellaneous stationary source category includes SO^ emis­
sions from:
• Petroleum Coke Calcining Kilns
• Glass Furnaces
• Ferrous Metals Industries
• Non-Ferrous Metals
• Miscellaneous Chemical Plants
• Mineral Processing Plants
• Sewage Treatment Plants
• Other Industrial Processes
• Industrial/Commercial/lnstitutional Incinerators
SO emissions from miscellaneous stationary sources are compared x
to total emissions within the 50-by-50 mile square in Figure El.20.
E-162
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Figure E1.19
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SOX EMISSIONS FROM MISCELLANEOUS STATIONARY SOURCES ( SHADED) 
VS. TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE
UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1 .20
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The spatial distribution of emissions from these sources is given in 
Figure El.21.
El.7.1 Petroleum Coke Calcining Kilns
At the time of our resurvey of emissions sources, only four 
of the five petroleum coke calcining kilns in the basin were in opera­
tion. Sulfur oxides emissions totalling 22.82 tons per day at locations 
shown in Figure El.22 were calculated for these sources based upon 
recent South Coast Air Quality Management District source tests.
That recent emissions behavior was assumed to represent the early 
1980's if 1977 emission control regulations were to be continued.
E.l.7.2 Glass Furnaces
Sulfur oxides emissions from glass furnaces were discussed 
in Section A2.5.2 of Appendix A2 of the study by Cass (1978).
Those estimates represented only emissions from loss of sulfur 
contained in raw materials charged to the furnaces; emissions from 
fuel oil combustion, if any, are included in our industrial fuel burning 
estimates. Discussions with South Coast Air Quality Management District 
personnel revealed no expected major changes in glass furnace operations 
other than increases in oil combustion which would already have been 
accounted for in our fuel burning survey. Therefore, late 1974 emis­
sions from glass furnaces as given in Section A2.5.2 of Cass (1978) 
were used to represent SO^ emissions from glass furnace raw materials 
in the early 1980's. Approximately two tons per day of SO emissionsX
are expected from 22 glass furnaces at 13 locations within the
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Figure E1 .21
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PETROLEUM COKE K ILN  SOX EM ISSIONS IN THE EARLY 1 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR  2 , IN TONS/OAY AS SO2
Figure E1.22
E-167
GLASS FURNACE SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY  1 980 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/DAY  AS SO2
Figure E1 .23
E-168
50-by-50 mile grid, as shown in Figure El.23. An additional 0.23 tons 
per day of S0 X emissions are attributed to four off-grid furnaces which 
are included within the air quality modeling emission inventory.
El.7.3 Ferrous Metals
Iron and steel industry emissions are dominated by Kaiser Steel 
located at Fontana, California, to the east of our grid system. Sulfur 
oxides emissions from that source in 1974 totalled 38.02 tons per day at 
a time when mill utilization stood at 91% of full capacity (see Table 
A2.10 of Appendix A2 of Cass (1978). In 1976, emissions from this 
source were reported as 34.09 tons per day (South Coast Air Quality 
Management District, 1978c).
From data given by Hunter and Helgeson (1976) it is estimated that 
coke oven gas accounted for about 23.05 tons/day or 61% of Kaiser's 
1974 emissions total. Since that time Kaiser has entered into a consent 
agreement to desulfurize its coke oven gas. South Coast Air Quality 
Management District personnel estimate that 95% of the sulfur previously 
present in coke oven gas will be removed. 1980's emissions for Kaiser 
steel thus were estimated as follows: Kaiser's 1976 sulfur oxides 
emissions total was subdivided into 20.67 tons per day from coke oven 
gas and 13.42 tons per day from other sources, in the same relative 
proportions as observed in 1974. Then coke oven gas was desulfurized 
by 95% and the resulting new level of coke oven gas emissions were recom­
bined with the remaining non-coke oven gas subtotal. Total Kaiser 
facility emissions of 14.45 tons per day are estimated for the early 
1980's. One additional off-grid steel processing facility contributes
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about 0 . 1  ton per day of S0 ^ emissions, bringing total emissions from 
this source class to 14.55 tons per day at locations itemized in Table 
El.19.
El.7.4 Nonferrous Metals Industries
The principal source of sulfur oxides emissions from nonferrous 
metals industries arises from secondary lead smelters which recover 
lead from scrap automobile batteries. In 1974, SO emissions fromX
five secondary lead smelters at two locations within the 50-by-50 mile 
grid totalled 8.67 tons per day.
In December 1977, the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
adopted Rule 1101 which required an approximately 90% reduction in SOx
emissions from those sources not already having appropriate emissions 
control equipment. Review of the proceedings of that regulatory 
discussion (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 1977c) permitted 
us to identify two additional small secondary lead smelters which had 
been excluded from the 1972 through 1974 emissions inventory. Combining 
those sources into our inventory, and assuming that the emissions 
reductions required under Rule 1101 are implemented on schedule, yields 
an emissions estimate for these sources of 0.89 tons per day of SO in 
the early 1980's.
When combined with three other miscellaneous metallurgical process 
sources, total emissions from this source class rise to 0.985 tons per 
day. The spatial distribution of emissions from on-grid nonferrous 
metals processing plants is given in Figure El.24. Off-grid sources
are itemized in Table El.19.
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Figure E1.24
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TABLE El.19
Itemization of Non-Utility Off-Grid Sources Included Within the 
Air Quality Modeling Emissions Projection for the Early 1980's
Grid Square
Stationary Source Type Location
East/West North/South
I J
Emission Rate 
(tons/day SO )X
Glass Furnaces
Thatcher Glass 04
Brockway Glass 26
Steel Industries
Kaiser Steel 33
Ameron Steel 32
Nonferrous Metals
San Bernardino Metals 39
Mineral Products
Crestlite 29
Rockwool 33
30 0.124a
17 0.103a
18 14.45b
19 0.10a
19 0.041C
-3 1.00a
18 0.90a
References: (a) See 1974 data in Table A2.ll of Cass (1978)
(b) See Text, Section El.7.3
(c) South Coast Air Quality Management District (1977c)
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El.7.5 Miscellaneous Chemical Plants
Two small chemical process operations within the 50-by-50 mile grid 
are included within this source class. One process involves detergent 
manufacturing, while the other involves SO2 treating of bottles destined 
for medical use. Sulfur oxides emissions from these sources are 
estimated at 0.038 tons per day at locations shown in Figure El.25.
El.7 . 6  Mineral Processing Plants
Mineral processing plant emissions in the early 1970's were
described in Section A2.5.4 of Cass (1978). Under current regulations,
emissions from these sources are expected to remain unchanged into the
early 1980's. Both mineral processing plants of interest are located
beyond our 50-by-50 mile grid. Their emissions totalling 1.90 tons per
day of SO are itemized in Table El.19. x
El.7.7 Sewage Treatment Plants
Sewage treatment plant digester gas is used for powering treat­
ment plant equipment. On some occasions, excess gas is flared. Hydrogen 
sulfide contained in that digester gas is converted to sulfur oxides 
air pollutant emissions upon combustion in either case.
Los Angeles area sewage works are currently in the process of 
upgrading all treatment plants to full secondary treatment standards.
When that occurs, a far greater amount of sewage sludge will be processed 
at these plants than was the case in the past. If that slude is digested 
before disposal, then digester gas emissions may increase. But until a final 
processing scheme has been adopted, it is impossible for us to estimate future
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Figure E1.25
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emissions levels accurately. Therefore, it will be assumed that new
source review rules will limit the potential SO emissions increase tox
a very small quantity.
An inventory of digester gas SO^ emissions in the early 1970's was 
presented in Section A2.5.6 of the study by Cass (1978). That inventory 
will be assumed to represent the early 1980's. Emissions of 0.64 tons 
per day of SO^ would then be indicated at locations as shown in 
Figure El.26.
El.7 . 8  Other Industrial Processes
In Section A2.5.5 of Cass (1978), a survey was performed which 
identified 42 items of industrial equipment with emissions too small 
to warrant a discussion of their mode of operation. Those sources 
are assumed to continue operation into the early 1980's, with emissions 
totalling 0.023 tons per day. All sources in this group have S0_^  
emissions less than 0.005 tons per day, and thus would not show on a 
gridded emissions summary given in tons per day to two decimal places.
El.7.9 Permitted Incinerators
Historical emissions from incinerators under permit in the 
early 1970's were discussed in Section A2.5.7 of Cass (1978). That 
survey will be assumed to represent emissions from these sources in the 
early 1980's. A total of 0.074 tons per day of sulfur oxides are 
emitted from 49 incinerators, most of which are too small to show on one
of our emissions maps.
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Figure E1 .26
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El . 8  Mobile Sources
The mobile source emissions projection includes contributions 
from a variety of gasoline and diesel highway vehicles, plus ships, 
railroads, and aircraft. The categories used to represent mobile 
source emissions are:
• Catalyst-equipped automobiles and light trucks on surface 
streets
• Catalyst-equipped automobiles and light trucks on freeways
• Noncatalyst gasoline-fueled vehicles
• Diesel trucks and buses
• Airport operations
9 Shipping operations
• Railroad operations
As mentioned previously, the principal reason for subdividing automotive 
and truck traffic into the four categories shown is to permit an analysis 
of the future sulfate air quality impact of oxidation catalyst-equipped 
vehicles. Catalytic converters were introduced to the vehicle fleet 
at the start of the 1975 model year in an effort to reduce automotive 
hydrocarbons and CO emissions. These oxidizing catalysts also are 
capable of oxidizing a portion of the sulfur originally contained in 
gasoline to form sulfuric acid mist at the car's tail pipe. A change 
in the relative proportion of SO^ and H^SO^ in vehicle exhaust in future 
years can be modeled conveniently if the catalyst-equipped vehicle SOX
emissions are separable from noncatalyst vehicles in the inventory.
Only autos and light trucks are currently being equipped with oxidation 
catalysts. Freeway and surface street driving are separated since
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driving cycle influences catalyst-equipped vehicle sulfuric acid mist 
emission rates.
Sulfuric acid mist emission rates from post-1975 automobiles and 
light trucks are a strong function of emission control system design. 
Choices available to manufacturers over the next few years include 
oxidation catalysts alone or with air injection, three-way catalysts 
alone or with air injection and a clean-up oxidation catalyst, and 
lean burning or stratified charge engines. Each of these vehicle types 
have different characteristic ratios of sulfates to total sulfur in 
their exhaust (Sommers _et al., 1977). From conversations with California 
Air Resources Board personnel (Rubenstein, 1978), it would appear that 
manufacturer's plans through the 1980 model year are essentially fixed 
at present. Thus the sales-weighted fraction of the vehicle population 
expected to use each particular emissions control system can be estimated 
yearly from 1975 through 1980. Beyond 1980 or 1981, the choice of 
future emissions control equipment and the degree of deterioration of 
emissions control hardware already on the road becomes so uncertain that 
detailed analysis of the level contemplated here must await further 
data. For that reason, the sulfur oxides emissions from mobile sources 
in the early 1980's will be calculated for conditions expected in the 
year 1980.
El.8.1 Traffic Volume Projections to the Year 1980
In Section A2.6.1 of the study by Cass (1978), baseline surface 
street traffic volumes within the 50-by-50 mile square were calculated 
for the year 1974. Those 1974 traffic volume estimates are shown in
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Figure El.27. As part of that survey, the annual compound rate of 
growth in surface street traffic volume between 1969 and 1974 was 
computed within "neighborhoods" defined by sectioning the 50-by-50 mile 
study area into ten-mile-by-ten-mile subdivisions. Those neighborhood- 
averaged growth rates are reproduced in Figure El.28.
Growth rates averaged over each neighborhood were assigned to each 
individual 2-mile-by-2-mile square in that neighborhood. The resulting 
matrix was then used to scale the 1974 surface street traffic counts of 
Figure El.27 to the year 1980 as shown in Figure El.29. Total surface 
street traffic in 1974 is estimated to average 79,376,000 vehicle miles 
traveled per day within the 50-by-50 mile study area. By 1980, surface 
street traffic volume is expected to increase to 87,395,000 vehicle miles 
traveled per day.
Freeway traffic growth between 1969 and 1974 was next examined by 
the neighborhood scale factor method previously described for surface 
streets. Freeway traffic counts in those years derived in Appendix A2 of 
Cass (1978) are reproduced in Figures El.30 and El.31. The 1969 traffic 
volumes were subtracted from 1974 traffic on a grid-square-by-grid-square 
basis. Then the annual rate of growth of freeway traffic in each square 
was determined. Much of the growth in freeway traffic over the 1969 to 1974 
period was due to new freeway construction. Between 1975 and 1980 new 
freeway projects are expected to be minimal. Therefore, an attempt was 
made to calculate future growth in freeway traffic on the basis of only 
that part of the historic freeway traffic growth rate which was due to 
expanded use of existing roadways. Calculated growth rates of greater
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Figure E1.27
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SURFACE STREET BLOCKED COMPOUND GROWTH R A T E , 1969-197*
Figure E1 .28
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Figure E1.29
SURFACE STREET T R A FF IC  COUNTS FOR 1980 IN THOUSANDS OF VMT PER DAY
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FREEWAY T R A FF IC  COUNTS FOR 1969 IN THOUSANDS OF VMT PER DAY (P RESENT  STUOY)
Figure E1 .30
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Figure E1 .31
FREEWAY TR A FF IC  COUNTS FOR 1974 IN THOUSANDS OF VMT PER DAY (PRESENT STUDY)
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than 20% per year in individual grid squares were almost always due to 
construction of a new freeway segment between 1969 and 1974. Therefore, 
growth rate data from such squares were disregarded. Freeway traffic 
growth rates from the remaining squares within each ten-mile-by-ten mile 
"neighborhood" next were averaged. Then 1974 freeway traffic volumes 
were projected to 1980 using the compound freeway traffic growth rates 
calculated for each neighborhood.
In two neighborhoods, freeway traffic was almost completely dominated 
by new freeways constructed since 1969. Alternative projection methods 
had to be engaged in those cases. In the Diamond Bar area (neighborhood 
I 21-25 by J 15-11) the new freeways were opened prior to 1974, and 1980 
volumes could be projected from 1974 data using the growth rate calculated 
for the next neighborhood to the south. In the Pasadena area (neighborhood 
I 16-20 by J 25-21) the new freeway of interest was opened after 1974 
and baseline traffic counts were not available. 1980 traffic on that 
newly opened stretch of Interstate 210 was estimated manually by looking 
at projected 1980 traffic flows on similarly sized sections of other 
freeways. Neighborhood-averaged freeway traffic growth rates are given 
in Figure El.32. The resulting 1980 freeway traffic projections are shown 
in Figure El.33.
El.8.2 Sulfur Oxides Emissions from Highway Vehicles
The annual average daily traffic densities given in Figures El.29 
and El.33 were then used to compute highway vehicle SO emissions on a 
spatially-resolved basis. Total surface street and freeway traffic 
densities were uniformly apportioned to vehicle miles traveled daily by
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Figure E1 .32
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Figure E1.33
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automobiles and light trucks, heavy duty gasoline trucks and buses, and 
diesel trucks and buses according to the fraction of total VMT driven by 
each vehicle type as given in Table E1 .20. Automotive and light truck 
traffic in 1980 was subdivided into the fraction traveled by 1975 and 
later model year vehicles ("catalyst-equipped" cars and trucks) and older 
cars ("noncatalyst-equipped" cars and trucks) on the basis of mileage 
accumulation estimates given for each model year in Table E1 .21.
Average vehicle miles traveled daily by each vehicle type were 
converted to annual average fuel quantities consumed in each grid cell 
daily using the fuel economy data given in Table E1 .20. In the case of 
1975 and later model year cars and light trucks, that fuel consumption 
figure was calculated in Table E1 .21 as a weighted average over several 
model years with progressively improving fuel economy, as expected from 
manufacturers response to the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(see Marks, 1977).
Sulfur oxides emissions for each vehicle type were then calculated 
from the sulfur content of the fuel used. Diesel fuel was taken as 
0.23 percent sulfur by weight based on historical data for the year 1973 
as given previously in Table A2.13 of Cass (1978). The sulfur content 
of the entire gasoline pool was also held at a level based on historical 
experience, subject to the sulfur content of unleaded gasoline in 1980 
not exceeding present California regulatory limits:
(E1.1)
(E1 .2)
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TABLE El.20
Percentage of Vehicle Miles Traveled and Fuel Economy for 
each Vehicle Type in 1980
Fraction of Daily Weighted Average 
Total Vehicle Miles Fuel Economy 
Vehicle Type Traveled (a)(b) (miles/gallon)
Automobiles
Catalyst-Equipped 53.0% 17-8m13.6 * (a)bcd) (e)fNon-Catalyst Type 23.8%
Light Trucks
13 l^6  ^
io:ow)
Catalyst-Equipped 9.2%
Non-Catalyst Type 4.1%
Medium and Heavy Duty 
Gasoline Trucks and Buses
6.5% 6.83(f)
Diesel Trucks and Buses 3.5% 4.6(d>
Notes:
(a) Fraction of vehicle miles traveled by automobiles, light trucks, 
medium and heavy gasoline trucks and buses and diesel trucks and 
buses computed from 1975 data reported for the South Coast Air 
Basin by TRW (Goodman et al. 1977; Arledge and Tan, 1977).
(b) Light duty vehicle miles traveled are divided into 69% by catalyst 
equipped vehicles and 31% by non-catalyst vehicles, as computed 
from Table El.21.
(c) Computed in Table El.21.
(d) See Environmental Protection Agency (1975).
(e) Assuming improvement is newer light track fuel economy proportional 
to that observed for newer automobiles.
(f) Heavy trucks computed at 6 mpg (Environmental Protection Agency, 
1975); medium trucks evaluated at 8 mpg.
TABLE El.21
Gasoline Use Calculation for 1980 Auto Fleet Light Duty Vehicle Use
Notes: (a) Energy Policy and Conservation Act Goals (see Marks, 1977).
(b) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fleet Average Fuel Economy Data, 
reduced to 94% of measured value (see Bureau of National Affairs, 1977a,b 
and 1978).
(c) Environmental Protection Agency (1975).
(d) Pre-catalyst auto fleet average fuel economy.
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Fraction of Annual Fraction Fuel Weighted Average
Age Model Total Vehicles Avg Mileage of Annual Economy Fuel Economy
(years) Year In Use (c) Driven (c) Travel (mpg) (mpg)
1 1980 0.083 15,900 0.116 20.oJaJ
19.0
18.0 *
2 1979 0.103 15,000 0.135 wt. avg. 
17.83 1978 0.102 14,000 0.1254 1977 0.106 13,100 0.122
5 1976 0.099 12,200 0.106
6 1975 0.087 11,300 0.086
7 1974 0.092 10,300 0.083
8 1973 0.088 9,400 0.072
9 1972 0.068 8,500 0.051
13.6(c)(d)10 1971 0.055 7,600 0.037
11 1970 0.039 6,700 0.023
12 1969 0.021 6,700 0.012
>13 1968(-) 0.057 6,700 0.033
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is the market share held by unleaded fuel in 1980, in
%/100.
is the market share held by leaded fuel in 1980, in
%/100.
is the sulfur content of unleaded gasoline in 1980, 
in weight percent.
is the sulfur content of leaded gasoline in 1980, 
in weight percent.
is the sulfur content of the entire gasoline pool 
during a base time period prior to large scale use 
of unleaded fuel, in weight percent.
(El.3)
In 1973, prior to the introduction of catalyst-equipped cars, 50% 
of the gasoline sales in California were of leaded premium grades (Ethyl
where
From Table El.22, we note that unleaded gasoline sulfur content 
historically has been lower than that of the leaded gasoline pool as a 
whole. Therefore, in the absence of deliberate desulfurization of gas­
oline, higher sulfur blending stocks formerly sold as leaded gasoline will 
have to be mixed into the unleaded pool as cars requiring unleaded fuel 
increasingly come to dominate the vehicle population. Refiners are 
assumed to blend their gasoline stocks such that the relative quality of 
the leaded and unleaded fuels is not permitted to depart greatly from 
historical norms. That behavior will be represented by holding the 
ratio, r, of leaded to unleaded fuel sulfur content at historic levels 
while unleaded fuel production climbs through the early 1980's.
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TABLE El. 22
Sulfur Content of Southern California Gasolines 
(% sulfur by weight)
Ratio
Leaded Leaded Average of Unleaded Leaded to
Regular Premium Leaded Grades Grade Unleaded
Summer 1974 0.057 0.033 0.045 0.026 1.73
Winter 1974-75 0.067 0.045 0.056 0.044 1.27
Summer 1975 0.057 0.034 0.045 0.041 1.10
Winter 1975-76 0.061 0.033 0.047 0.038 1.22
Summer 1976 0.062 0.034 0.048 0.029 1.66
Average 1.4
Reference: Shelton (1974)
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Corporation, 1974), while virtually all of the remainder consisted of
leaded regular. The average sulfur content of the southern California
gasoline pool in that year was computed in Section A3.8.2.1 and Table
A3.10 of Cass (1978) as 0.047% by weight from a calendar-weighted average
of U.S. Bureau of Mines data: 25% winter 1972-1973 samples; 50% summer
1973 samples; 25% winter 1973-1974 samples. That 0.047% sulfur content
will be taken as our historical gasoline pool sulfur content, S . From
bo
Table El.22, we note that the mean ratio of leaded to unleaded gasoline 
sulfur contents is r ~ 1.4. From the fuel economy data and relative 
vehicle use levels given in Table El.20, it is estimated that gasoline 
demand in 1980 will be for 54% unleaded fuel and 46% leaded fuels. Set­
ting the sulfur content of the gasoline pool at 1973 levels of 0.047%,
with f = 0.54, f, = 0.46, r ~ 1.4, we may solve equations El.l and El.3 u 1
for the desired 1980 gasoline sulfur contents provided that unleaded fuel 
sulfur content satisfies inequality El.2. An unleaded fuel sulfur con­
tent estimate for 1980 of 0.039% sulfur by weight is obtained, along 
with an estimate that the leaded gasoline pool would average 0.056% 
sulfur by weight. Both those figures are within the range of experience 
in recent years, as shown in Table El.22.
Highway vehicle SO emissions projected for the early 1980's areX
summarized in Figures El.34 through El.37. While diesel trucks and 
buses account for only 3.5% of highway miles traveled, they still account 
for a large fraction of highway traffic SO emissions because the sulfurX
content of diesel fuel is much higher than that of gasoline. In a similar 
fashion, even though catalyst-equipped cars and trucks will account for
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C A T A L Y S T - E QU IP P ED VE H I C L E  SURFACE S TR E ET  SOX EMIS SION S IN t h e  EARLY 1 9 8 0 ' S :  TE ST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
FIGURE E1 .34
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C A TA LYS T -EQ U IP PED  V EH IC LE  FREEWAY SOX EM ISSIONS IN THE E AR LY  1 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR  2 , IN  TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1.35
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N ON -CATALYST GASOLINE V EH IC LE  SOX EM ISSIONS IN THE EARLY 1 9 8 0 'S : TEST YEAR 2 , IN  TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1.36
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D IE S EL  TRUCK AND BUS SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY 1 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN  TONS/CAY AS SO2
Figure E1.37
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the majority of light duty vehicle miles traveled in 1980, the SO^ 
emissions from older cars will be higher due to the expected higher 
sulfur content of leaded gasoline.
El.8.3 S0X Emissions from Airport, Shipping and Railroad Operations 
The spatial distribution of SO emissions from airport,X
shipping and railroad operations was established for the year 1973 in 
Appendix A2 of Cass (1978). Those emissions were scaled forward to the 
year 1980 on the basis of anticipated changes in the level of use of 
each transportation mode.
Airport emissions within our grid system are dominated by 
activities at Los Angeles International Airport. A forecast of the 
level of air carrier operations at Los Angeles International Airport 
was thus used to estimate future emissions from aircraft landing 
and take-off. While passenger traffic has climbed sharply in recent 
years, much of that traffic increase has been reflected in higher 
passenger load factors per plane rather than in a great increase in 
the number of aircraft landings per se. As shown in Table El.23, 
actual aircraft operations (landings plus take-offs) are expected 
to be about the same in 1980 as was observed during the early 1970's.
SO emissions from airport operations were scaled to 1980 from 1973 
data given in Figure A2.37 of Cass (1978) based on the ratio of 
1980 to 1973 air carrier operations estimated from Table El.23.
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Source:
TABLE El.23
Air Carrier Operations at Los Angeles International Airport
Year Air Carrier Operations
1972 371,563
1973 377,466
1974 342,540
1975 340,090
1976 356,536
1977 360,516
1980 forecast 363,600
Kaplan (1978).
1980 forecast is said to be from the September 1978 edition of 
the LAX draft Environmental Impact Report.
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Total SO^ emissions from aircraft operations in 1980 are expected to 
average 1.02 tons per day within our 50-by-50 mile grid, as shown in 
Figure El.38.
Historical data on merchant vessel arrivals at Los Angeles and Long 
Beach Harbors are given in Table El.24 (Alber, 1978). A projection of 
vessel arrivals in 1980 was made based on a linear regression line drawn 
through the historical data in that table. Then sulfur oxides emissions 
from shipping operations within our grid system were scaled to 1980 from 
1973 values given in Figure A2.38 of Cass (1978) based on the ratio of 
estimated 1980 to 1973 merchant vessel arrivals at Los Angeles plus 
Long Beach harbors. A 1980 total of 13.21 tons per day of SO^ emissions 
from shipping operations within our grid system are projected to occur 
at locations shown in Figure El.39. The effect of emissions from ships 
in the shipping lanes beyond our grid system is assumed to have been 
included in our estimate of sulfate background air quality.
Sales of fuel oil to railroads in California during the years 
1972 through 1976 are indicated in Table El.25. Conversations with Union 
Pacific Railroad personnel (Cocking, 1978) indicate that the low levels 
of fuel use in 1975 and 1976 were due to slack economic conditions in 
those years. A sharp rebound in fuel consumption was reported by Union 
Pacific, with fuel use growing by about 20% per year during the period 
1977-1978. From discussions with Amtrak personnel (Adams, 1978) it is 
felt that railroad fuel use will climb a total of another 30% from 1978 
through 1980. A railroad fuel sales projection for 1980 thus was con­
structed by growing 1976 fuel sales to railroads by 20% per year during
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Source: 
Note:
TABLE El.24
Merchant Vessel Arrivals 
Los Angeles plus Long Beach Harbors
Year Merchant Vessel Arrivals
1972 4718
1973 5019
1974 4839
1975 4804
1976 5071
1977 5546
1978 (6723)* (1)
Alber (1978).
(1) Extrapolated to 12 months from the 4482 vessel arrivals 
which occurred through the end of August 1978.
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TABLE El. 25
Sales of Fuel Oil to Railroads in California
Year Thousands of Barrels of Distillate Oil
1970 10,081
1971 11,275
1972 8,806
1973 8,530
1974 8,406
1975 6,567
1976 5,839
Reference: Bureau of Mines (1971 through 1977).
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AIRPORT OPE RATIUN SOX EMISS IONS IN THE EARLY  19 8 0 'S :  TEST YE AR  2 ,  IN TONS/CAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .38
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SH IP P ING  OPERATION SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY  19 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR 2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1.39
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1977 and 1978 and by 15% per year during 1979 and 1980. The ratio of 
projected 1980 to actual 1973 fuel sales to railroads in California was 
then used to scale the railroad operations S0X emissions distribution of 
Figure A2.39 of Cass (1978) up to the 1980 forecast levels shown in 
Figure El.40. Sulfur oxides emissions of 4.33 tons per average day are 
projected for the early 1980's within our 50-by-50 mile grid.
El.8.4 Mobile Source Emissions in Time Series
In order to recover thirty-six consecutive monthly emissions 
estimates for our three-year test period in the 1980's, annual average 
emissions rates for highway vehicles were modulated by the seasonal vari­
ation in gasoline sales observed during each month of the years 1972 
through 1974 as computed from Ethyl Corporation (1974) data. In spite of 
the inclusion of a seasonal variation in fuel sales to highway vehicles, 
monthly average mobile source SO^ emissions are nearly constant through­
out the years of interest, as shown in Figures El.41 and El.42.
While automotive emissions seem nearly constant over time on a 
seasonal basis, there is still a strong diurnal variation in hourly traf­
fic volumes. Diurnal variation estimates for automobiles and light 
trucks, diesel trucks, and aircraft are given in Table El.26. The data 
for automobile travel on freeways and surface streets are from Nordsieck 
(1974) as presented previously in Figure 4.11 and Table 4.8 of Chapter 4 
of Cass (1978). The time history of diesel traffic flow given in Table 
El.26 was obtained by weighting the diurnal variation in total freeway 
travel given in the first column of that table by the fraction of freeway 
traffic due to heavy duty diesels at each hour (given by Arledge and Tan,
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RAILROAD OPERATION  SOX EM ISSIONS IN THE EARLY 1980'S :  JAN  OF TEST YEAR  2 , IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1 .40
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SOX EMISSIONS FROM GASOLINE-FUELED AUTOS AND TRUCKS (SHADED) 
VS. TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1.41
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SOX EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, RAILROADS AND DIESEL VEHICLES ( SHADED) 
VS. TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1.42
TABLE El. 26
Diurnal Variations of Source Activities (1974) 
(Fraction of Daily Total Assignable to a 1 hour Period)
Power
Plants
Gasoline Fueled
Surface 
Freeways Streets 
(a)(b) (a)(c)
Highway Vehicles
Weighted Average (d) 
(0.39 Freeway + 
0.61 Surface)
Diesel Highway 
Vehicles (e)
Los Angeles 
International 
Airport (f)
(Midnight) 2400-100 0.02756 0.00776 0.00677 0.00716 0.013 0.024
100-200 0.01911 0.00776 0.00677 0.00716 0.015 0.009
200-300 0.01695 0.00776 0.00677 0.00716 0.017 0.008
300-400 0.01484 0.00776 0.00677 0.00716 0.019 0.008
400-500 0.01381 0.00776 0.00677 0.00716 0.021 0.008
500-600 0.01484 0.0178 0.00677 0.01107 0.053 0.009
A.M. 600-700 0.01695 0.0591 0.0293 0.0409 0.063 0.009
700-800 0.02334 0.0768 0.0651 0.0697 0.082 0.043
800-900 0.03709 0.0648 0.0651 0.0650 0.069 0.063
900-1000 0.04451 0.0536 0.0502 0.0515 0.057 0.063
1000-1100 0.05095 0.0494 0.0502 0.0499 0.052 0.063
1100-1200 0.05404 0.0494 0.06088 0.0564 0.052 0.063
1200-1300 0.05616 0.0494 0.06088 0.0564 0.052 0.063
1300-1400 0.06043 0.0494 0.06088 0.0564 0.048 0.063
1400-1500 0.06146 0.0569 0.06088 0.0593 0.052 0.063
1500-1600 0.06387 0.0746 0.06088 0.0662 0.060 0.063
1600-1700 0.06043 0.0746 0.0820 0.0791 0.057 0.063
1700-1800 0.05940 0.0746 0.0820 0.0791 0.050 0.063
P.M. 1800-1900 0.05724 0.0598 0.0540 0.0563 0.037 0.055
1900-2000 0.05306 0.0302 0.0540 0.0447 0.017 0.054
2000-2100 0.05404 0.0302 0.03077 0.0306 0.016 0.048
2100-2200 0.05616 0.0302 0.03077 0.0306 0.016 0.036
2200-2300 0.04771 0.0302 0.03077 0.0306 0.039 0.036
(Midnight) 2300-2400 0.03606 0.0302 0.03077 0.0306 0.043 0.024
Notes: (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
From Nordsieck (1974)
Used for catalyst equipped autos and light trucks - freeway.
Used for catalyst equipped autos and light trucks - surface streets. 
Used for non-catalyst gasoline vehicles.
Computed from freeway diesel use data given by Arledge and Jan (1977). 
From Roth et al. (1974). M-208
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1977). The result indicates, not supprisingly, that diesel traffic is 
relatively heavier at night than automobile traffic. The diurual 
variation in aircraft flights was adapted from data given for Los Angeles 
International Airport by Roth e_t al. , (1974) . Lacking any other data, 
the level of fuel use by railroads and ships was assumed to be constant 
throughout the day.
El.9 Emissions Projection Summary and Discussion
Figure El.43 summarizes the sulfur oxides emissions projection 
for the central portion of the South Coast Air Basin under conditions of 
low natural gas supply. In the event of the loss of the industrial 
natural gas supply, emissions within the 50-by-50 mile grid would total 
about 355 tons per average day. Major off-grid sources would amount to 
another 64.3 tons per day of S0X emissions. Those figures correspond 
quite closely to the 343 tons per day on-grid, plus 91 tons per day off- 
grid during the year 1974. In spite of the introduction of several 
new emissions control regulations during the late 1970's future air 
quality might look much like past air quality if large amounts of fuel 
oil were burned by local industries.
Comparison of Figure El.43 to Figure El.44 shows that annual average
data hide some remarkable changes which have occurred between 1974 and
our forecast period. The strong seasonal variation in electric utility
fuel SO^ emissions present in the early 1970's would be absent under
conditions of low natural gas supply. The annual average value of
those utility fuel SO emissions would remain about the same in spitex
of a great increase in oil combustion because the sulfur content of fuel
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SULFUR OXIDES EMISSIONS HI THIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Figure E1 .43
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SULFUR OXIDES EMISSIONS WITHIN THE 50 BY 50 MILE SQUARE
Figure E1.44
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was cut from 0.44% by weight in 1974 down to 0.22% sulfur by weight 
at present.
A second major change in emissions between the early 1970's and 
the early 1980's involved the nearly complete elimination of SO^ 
emissions from chemical plants. However, in place of the chemical 
plant emissions, more than 70 tons per day of S0V emissions would occur 
from industrial fuel burning under conditions of low natural gas supply. 
Bringing fuel burning emissions under control through restoration of 
the natural gas supply or installation of desulfurization or emissions 
control equipment thus is seen to be critical during the decade of the 
1980's if sulfate air quality is to be improved beyond 1974 levels.
Tables El.27 through El.29 show the monthly emissions history for 
individual source and equipment types within the general source cate­
gories of Figure El.43. The emissions inventory created for air quality 
model use contains spatially resolved source strength data defined on 
the 50-by-50 mile grid for each of the 26 source types shown in 
Table El.27 through El.29 for each month of three test years in the early 
1980's. An itemization of large off-grid sources is also included.
One principal reason for compiling emissions on a source-by-source 
basis is to be able to display the spatial distribution of SO^ emission 
strength. Figures El.45 through El.47 summarize annual average SO^ 
emissions density for those test years. It is seen that the largest 
SO^ emission source densities are still located in a narrow strip along 
the coastline stretching from Los Angeles International Airport (near
TABLE E1.27a
Sulfur Oxides Emissions Within the 50 by 50 Mile Square Grid
Early 1980's Test Year 1
(in short tons per day as SO2)
STATIONARY SOURCES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ANNUAL
FUEL COMBUSTION
ELECTRIC U T I L I T I E S
RESIDUAL OIL 139.80 127.93 119.15 107.61 110.18 113.12 136.13 143.48 139.07 124.44 144.54 141.57 128.95
D IS TILL A TE  OIL 2.28 2.09 1.94 1.76 1.80 1.85 2.22 2. 34 2.27 2.03 2.36 2.31 2.10
REFINERY FUEL 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00
LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS
CUSTOMERS 49.41 50.28 48.75 49.98 47.89 48.44 44.64 45.67 47.99 46.76 48.29 45.39 47.77
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS
CUSTOMERS 0.46 0.43 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.1 8 0.3 0 0.4 0 0.27
CHEMICAL PLANTS
SULFUR RECOVERY 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
SULFURIC ACID 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08
OTHER CHEMICALS 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
PETROLEUM REFINING AND PRODUCTION
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
DELAYED COKERS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
MISC. REFINERY PROCESS 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.7 6 0.76
O IL  FIELD PRODUCTION 4.30 4.30 4.3 0 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.3 0 4.3 0 4.3 0 4.30
MISC. STATIONARY SOURCES
PETROLEUM COKE KILNS 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82
GLASS FURNACES 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
NON-FERROUS METALS 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
FERROUS METALS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
MINERAL PRODUCTS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
PERMITTED INCINERATORS 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
MOBILE SOURCES
CATALYST-EQUIPPED L T .  DUTY
VEHICLES -  SURFACE 7.06 7.38 7.57 7.50 7.84 8.26 7.92 8.13 7.74 7.61 7.71 7.67 7.70
CATALYST-EQUIPPED L T .  DUTY
VEHICLES -  FREEWAY 4.92 5.14 5.27 5.23 5.46 5.76 5.52 5.66 5.39 5.30 5.37 5.34 5.36
NON-CATALYST L T .  DUTY VEHICLES 14.55 15.20 15.59 15.45 16.16 17.02 16.32 16.75 15.95 15.67 15.88 15.80 15.86
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES 17.15 17.91 18.38 18.21 19.04 20.06 19.23 19.74 18.80 18.47 18.71 18.62 18.69
AIRPORT OPERATIONS 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 J .02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
SHIPPING OPERATIONS 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21
RAILROAD OPERATIONS 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.3 3 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33
TOTAL 365.35 356.08 346.66 335.73 338.33 344.43 361.87 371.64 367.09 350.18 372.88 366.82 356.4 E-213
TABLE E1.27b
Major Off-Grid Emission Sources Included within the 
South Coast Air Basin Sulfur Oxides Modeling Inventory 
Early 1980's Test Year 1 
(in short tons per day as SO2)
STATIONARY SOURCES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ANNUAL
FUEL COMBUSTION
ELECTRIC U T I L I T I E S  
RESIDUAL OIL 51.38 47.02 43.79 39.55 40.50 41.58 50.03 52.74 51.11 45.74 53.13 52.03 47.40
DISTILLA TE OIL 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.0 3 0.03 0.02
REFINERY FUEL — — — — — — — — — — — — —
LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS
CHEMICAL PLANTS 
SULFUR RECOVERY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
SULFURIC ACID — — — — — — — — — — — — —
OTHER CHEMICALS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
PETROLEUM REFINING AND 
PRODUCTION
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
DELAYED COKERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
MISC. REFINERY UNITS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
O IL  FIELD PRODUCTION — — — — — — — — — — — — —
MISC. STATIONARY SOURCES 
PETROLEUM COKE KILNS . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ ____ __ ____ ____
GLASS FURNACES 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.2 3
NON-FERROUS METALS 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
FERROUS METALS 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55
MINERAL PRODUCTS 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES — — — — — — — — — — — — —
PERMITTED INCINERATORS — — — — — — — — — — — —
TOTAL OFF-GRID STATIONARY SOURCES 68.12 63.74 60.53 56.29 5 7 . 2 4 58.32 66.77 69.49 67.85 62.48 69.88 68.78 64.14
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TABLE E1.28a
Sulfur Oxides Emissions Within the 50 by 50 Mile Square Grid
Early 1980's Test Year 2
(in short tons per day as SO2)
STATIONARY SOURCES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ANNUAL
FUEL COMBUSTION
ELECTRIC U T I L I T I E S  
RESIDUAL OIL 126.10 126.41 126.70 107.76 117.74 143.06 145.77 146.63 131.75 138.79 141.45 99.46 129.31
DISTI ALLATE OIL 2.06 2.06 2.07 1.76 1.92 2.33 2.38 2.39 2.15 2.26 2.31 1.62 2.11
REFINERY FUEL 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00
LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS 49.69 50.23 45.16 48.16 45.85 44.77 43.41 42.88 45.17 44.38 45.19 42.73 45.60
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.33 0.26 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.19 0. 20 0.26 0.36 0. 28
CHEMICAL PLANTS 
SULFUR RECOVERY 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
SULFURIC ACID 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08
OTHER CHEMICALS 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
PETROLEUM REFINING AND PRODUCTION 
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
DELAYED COKERS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
MISC. REFINERY PROCESS 0. 76 0.76 0. 76 0. 76 0.76 0.76 0. 76 0. 76 0.76 0.  76 0.76 0.76 0. 76
OIL FIELD PRODUCTION 4. 30 4.30 4. 30 4. 30 4.30 4. 30 4. 30 4. 30 4. 30 4. 30 4. 30 4.30 4. 30
MISC. STATIONARY SOURCES 
PETROLEUM COKE KILNS 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82
GLASS FURNACES 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
NON-FERROUS METALS 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
FERROUS METALS 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00
MINERAL PRODUCTS 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0. 00
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
PERMITTED INCINERATORS 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
MOBILE SOURCES
CATALYST-EQUIPPED LT .  DUTY
VEHICLES -  SURFACE 7.19 7.41 7.72 7.79 8.16 8.08 8.02 8.15 7.68 7.67 7.67 7.09 7.72
CATALYST-EQUIPPED L T .  DUTY 
VEHICLES -  FREEWAY 5.01 5.16 5.38 5.43 5.68 5.63 5.58 5.68 5.35 5.34 5.34 4.94 5.38
NON-CATALYST L T .  DUTY VEHICLES 14.82 15.27 15.90 16.06 16.81 16.65 16.52 16.80 15.82 15.80 15.80 14.60 15.91
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES 17.46 17.99 18. 74 18.92 19.81 19.62 19.46 19.80 18.65 18.62 18.62 17.20 18.75
AIRPORT OPERATIONS 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
SHIPPING OPERATIONS 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21
RAILROAD OPERATIONS 4.33 4.33 4. 33 4. 33 4. 33 4. 33 4. 33 4.33 4.33 4. 33 4.33 4.33 4. 33
TOTAL 352.51 354.71 351.76 335.93 345.95 370.07 371.03 372.21 356.48 362.78 366.36 317.72 354.79
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TABLE E1.28b
Major Off-Grid Emission Sources Included within the 
South Coast Air Basin Sulfur Oxides Modeling Inventory 
Early 1980's Test Year 2 
(in short tons per day as SO2)
STATIONARY SOURCES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ANNUAL
FUEL COMBUSTION
ELECTRIC U T I L I T I E S  
RESIDUAL OIL 46.35 46.46 46.57 39.61 43.28 52.58 53.58 53.90 48.42 51.01 51.99 36.56 47.53
D IS TILLA TE  OIL 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.0 3 0.02 0.02
REFINERY FUEL — — — — — — — — — — — — —
LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS
CHEMICAL PLANTS 
SULFUR RECOVERY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SULFURIC ACID — — — — — — — — — — — — —
OTHER CHEMICALS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
PETROLEUM REFINING AND PRODUCTION 
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS . . . . . . . . . . . .
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
DELAYED COKERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
MISC. REFINERY UTNIS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
O IL  FIELD PRODUCTION — — — — — — — — — — — — —
MISC. STATIONARY SOURCES 
PETROLEUM COKE KILNS _ _ _ _ _ _
GLASS FURNACES 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.2 3 0.23 0.2 3
NON-FERROUS METALS 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
FERROUS METALS 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55
MINERAL PRODUCTS 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES — — — — — — — — — — — — —
PERMITTED INCINERATORS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
TOTAL OFF-GRID STATIONARY SOURCES 63.09 63.20 63. 31 56.35 60.02 69.33 70.33 70.65 65.16 67.75 68.74 53.30 64.27
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TABLE E1.29a
Sulfur Oxides Emissions Within the 50 by 50 Mile Square Grid
Early 1980's Test Year 3
(in short tons per day as SO2)
STATIONARY SOURCES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ANNUAL
FUEL COMBUSTION
ELECTRIC U T I L I T I E S  
RESIDUAL OIL 139.95 114.63 106.43 95.91 104.17 126.70 137.08 130.43 151.04 147.32 149.40 147.41 129.31
DI STI LLATE OIL 2.28 1.87 1.74 1.57 1. 70 2.07 2.24 2.13 2.46 2.40 2.44 2.41 2.11
REFINERY FUEL 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00
LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS A3.34 48.64 44.06 44.94 43.13 44.22 41.44 41.98 44.85 43.53 46.16 42.39 44.01
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.27 0. 23 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.25 0.35 0.26
CHEMICAL PLANTS 
SULFUR RECOVERY 3.51 3.51 3. 51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
SULFURIC ACID 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08
OTHER CHEMICALS 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
PETROLEUM REFINING AND PRODUCTION 
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95 44.95
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
DELAYED COKERS 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00
MISC.  REFINERY PROCESSES 0.76 0.76 0.76 0. 76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
OIL FIELD PROCESSES 4.30 4. 30 4.30 4. 30 4. 30 4. 30 4.30 4. 30 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30
MISC. STATIONARY SOURCES 
PETROLEUM COKE KILNS 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82
GLASS FURNACES 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
NON-FERROUS METALS 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
FERROUS METALS 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MINERAL PRODUCTS 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES 0.02 0. 02 0.02 0. 02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
PERMITTED INCINERATORS 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
MOBILE SOURCES
CATALYST-EQUIPPED L T .  DUTY
VEHICLES -  SURFACE 6.91 7.19 6.95 7.70 7.98 8.18 8.23 8.19 7.76 8.01 7.58 7.94 7.72
CATALYST-EQUIPPED L T .  DUTY 
VEHICLES -  FREEWAY 4.82 5.01 4.84 5.37 5.56 5.70 5.73 5.70 5.40 5.58 5.28 5.53 5.38
NON-CATALYST L T .  DUTY VEHICLES 14.24 14.81 14.31 15.87 16.45 16.85 16.96 16.86 15.98 16.50 15.61 16.35 15.91
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES 16.78 17.46 16.87 18.70 19.38 19.85 19.99 19.88 18.83 19.44 18.40 19.27 18.75
AIRPORT OPERATIONS 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
SHIPPING OPERATIONS 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21
RAILROAD OPERATIONS 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33
TOTAL 358.45 339.74 325.27 320.05 328.32 353.50 361.56 355.04 376.25 372.67 374.84 371.37 353.18
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TABLE E1.29b
Major Off-Grid Emission Sources Included within the 
South Coast Air Basin Sulfur Oxides Modeling Inventory 
Early 1980's Test Year 3 
(in short tons per day as SO2)
STATIONARY SOURCES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ANNUAL
FUEL COMBUSTION
ELECTRIC U T I L I T I E S  
RESIDUAL OIL 51.44 42.13 39.12 35.25 38.29 46.57 50.38 4 7.94 55.51 54.15 54.19 54.18 47.53
D IS TILLA TE  OIL 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
REFINERY FUEL — — — — — — — — — — — — —
LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS 
CUSTOMERS _ _ _
CHEMICAL PLANTS
SULFUR RECOVERY . . . . . . . . . ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
SULFURIC ACID — — — — — — — — — — — — —
OTHER CHEMICALS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
PETROLEUM REFINING AND PRODUCTION 
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS . . . . . . . . . ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
DELAYED COKERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
MISC. REFINERY UNITS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
O IL  FIELD PRODUCTION — — — — — — — — — — — — —
MISC. STATIONARY SOURCES 
PETROLEUM COKE KILNS _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
GLASS FURNACES 0. 23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
NON-FERROUS METALS 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
FERROUS METALS 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55
MINERAL PRODUCTS 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES — — — — — — — — — — — — —
PERMITTED INCINERATORS — — — — — — — — — — — — —
TOTAL OFF-GRID STATIONARY SOURCES 68.16 58.87 55.86 51.99 55.03 63.31 67.12 64.68 72.26 70.90 71.66 70.93 64.27
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Figure E1.45
TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY  1 9 8 0 ' S :  TEST YEAR 1 UNDER CONDIT IONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS S U P P L Y ,  IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
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TOTAL SOX EMISSIONS IN THE EARLY  1 9 8 0 * S: TEST YEAR 2 UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS S U P P L Y ,  IN TONS/DAY AS SO2
Figure E1.46
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TOTAL SOX EM ISSIONS IN THE EAR LY  1 9 8 0 'S :  TEST YEAR 3 UNDER CONDITIONS OF LOW NATURAL GAS S U P P LY , IN  TONS/DAY AS SO?
Figure E1 .47
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Lennox) on the north to Huntington Beach (opposite Santa Ana) on the 
south. However, sulfur oxides emissions in the downtown Los Angeles 
area have grown beyond levels observed in the early 1970's due to 
increased industrial fuel oil use under conditions of low natural gas 
supply.
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APPENDIX F-l
ELECTRIC GENERATION PLANTS 
William P. Rogerson
Two large utilities —  Southern California Edison Company 
(Edison), a privately owned utility, and the Los Angeles Department 
of Water and Power (DWP), a municipal utility —  supply nearly all of 
the Los Angeles basin and vicinity with its electrical energy. Prior 
to 1950, even if sulfur oxides air pollution had been perceived as a 
problem, the utilities would not have been involved; almost all of 
their energy was generated by pollution-free hydroelectric plants. 
However, during the 50s and 60s, as prime hydro sites became rarer, 
more and more steam plants designed to burn gas or oil were constructed. 
Of course, it was cheapest to build them beside the customers they were 
to supply, and thus within the air basin. By 1967, 86.8 percent and 
83.7 percent, respectively, of Edison's and DWP's capacity consisted 
of these oil and gas-fired plants. After 1967 the advent of nuclear 
steam plant technology and construction of out-of-basin coal-fired 
steam plants began to reduce the utilities' dependence on in-basin oil 
and gas-fired steam plants in percentage terms. However, in absolute 
magnitudes, this dependence continued to grow, spurred by the basin's 
increasing demand for energy. In 1976 Edison possessed eleven oil 
and gas-fired steam power plants totalling 8786 megawatts (MW), all 
but 130 MW of it in the air basin. For its part, DWP owned four oil 
and gas-fired steam plants totalling 3199 MW of power. This amounted
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to 65 percent and 54 percent, respectively, of Edison's and DWP's 
total capacity in 1976 (Los Angeles Department of Water and Power,
1976; Southern California Edison Co., 1976).
In 1967 the sulfur oxides pollution problem from electric 
utilities was still primarily a potential one. The bulk of energy 
produced in the in-basin plants originated from combustion of natural 
gas which essentially results in no sulfur oxides emissions. This 
policy was followed because of the pollution-minimizing character of 
natural gas, its artificially low regulated price relative to oil, and 
the fact that when gas is burned in plants less maintenance is 
required. However, as available natural gas supplies dwindled, both 
utilities were forced to substitute sulfur-bearing fuel oil to an 
ever greater extent. This switch to oil combined with construction 
of new oil-fired steam capacity resulted in hundreds of tons per day 
of increased sulfur oxides emissions from electric utilities over the 
decade from 1967 to 1977.
As early as 1958, regulatory authorities had recognized 
this problem by requiring utilities to burn low sulfur (less than 0.5 
percent by weight) fuel oil, dependent upon natural gas supply 
conditions. By 1968 the rule had been changed to hold regardless of 
natural gas supply conditions. But in Edison's case, for example, 
electricity generation from oil rose 455 percent between 1968 and 1976. 
Total allowable sulfur oxides emissions also rose by the same 
proportion. This growth in sulfur oxides emissions was further 
restrained during 1977 when local regulations were amended to prohibit 
burning of fuel oil containing over 0.25 percent sulfur by weight.
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Provision of large quantities of low sulfur fuel oil is 
costly compared to purchase of high sulfur oil. Thus the question 
arises, "Have rules concerning the sulfur content of fuel been set at 
an economically efficient level?" That question can be investigated 
by comparison to the emissions control costs facing other industries 
that might participate in a market for transferable licenses to emit 
air pollutants. However, as a prelude to that study, the costs and 
other relevant characteristics of various emission control strategies 
for electric utilities need to be determined. Furthermore, there is 
some question as to whether the current strategy of burning low sulfur 
fuel is the best way to achieve existing air quality levels. This 
chapter attempts to fill these needs by identifying the costs and 
other relevant factors associated with two different methods of 
achieving sulfur oxides emission levels from power plants equivalent 
to those if rules permitting the maximum sulfur content of fuel to be 
5 percent, 2.5 percent, 1 percent, 0.5 percent, 0.25 percent, 0.1 
percent, and .025 percent were in effect. The two methods of emission 
control are burning fuel oil of the desired sulfur content or 
installing scrubbers on plant smokestacks to remove sulfur oxides 
from exhaust gases while burning higher sulfur fuel.''
■kPurchase of natural gas is also a viable S0X control technique. 
However, the availability of natural gas depends on federal natural 
gas allocation policies which are beyond the control of the electric 
utility industry. In this paper, the emissions and costs facing the 
electric utility industry will be calculated for a special case, that 
is for 100 percent fuel oil combustion. If natural gas supplies 
become available at a price competitive with oil, then emissions and 
hence potential demand for licenses to emit sulfur oxides air 
pollutants are easily scaled downward.
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Given a choice between burning low sulfur oil and installing 
scrubbers, it is shown here that burning low sulfur fuel oil is in fact 
the cost-effective method of emission control (given 1977 prices for 
fuels and emissions control equipment). The marginal cost per ton of 
sulfur oxides from burning progressively lower sulfur fuels is calculated. 
This allows calculation of the utilities' maximum demand for licenses 
to emit sulfur oxides air pollutants if they were placed in a situation 
where utilities have to pay some fee per ton of SO^ emitted.
FUEL COSTS
Fuel costs affect both the choice of strategy for emissions
control and the extent to which any strategy is pursued. Ceteris
paribus, as the price difference between high and low sulfur fuel rises,
the option of burning low sulfur fuel becomes less attractive relative
to the other two options of burning high sulfur fuel oil and scrubbing
emissions or simply burning high sulfur fuel oil and not scrubbing.
In the simplest case, suppose there are only two grades of oil —  high
and low sulfur. Suppose the utility must pay $£ for every unit of
sulfur oxides emitted by it. High sulfur oil releases a, units ofh
sulfur oxides per unit of oil; low sulfur oil releases units. Let 
the price of low and high sulfur oil be, respectively, P^ and P^.
Suppose that scrubbing emissions costs $e per unit of oil burned and 
that after scrubbing, low and high sulfur oil release, respectively, 
and 3^ units of sulfur oxides per unit of oil burned.
The total costs of purchasing and burning one unit of oil 
then depends on whether emissions are scrubbed and the purchase price.
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TABLE 1
TOTAL COST OF BURNING ONE UNIT OF OIL
Low Sulfur Oil High Sulfur Oil
Emissions
are e + i e£ + P£ e + £ 6 h + p h
Scrubbed
Emissions
are not lat + P£ la, + Pu h h
The utility will select the strategy associated with the smallest 
total cost in Table 1. Clearly as (P^ - P^) rises, the option of 
burning high sulfur fuel oil becomes more attractive.
Estimated prices for fuel oil as a function of sulfur content 
that will be used in this study are given in Table 2 and Figure 1 (Cass 
and Rogerson, 1980). Note that 1977 prices are used. These older 
prices are used because current prices are extremely variable due to 
continuing price rises and shortages, and it is difficult to determine 
what current market prices are (Riess, 1979; Hyska, 1979; Felger, 1979). 
Therefore, 1977 prices (which were fairly stable for two to three years) 
may give a better picture of long-term relative prices, that is, the 
premium commanded by lower sulfur fuel in a stable oil market.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED 1977 PRICE OF RESIDUAL FUEL OIL 
BY SULFUR CONTENT
% Sulfur Price
0.025 $16.90 (extrapolated)
0.10 15.80
0.25 14.50
0.50 13.75
1.0 13.00
2.5 11.00
2.5+ 10.00
Fig. 1 Prices of Fuel Oil in 1977 As a Function of Percent Sulfur by Weight
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CAPACITY FACTORS
Capacity factors reflect the percentage of a generating 
station's potential electricity production that is actually used 
during a given year. Since the capital cost of scrubber installation 
is the same whether or not the plant is used continuously at full load, 
capacity factors may affect the cost of emission control per barrel of 
fuel oil burned.
Capacity factors used in this study are those predicted for 
1980 by Edison and DWP. Work was begun on this study using the 
utilities' 1977 predictions for 1980. Current (1979) predictions 
for 1980 subsequently were obtained and they differ insignificantly 
from the earlier version. Hence calculations based on the 1977 forecast 
for 1980 have been used herein.
Tables A-l and A-2 at the end of this chapter give the 
projected capacity factors of the various plants. Table A-3 presents 
the heat rates. Based on these tables, Tables A-4 and A-5 give the 
projected oil use of the plants under conditions of low natural gas 
supply.
SCRUBBER COSTS
Estimates of the cost of installing and operating flue gas 
scrubbing units can be obtained from two sources: an SRI International 
study (SRI International, 1978) done for Edison, and an Aerospace 
Corporation study (Leo and Rossoff, 1978) done for the California Air 
Resources Board. The former uses 1978 dollars and the latter uses 
1977 dollars. Both estimate costs for a system designed to remove
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90 to 95 percent of the SO2 formed during the combustion of a fuel 
oil containing .5 percent sulfur. Therefore the cost estimates 
should be comparable.
Tables A-6 and A-7 give the estimated capital cost of 
scrubber installation in dollars per KW. Tables A-8 and A-9 present 
operating costs. Neither study presented estimates for every plant.
In the cases where no scrubber cost estimates were given for a 
particular generating unit, a cost estimate is taken equal to the 
average overall generating units for which specific information is 
available. For each plant the average of the SRI and Aerospace 
figures is calculated, and this is the cost figure that is used in 
this study.
Tables A-10 and A-ll present the annualized scrubbing costs 
for the various units. An annual charge of 20 percent of the total 
capital investment is levied to account for interest payments, taxes, 
and insurance. The Aerospace study used 19 percent; the SRI study 
used 21 percent. Edison apparently uses 20 percent for its own 
planning purposes (McCrackin, 1977).
LEAST COST EMISSIONS CONTROL STRATEGIES
The scrubber cost estimates were for systems designed to 
remove 90 to 95 percent of the SO2 which results when burning 0.5 
percent sulfur fuel oil.'*' The costs of scrubbing emissions from 
other grades of fuel would be comparable (Leo, 1979), so it will be 
assumed that scrubbers could be used in conjunction with the combustion 
of any grade of fuel oil and that 90 percent of the SO2 could be
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removed. The only exception is that for use with 0.5 percent sulfur 
fuel it will be assumed that 95 percent of the SO^ is removed to give 
the scrubbers full benefit of any doubt.
Table 3 shows the price differences which exist between 
various grades of residual oil.
TABLE 3
PRICE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FUEL OIL GRADES 
AS A FUNCTION OF SULFUR CONTENT
Grades of Oil Price Difference
2.5+ % vs. .5% $3.75
2.5 % vs. .25% 2.50
1 % vs. .1% 2.80
.5 % vs. .025% 3.15
In Tables A-10 and A-ll at the end of this discussion, it is 
shown that the minimum cost of scrubbing emissions at any electric 
generating unit is $3.59 per barrel of fuel oil consumed. Therefore 
by reference to Table 3 we see that the only situation in which it 
might be marginally profitable to install scrubbers instead of to burn 
low sulfur oil in any unit is to burn very high sulfur oil while 
scrubbing to 0.5 percent sulfur oil. Aside from Haynes Unit 6 and
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Alamitos units 5 and 6 it is never even marginally profitable to 
install scrubbers. In the next section it is therefore assumed that 
the least cost control technology is to burn low sulfur oil.
DERIVED DEMAND FOR LICENSES TO EMIT SULFUR OXIDES AIR POLLUTANTS
Suppose that a license entitles the holder to emit one ton 
of SO^ into the atmosphere. (Variations such as perpetual licenses 
can be easily handled. The algebraically simplest case is treated 
here.) There are 6.384(x) pounds of sulfur oxides emitted from burning 
a barrel of (x) percent sulfur oil. Let i  be the price of a license. 
Let p be the price per barrel of x percent sulfur oil. Then the
X
total cost, c, to the utility of burning one barrel of x percent sulfur 
oil is
This is the "full" price of a barrel of x percent sulfur oil when the 
cost of emissions control is considered to be part of the price.
The utility obviously chooses to burn the grade of fuel such 
that the full price is minimized. Table 4 presents the full price for 
the grades of oil presented in this paper.
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TABLE 4
FULL PRICE PER BARREL OF OIL AS A
FUNCTION OF SULFUR CONTENT
% Sulfur by Weight
£ 6.384 x + p 
2000 X
(Dollars per Barrel)
0.025
-3
0.08x10 £ + 16.90
0.10
-3
0.32x10 £ + 15.80
0.25
-3
0.80x10 £ + 14.50
0.50
-3
1.60x10 £ + 13.75
1.0
-3
3.19x10 £ + 13.00
2.5
-3
7.89x10 £ + 11.00
4.0
-3
12.77x10 £ + 10.00
Because price is a convex function of sulfur content, x, it is true 
that the utility's choice of x is a decreasing function of £. When 
the price of a license, £, is zero, the highest sulfur oil is chosen 
to minimize costs. As £ rises the utility eventually chooses x = 2.5 
percent, x = 1 percent, etc., until at some point it chooses x = .025 
percent. Table 5 presents the fuel oil sulfur content specifications 
which minimize the total cost of oil as a function of the price of a 
license to emit sulfur oxides air pollutants.
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TABLE 5
CHOICE OF SULFUR CONTENT WHICH MINIMIZES 
THE FULL PRICE OF OIL AS A FUNCTION 
OF THE PRICE OF A LICENSE TO EMIT SULFUR OXIDES
Price £ of a license
to emit a ton of SO ,x
in 1977 dollars
Sulfur content of fuel 
chosen (x),
____in % by weight
: 0 to $ 210 4.0
210 to 420 2.5
420 to 470 1.0
470 to 940 .5
940 to 2720 .25
2720 to 4590 .10
4590 and up .025
Three points should be noted. First, a smoothed control 
cost function can of course be obtained by blending oils of differing 
sulfur content. Second, the choice of whether to include the endpoints 
of the intervals in the left-hand column of Table 5 is arbitrary. Third, 
the last open-ended interval is based on the assumption that 0.025 
percent sulfur oil is the lowest sulfur oil likely to be obtained under 
any circumstances.
If the utilities' choice of fuel sulfur content followed 
Table 5, we can calculate the demand for licenses and amount of sulfur 
released into the atmosphere, given the utilities' projected needs for
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fuel in the example case where fuel needs will be met by burning oil
2rather than natural gas, as shown in Table 6 and Figure 2.
TABLE 6
DERIVED DEMAND FOR LICENSES TO EMIT SULFUR OXIDES AIR POLLUTANTS 
AT EDISON AND DWP POWER PLANTS
Price of a license to
emit a ton of SOX
(dollars)
Demand by Edison 
(tons per day)
Demand by DWP 
(tons per day)
Total Demand 
(tons per day)
$ o to $ 210 2371 734 3105
210 to 420 1482 459 1941
420 to 470 593 184 777
470 to 940 296 92 388
940 to 2720 148 46 194
2720 to 4590 59 18 77
4590 and up 15 5 20
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Of course if we had considered intermediate sulfur contents the demand 
function would decrease smoothly instead of being a step function. As 
before, the value of demand at points of discontinuity can be the 
upper or lower value. Since one license represents one ton of sulfur 
oxides emitted into the air, the derived demand curves also yield the 
amount of sulfur emitted into the atmosphere annually by the utilities 
as a function of license price.
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Fig. 2 Derived Demand for Licenses
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FOOTNOTES
1. The Aerospace study suggested 90 percent of the SO2 would be 
removed. The SRI study suggested 95 percent would be removed.
2. In reality, some combination of gas and oil will probably be used 
in the early 1980s. Use of any natural gas would lower utility 
demand for licenses to emit sulfur oxides.
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TABLE A-l
MID-1977 PROJECTION OF 1980 ELECTRICAL GENERATION BY 
EDISON OIL FIRED STEAM PLANTS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
Notes:
(a) Cluster of old units
(b) Reference: Southern California Edison Company (1976)
(c) Reference: Southern California Edison Company (June 1977)
Plant Unit Capacity
(Megawatts)
(b)
Capacity
Factor
(O
Estimated Electrical 
Production
(10 kwh/365 day year)
Alamitos 1 175 2A.3 372.75
2 175 2A.3 372.75
3 320 6A.3 1,807.40
4 320 64.3 1,807.40
5 A80 71.6 3,018.89
6 A80 71.6 3,018.89
El Segundo 1 175 24.3 372.75
2 175 2A.3 372.75
3 335 64.3 1,892.12
A 335 64.3 1,892.12
Etiwanda 1 132 8.5 98.56
2 132 8.5 98.56
3 320 64.3 1,807.40
A 320 64.3 1,807.40
Highgrove 1 32.5 8.5 24.27
2 32.5 8.5 24.27
3 A4.5 8.5 33.23
A AA.5 8.5 33.23
HuntingtonBeach 1 215 58.6 1,106.70
2 215 58.6 1,106.70
3 215 58.6 1,106.70
A 225 58.6 1,158.17
Long Beach (a) 100 8.5 74.5
Mandalay 1 215 58.6 1,106.70
2 215 58.6 1,106.70
Ormond Beach 1 750 69.2 4,558.90
2 750 69.2 4,558.90
Redondo Beach 1 7A 8.5 55.25
2 7A 8.5 55.25
3 70 8.5 55.25
A 7A 8.5 55.25
5 175 24.3 372.75
6 175 24.3 372.75
7 A80 71.6 3,018.89
8 A80 71.6 3,018.89
San Bernardino 1 63 8.5 47.04
2 63 8.5 47.04
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TABLE A-2
MID-1977 PROJECTION OF 1980-81 ELECTRICAL GENERATION BY 
DWP OIL FIRED STEAM PLANTS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
Plant Unit
Capacity
(Megawatts)
Capacity
Factor
Estimated Electricity 
Production
(10 kwh/365 day year)
Haynes 1 222 50.22 977.6
2 232 67.37 1,370.3
3 220 66.41 1,279.8
4 227 70.43 1,398.5
5 344 69.91 2,109.6
6 344 77.90 2,350.5
Scattergood 1 179 31.01 485.9
2 179 33.70' 528.0
3 309 76.14 2,060.3
Harbor 1 78.5 0 0
2 78.5 0 0
3 92 0.92 7.4
4 92 2.14 17.3
5 94 1.61 13.3
Valley 1 101 4.73 41.9
2 101 3.27 28.9
3 171 9.41 141.0
4 160 29.43 412.5
Total 3,224 46.84 13,222.7
Reference: Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(February 7, 1977 and August 9, 1977)
TABLE A-3
1976 AVERAGE HEAT RATES FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON AND 
LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER CONVENTIONAL STEAM 
GENERATING STATIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN
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Notes: (a) Heat rate: total BTU's of fuel heating value consumed
net kwh of electricity produced
(b) Electrical generation using oil is estimated to be 3.5% more thermally efficient than using natural gas.
References: Southern California Edison (1976)
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (1976).
1976
Actual. . 
Heat Rate^ 
(BTU /kwh)
1976
Oil Burned 
(10° BTU/Yr)
1976
Natural Gas 
(10° BTU/Yr)
Heat Rate Adjusted., . 
to All Oil Operation 
(BTU/kwh)
Southern California Edison
Alamitos 9,868 68,197,613 8,850,727 9,830
El Segundo 10,022 30,204,169 10,354,953 9,936
Edlwanda 10,101 30,862,690 9,529,807 10,020
Highgrove 13,997 383,999 287,543 13,794
Huntington Beach 9,974 21,832,079 10,374,217 9,865
Mandalay 9,815 13,351,131 4,322,416 9,734
Ormond Beach 9,754 56,764,209 1,245,721 9,747
Redondo Beach 10,235 48,373,537 9,681,465 10,177
San Bernardino 10,268 3,419,742 4,373,825 10,073
Los Angeles Dept, of Water & Power
Haynes 9,564 62,211,510 4,900,723 9,540
Scattergood 10,129 6,632,475 10,204,564 9,919
Harbor 12,801 393,242 922,494 12,668
Valley 11,299 3,800,348 4,271,610 11,116
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Notes:
EARLY 1980s PROJECTED RESIDUAL FUEL OIL USE 
BY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CONVENTIONAL STEAM 
GENERATING STATIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN 
(BASE CASE: ALL FUEL NEEDS MET BY OIL)
TABLE A-4
Plant Unit Residual Fuel 
Oil Consumption. 
(Barrels/Year)
Alamitos 1 598,608
2 598,608
3 2,902,550
A 2,902,550
5 A ,8A8,11A
6 A,8A8,11A
El Segundo 1 605,06A
2 605,06A
3 3,071,371
A 3,071,371
Etiwanda 1 161,6052 161,605
3 2,963,521
A 2,963,521
Highgrove 1 5A.6932 5A,693
3 7A,885A 7A.885
Huntington Beach 1 1,783,606
2 1,783,606
3 1,783,606A 1,866,557
Long Beach 15A,183(a) (b)
Mandalay 1 1,759,921
2 1,759,921
Ormond Beach 1 7,259 ,A37
2 7.259.A37
Redondo Beach 1 91,8592 91,859
3 91,859
A 91,859
5 619,7A0
6 619,7A0
7 5,019,252
8 5,019,252
San Bernardino 1 77.A10
2 77 ,A10
Total 67,771,336
(a) Heat rate for the older Long Beach conventional 
generating units assumed to be 12,668 BTU/kwh 
based upon data from small, old units at the LADWP 
Harbor Plant.
(b) SCE residual fuel oil energy content given as 
6,121,080. BTU/bbl.
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EARLY 1980s PROJECTED RESIDUAL FUEL OIL USE 
BY LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER CONVENTIONAL 
STEAM GENERATING STATIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN 
(BASE CASE: ALL FUEL NEEDS MET BY OIL)
TABLE A-5
Plant Unit Residual Oil 
Consumption 
(Barrels/year)
Haynes 1 1,524,192
2 2,136,458
3 1,995,358
4 2,180,425
5 3,289,113
6 3,664,548
Scattergood 1 787,671
2 855,918
3 3,339,863
Harbor 1 0
2 0
3 15,320
4 35,817
5 27,535
Valley 1 76,119
2 52,502
3 256,152
4 749,381
Total 20,986,372
Notes: (a) LADWP Residual Fuel Oil energy content
given as 6,118,849 BTU/bbl
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ESTIMATED CAPITAL COSTS OF SCRUBBER
INSTALLATION FOR EDISON ($/KW)
TABLE A-6
Plant Unit SRI Aerospace Avera;
Alamitos 1 140* 120.6 130.3
2 140* 120.6 130.3
3 146.5 120.6 133.6
4 146.5 120.6 133.6
3 136.4 120.6 128.5
6 136.4 120.6 128.5
El Segundo 1 140* 161.5 150.8
2 140* 161.5 150.8
3 145.4 161.5 153.5
4 145.4 161.5 153.5
Etiwanda 1 140* 143.9 142.0
2 140* 143.9 142.0
3 143.5 143.9 143.7
4 143.5 143.9 143.7
Highgrove 1 140* 134.9* 137.5
2 140* 134.9* 137.5
3 140* 134.9* 137.5
4 140* 134.9* 137.5
Huntington 1 148.5 142.7 145.6
Beach 2 148.5 142.7 145.6
3 146.4 142.7 144.6
4 146.4 142.7 144.6
Long Beach 140* 134.9* 137.5
Mandalay 1 148.5 134.9* 141.7
2 148.5 134.9* 141.7
Ormond Beach 1 131.2 121.8 126.5
2 131.2 121.8 126.5
Redondo Beach 1 140* 150.4 145.2
2 140* 150.4 145.2
3 140* 150.4 145.2
4 140* 150.4 145.2
5 140* 150.4 145.2
6 140* 150.4 145.2
7 136.4 150.4 143.4
8 136.4 150.4 143.4
San Bernardino 1 140* 134.9* 137.5
2 140* 134.9* 137.5
*Cost estimates for these particular units not given in the
references cited; hence the average of the estimates for all 
plants (DWP and Edison) was used. For SRI this figure is 
$140 and for Aerospace it is $134.9.
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TABLE A-7
ESTIMATED CAPITAL COSTS OF SCRUBBER
INSTALLATION FOR DWP ($/KW)
Plant Unit SRI Aerospace Averag
Harbor 1 140 134.9* 137.5
2 140 134.9* 137.5
3 140 134.9* 137.5
4 140 134.9* 137.5
5 140 134.9* 137.5
Valley 1 140 154.3 147.2
2 140 154.3 147.2
3 140 154.3 147.2
4 140 154.3 147.2
Scattergood 1 140 134.9* 137.5
2 140 134.9* 137.5
3 140 134.9* 137.5
Haynes 1 140 117.5 128.8
2 140 117.5 128.8
3 140 117.5 128.8
4 140 117.5 128.8
5 140 117.5 128.8
6 140 117.5 128.8
’‘Aerospace did not give estimates for these plants. The average 
figure of $134.9 was therefore used.
**SRI did not break down its estimate for DWP by plant. It only gave 
an overall average for DWP of $140/KW.
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TABLE A-8
ESTIMATED OPERATING COSTS OF SCRUBBERS 
FOR EDISON (MILLS/KWH)
Plant Unit SRI** Aerospace Average
Alamitos 1 2.1 1.7 1.9
2 2.1 1.7 1.9
3 2.1 1.7 1.9
A 2.1 1.7 1.9
5 2.1 1.7 1.9
6 2.1 1.7 1.9
El Segundo 1 2.1 2.1 2.1
2 2.1 2.1 2.1
3 2.1 2.1 2.1
A 2.1 2.1 2.1
Etiwanda 1 2.1 1.8 2.0
2 2.1 1.8 2.0
3 2.1 1.8 2.0
A 2.1 1.8 2.0
Highgrove 1 2.1 2.0* 2.1
2 2.1 2.0* 2.1
3 2.1 2.0* 2.1
A 2.1 2.0* 2.1
Huntington 1 2.1 2.0 2.1
Beach 2 2.1 2.0 2.1
3 2.1 2.0 2.1
A 2.1 2.0 2.1
Long Beach 2.1 2.0* 2.1
Mandalay 1 2.1 2.0* 2.1
2 2.1 2.0* 2.1
Ormond Beach 1 2.1 1.7 1.9
2 2.1 1.7 1.9
Redondo Beach 1 2.1 A.5 3.3
2 2.1 A.5 3.3
3 2.1 A.5 3.3
A 2.1 A.5 3.3
5 2.1 1.9 2.0
6 2.1 1.9 2.0
7 2.1 1.9 2.0
8 2.1 1.9 2.0
San Bernardino 1 2.1 2.0* 2.1
2 2.1 2.0* 2.1
*Aerospace did not provide an estimate for this unit. Therefore the
weighted average for all plants (except Redondo 1-A and Valley)
was used.
**SRI provided iDnly an average estimate for all Edison plants.
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ESTIMATED OPERATING COSTS OF SCRUBBERS FOR DWP (MILLS/KWH)
TABLE A-9
Plant Unit SRI** Aerospace Average
Harbor 1 2.1 2.0* 2.1
2 2.1 2.0* 2.1
3 2.1 2.0* 2.1
4 2.1 2.0* 2.1
5 2.1 2.0* 2.1
Valley 1 2.1 4.7 3.4
2 2.1 4.7 3.4
3 2.1 4.7 3.4
4 2.1 4.7 3.4
Scattergood 1 2.1 2.0* 2.1
2 2.1 2.0* 2.1
3 2.1 2.0* 2.1
Haynes 1 2.1 1.4 1.8
2 2.1 1.4 1.8
3 2.1 1.4 1.8
4 2.1 1.4 1.8
5 2.1 1.4 1.8
6 2.1 1.4 1.8
*Aerospace did not provide an estimate for this unit. Therefore the
weighted average for 
was used.
all plants (except Redondo 1-4 and Valley)
**SRI provided only an 
Therefore this figure
average estimate 
is used.
for all Edison plants.
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TABLE A-10
ESTIMATED ANNUALIZED SCRUBBING COSTS FOR EDISON
Plant Unit
Annualized Capital 
Cost
(Mills/kwh)
Total Annualized 
Cost
(Mills/kwh)
Total Annualized 
Cost
($ per bbl)
Alamitos 1 12.2 14.1 8.78
2 12.2 14.1 8.78
3 4.7 6.6 4.11
4 4.7 6.6 4.11
5 4.1 6.0 3.74
6 4.1 6.0 3.74
El Segundo 1 14.2 16.3 10.04
2 14.2 16.3 10.04
3 5.5 7.6 4.68
4 5.5 7.6 4.68
Etiwanda 1 38.1 40.1 24.50
2 38.1 40.1 24.50
3 5.1 7.1 4.34
4 5.1 7.1 4.34
Highgrove 1 36.9 39.0 17.32
2 36.9 39.0 17.32
3 36.9 39.0 17.32
4 36.9 39.0 17.32
Huntington 1 5.7 7.8 4.84
Beach 2 5.7 7.8 4.84
3 5.6 7.8 4.84
4 5.6 7.8 4.84
Long Beach 10 36.9 39.0 18.84
Mandalay 1 5.5 7.6 4.78
2 5.5 7.6 4.78
Ormond Beach 1 4.2 6.1 3.83
2 4.2 6.1 3.83
Redondo Beach 1 39.0 42.3 25.40
2 39.0 42.3 25.40
3 39.0 42.3 25.40
4 39.0 42.3 25.40
5 13.6 15.6 9.38
6 13.6 15.6 9.38
7 4.6 6.6 3.97
8 4.6 6.6 3.97
San Bernardino 1 36.9 39.0 23.44
2 36.9 39.0 23.44
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ESTIMATED ANNUALIZED SCRUBBING COSTS FOR DWP *
TABLE A-ll
Plant Unit
Annualized Capital 
Cost
(Mills/kwh)
Total Annualized 
Cost
(Mills/kwh)
Total Annualized
Cost
($ per bbl)
Harbor 1 * k k
2 * k k
3 341.2 343.3 165.81
4 146.7 148.8 71.87
5 195.0 197.1 95.20
Valley 1 71.1 74.5 40.98
2 102.8 106.2 58.41
3 35.7 39.1 21.51
4 11.4 14.8 8.14
Scattergood 1 10.1 12.2 6.71
2 9.3 11.4 7.03
3 4.1 6.2 3.83
Haynes 1 5.9 7.7 3.94
2 4.4 6.2 3.97
3 4.4 6.2 3.97
4 4.2 6.0 3.85
5 4.2 6.0 3.85
6 3.8 5.6 3.59
*No electricity is produced from these units.
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APPENDIX F-2 
PETROLEUM COKE CALCINERS 
Robert Hahn
This paper examines the economics of the petroleum coke 
calcining industry in the Los Angeles basin. The purpose is to assess 
the viability of the coke calciners under a market in transferable 
rights to emit sulfur oxides. A summary of the coke calcining process 
is presented in Section I along with some background material on the 
industry. Estimates of abatement costs, emissions and the demand for 
sulfur oxides emission licenses are presented in Section II. The 
issue of plant closure is discussed in Section III.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Almost all calciners currently used for processing petroleum 
coke are rotary kilns, of the type illustrated in Figure 1 (Hunter and 
Helgeson, 1976). Green coke is fed continuously down the rotary kiln 
while air and gas, injected from the bottom, pass over and through the 
coke. In the process, moisture is removed and volatiles are released, 
which are then burned to help meet the kiln's energy requirements 
(Foulkes and Harper, 1978). While the coke can also be used as fuel 
for the process, this is not allowed in Los Angeles because of the 
comparatively high sulfur content of the coke. Instead, either oil or 
natural gas is usually used.
F i g u r e  1. P e t r o l e u m  Co k e  Ca l c i n a t i n g  K i l n  S c h e m a t i c .
Source: Hunter and Helgeson (1976), p. K-2.
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The main source of sulfur oxides emissions (S0X) results from 
the combustion of coke dust particles, which are entrained in the air 
and gas passing through the system. The majority of these emissions 
pass through the stack; however, a small amount (equal to 
approximately 1 percent of the stack emissions) leave through the 
cyclone dust collector (Hunter and Helgeson, 1976). In addition, SO^ 
emissions can result from the burning of sulfur-bearing fuels, but 
again, such emissions are relatively small, usually comprising less
than 5 percent of total S0X emissions.
The quality of calcined coke depends on the level of 
impurities, such as sulfur and metals, the crystalline structure and 
several physical properties such as conductivity and resistance (Reis, 
1975b). Traditionally, cokes with low sulfur and metallic content 
have been used in the production of aluminum anodes. The primary 
aluminum industry has been the major demander of calcined coke in the 
past and, according to projections of two industry participants, will 
remain so in the future, comprising about 75 percent of the market 
(Buddenberg, 1979; Foulkes and Harper, 1978).
The structure of the industry reflects the close linkages to 
the supplier of its inputs and its principal customer. Approximately 
30 percent of United States calcining capacity is owned by divisions 
or subsidiaries of oil companies while 40 percent of the capacity is 
accounted for by end users, primarily aluminum (Buddenberg, 1979).
The market shares of the four largest U.S. firms are given in Table 1.
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TABLE 1 
MARKET SHARES
Great Lakes Carbon 35 %
Kaiser 15 %
Reynolds Aluminum 15 %
Union Oil Co. 10 %
4 firm concentration ratio 75 %
Source: Buddenberg (1979)
Several of the firms in the industry have established subsidiaries in 
other countries. The general picture that emerges is one of a highly 
concentrated industry with some vertical integration both backwards 
and forwards.
There are two firms which have petroleum coke calcining plants 
in the Los Angeles basin —  Great Lakes Carbon (GLC) operates a plant 
with three kilns in Wilmington, California, and Martin Marietta Carbon 
(MM) runs a plant with one kiln in Carson, California. The next 
section develops estimates of the effects of different pollution 
abatement schemes by focusing on the characteristics of the two 
individual plants.
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II. ABATEMENT COSTS OF PETROLEUM COKE CALCINERS IN LOS ANGELES
Ideally, it would be useful to predict how the petroleum coke 
calciners would fare under a decentralized market system such as an 
effluent fee or tradable license scheme. This requires an estimate of 
profits and abatement costs. Because figures on the profitability of 
calcining operations are unavailable, the following remarks will focus
on the problem of obtaining abatement cost estimates for S0X 
emis sions.
There are three published studies which develop estimates for 
the cost per ton of S0X or S02 removed. The estimates are summarized 
in Table 2. The scrubber cost estimates are developed under very
TABLE 2
ESTIMATE OF S0x 0R S02 REMOVAL COST USING 
CURRENTLY AVAILABLE SCRUBBER TECHNOLOGY
Source GLC
Hunter and Helgeson (1976) $ 600/ton of SO a° x
Leo and P^ossoff (1978) $2447/ton of S02^
MM
$ 600/ton of SO^3 
$11 57/ton of S02^
South Coast AQMD (1978) $1740/ton of S02c $ 80/ton of S02c
a. Rough estimates presumably in 1976 dollars; these estimates do not 
distinguish between the two plants
b. in late 1977 dollars
c. presumably in 1978 dollars
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different assumptions. The figure of $80 per ton of SO2 re<*uct^on f°r 
MM is suspect and may be a typographical error. The most detailed 
documentation of cost estimates is contained in Leo and Rossoff 
(1978). These cost estimates are based on the objective of emitting
no more than 1.5 pounds of S02 Per ton of §reen coke charged into the 
kiln, which is equivalent to about a 90% reduction in emissions using 
their emissions projections. To meet this level of emissions 
reductions, Leo and Rossoff assume that both companies will build 
scrubbers. This explains their relatively high figure for the average 
SC*2 removal cost.
The abatement costs presented in the literature are of limited 
use because they rarely consider how costs vary as a function of 
emissions. Since such information is fundamental, I have developed 
estimates of the abatement cost curves on the basis of data from Great 
Lakes Carbon and Martin Marietta.
Table 3 gives the cost of reducing S0x emissions for GLC. 
Currently, GLC has three baghouses in operation to remove 
particulates. The technology on which the Great Lakes Carbon cost 
estimates are based is sodium carbonate injection, which is a wet 
scrubbing process. Cost estimates are provided for 70 and 80 percent 
removal. This allows us to compute an incremental or marginal cost
for removing a ton of SO^ fn the 0-70 percent interval and the 70-80 
percent interval. The basic approach is to divide the incremental 
cost by the number of tons removed. An estimate of the incremental 
cost is obtained by removing the items labeled "Plant Overhead" and 
"Contingency," and adding the first two columns in Table 3. This
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yields a cost of $2,552,000 for 70 percent removal and an incremental 
cost of $513,900 for removing the next 10 percent.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED COST OF ABATEMENT —  SUBMITTED BY 
GREAT LAKES CARBON AS PART OF TESTIMONY ON PROPOSED RULE 1119
SODIUM CARBONATE INJECTION 
(Annual Cost)
Source: Great Lakes Carbon Corporation (1979).
Continuous
70%
controls
80%
Intermittent controls 
36 days 18 days
Raw material, delivered 1 ,288,200 1 ,682,400  138,020 69,010 
Utilities  93,100  93,100  9,980 4,990 
Manpower & benefits  180,600  180,600  19,350  9,675
Repair & Maintenance  222,100  222,100  23,800  11,900
Waste Disposal  451,100  570,800  48,330  24,165 
Plant Overhead  339,800  339,800  339,800  339,800 
Taxes & Insurance  50,000  50,000  50,000  50 ,000 
Depreciation (5 years)  200,000  200,000  200,000 200,000 
Supervision & benefits  66,900  66,900  66,900  66,900
SUBTOTAL 2,891,800 3 ,405,700  896 ,180  776 ,440 
Contingency (10%)  289,200 341,000  89 ,620  77,640 
TOTAL [3,181,000 3,746,700  985,800  854,080
$/ton calcined coke 5.26 6.19 1.63 1.41
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Total yearly emissions are computed by linking the rate of 
input with daily emissions and then multiplying by the number of days 
per year the plant is operating. GLC has three kilns with a capacity 
to produce 600 short tons per day of calcined coke (Leo and Rossoff, 
1978). I assume a charge rate of 36.9 tons per hour per kiln which 
corresponds to a daily emissions rate of 15.24 tons of SO^ for app 
three kilns (Cass, 1979). Combining this emissions data with the cost 
data yields a marginal cost per ton of $650 for the first 10.67 tons 
and $920 for the next 1.52 tons. This information is summarized in 
Table 4.
TABLE 4
MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST DATA 
(1978 $s)
Percent reduction Quantity reduced Marginal cost 
in emissions (tons SOx/day) ($/ton S0X^
GLC 
0- 70 
70- 80 
80-100
 0-10.67 
 10.67-12.19 
 12.19-15.24
 650 
 920 
 920 and up 
MM 
0- 33 
33- 80 
80-100
 0-2.50 
 2.50-6.06 
 6.06-7.58
 0 
 1320 
 1320 and up 
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The calculations for Martin Marietta require some further 
assumptions. With current equipment, MM can remove approximately 33 
percent of their total S0X emissions (Young, 1980). To remove 80 
percent of their total SO^ emissions would require a capital outlay of 
$5.5 million. This includes expenditure on a spray dryer scrubber 
system, a baghouse, and significant modifications to existing 
equipment (Young, 1980). Assuming a 20 percent capital recovery 
factor yields an annualized capital cost of $1.1 million. Since no 
figures on operating costs were available, they were estimated on the 
basis of the Great Lakes Carbon data in Table 3. Subtracting the 
depreciation figure from the 80 percent removal cost estimate gives a 
total of $2,865,900 or about $640/ton. This figure is assumed to be 
MM's operating cost per ton for removing anywhere from 33-80 percent 
of the SO^ emissions.
To obtain the annual capital cost per ton of SO^ removed, an 
estimate of total emissions is needed. MM has a single kiln with a 
rated capacity of 750 tons per day (Leo and Rossoff, 1978). Assuming 
a 37 ton per hour charge rate, this corresponds to an average daily 
emissions rate of 7.58 tons of SO^ (Cass, 1979). Dividing the cost of 
removal by the corresponding reduction in tons results in an 
annualized capital cost of $680/ton for reductions between 33 and 80 
percent. Adding the operating cost yields a total incremental cost of 
$1320/t on in this range. These calculations are summarized in Table 4.
It is possible to compute the derived demand for S0X emission 
licenses from the marginal cost information contained in Table 4. At 
any given license price, a firm chooses that level of licenses which
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minimizes the sum of abatement costs and license costs. The data for 
GLC and MM are presented in Table 5. The choice of whether to include 
the endpoints of the intervals in the left-hand column of the table is 
arbitrary.
The derived demand curves shown in Figure 2 are drawn as step 
functions to indicate that only a few discrete changes in abatement 
levels are considered. According to the graph, GLC will reduce 
emissions by 0, 70 or 80 percent, unless the price of a license is at 
a switching point. Similarly MM will reduce emissions by 33 or 80 
percent. These emission reductions should not be interpreted as 
precise point estimates, but rather as an indication of the likely 
range of abatement which calciners would choose in response to a 
market mechanism for controlling SO^ emissions.
TABLE 5
THE DERIVED DEMAND FOR S0x EMISSION LICENSES
License Price Demand in
(1978 $s) tons SOx/cjay
 0-650  15.24
 650-920  4.57
GLC J____ 920 and up_____ ______ 3 .05
0-1320  5.08
1320 and up ______ 1.52MM
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Fig. 2 Estimate of Derived Demand for SOx Emissions Licenses
DG - Derived demand for SOx emission licenses by GLC
DM - Derived demand for SOx emission licenses by MM
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III. THE POSSIBILITY OF PLANT CLOSURE
There is one important point which the analysis has left 
unresolved. That is the effect a market in tradable licenses would 
have on output decisions, and in the extreme, whether either or both 
of the firms would be forced to close down. If the supply price of 
raw coke were to remain unchanged, then the effect on output would 
ultimately depend on the elasticity of demand for calcined coke and 
the change in the supply function induced by the implementation of a 
market in SO- emission licenses. Information on these parameters is
X
unavailable; nevertheless, it may be possible to develop some educated 
guesses on the likelihood that these firms would be forced to close.
Plant closure would be likely to occur if the price of inputs
increased significantly relative to competitors. A market in S0X 
emission licenses could affect local calciner costs in two ways: 
first, by charging for the right to pollute and second, by affecting 
the price of green coke. The first effect will probably increase 
overall spending on S0X abatement for both GLC and MM, but this should 
be compensated for by a decline in the price of green coke.
The reason for the expected drop in raw coke prices is that 
local petroleum refiners who supply coke would have two alternatives 
if local calciners shut down. The refiners could either sell the coke 
as fuel or sell the coke to calcining operations outside the Los 
Angeles basin. In the first case, losses on sales could be quite 
significant. According to one oil industry executive, current prices 
for raw coke sold to calciners range from $20 to $70 per ton while 
prices on green coke sold as fuel range from $15 to $40 per ton. The
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coke sold for fuel is typically of lower quality than that sold to 
calciners. Using the above numbers it would appear that selling all 
green coke as fuel could result in losses on the order of $15 to $30 
per ton of green coke. If, instead, the green coke were sold to 
calciners, the cost of rail transportation could be expected to exceed 
$20 per ton for shipping to San Francisco and at least twice that much 
for shipping to calciners in the Pacific Northwest (Riske, 1980). It 
appears, then, that local oil companies would be willing to absorb at 
least a $10 reduction in the price of green coke (per ton) before 
looking for other alternatives. If this is true, the likelihood that 
calciners would have to close would seem to be small, provided the 
equilibrium license price does not induce them to remove more than 80 
percent of their current S0X emissions.
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APPENDIX F-3
SULFUR ABATEMENT AT KAISER STEEL 
by George Fox
Modern iron making is a complex chemical process involving the 
reduction of iron ore —  oxidized elemental iron and impurities —  to 
molten iron that is 94.15 percent pure. The two main inputs to the 
process, coal and iron ore, contain large amounts of sulfur; 
metallurgical coals typically contain from .4 to 1.2 percent sulfur by 
weight, iron ores from .015 to .15 percent. Hot metal must contain 
less than .03 percent sulfur to retain its strength and structural 
properties; excess sulfur leads to cracking and tearing in rolling.'*'
In section I we will follow the flow of sulfur through a modern 
ironmaking facility. In so doing we will estimate the total discharge 
of sulfur from the Kaiser Steel plant, this being the first step in 
assessing the demand for sulfur oxides emission licenses should a 
market in licenses be implemented.
We will also discuss planned and in-place emission control 
equipment, as well as promising, inexpensive newer techniques for the 
reduction of sulfate pollution. Within this framework we will also 
look at process control options as they currently exist and the 
effects a spot market in emission licenses may have on input selection 
and production alteration. The steelmaking section will not be looked 
at in this study. Kaiser has shut down all open hearth furnaces, a 
large source of sox emissions, and is currently operating the basic
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oxygen plant no. 2, responsible for less than four tons SO2
equivalents per year (1978 inventory). The no. 1 oxygen shop, which
is currently unused due to slack steel demand, emits roughly 20 tons
2per year SO2 equivalents.
Section II will attempt to pick up some loose ends: the 
trigger price mechanism and its effect on West Coast steel markets, 
inland transportaion as a competitive disadvantage and the very 
important question of Kaiser's future viability in facing an emission 
license market in addition to worldwide steelmaking overcapacity.
Before examining these issues, a brief history and corporate 
profile of Kaiser Steel will be undertaken as useful background for 
the analysis to follow. Kaiser's Fontana, California, iron and 
steelmaking facility was constructed during World War II to supply 
Henry J. Kaiser's shipyards with steel. Kaiser wanted to locate on 
the coast but the military insisted that the plant be protected from 
possible Japanese shelling. The inland location without access to 
inexpensive shipping, puts Kaiser at a distinct disadvantage.
However, due to the recent closings of other mills, Kaiser is now the 
only fully integrated steel mill west of the Rockies. As the nation's 
ninth largest steel producer, Kaiser has capacity running to 3.4 
million tons of finished steel.
The company owns its own iron ore mine and pelletizing plant, 
Eagle Mountain in Riverside County, California, 160 miles from its 
Fontana mill, which supplies about 2.6 million tons of ore. About 75 
percent of the coal requirements are fulfilled by mines owned and 
leased in Sunnyside, Utah, 800 miles away, and York Canyon, near
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Raton, New Mexico, 1100 miles away. All limestone requirements are 
satisfied through ownership in mines at Cushenbury, California, 
operated by Kaiser Cement and Gypsum. Proven reserves of both coal 
and limestone are estimated at fifty years.
Seven coke oven batteries, each containing 45 individual oven 
slots, with a combined capacity of nearly 1.7 million tons of coke per 
year, supply four ironmaking blast furnace with raw iron output over 
2.6 million tons per year. Two sinter lines with a combined capacity 
of 3850 tons per day produce agglomerations of ore and coke fines, 
recycled flue dust, mill scale, scrap and limestone for use in the 
blast furnaces.
Under the old steelmaking technology there were twelve open 
hearth furnaces which are now shut down. In early October 1979, the 
No. 1 Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) shop, originally constructed in 1959, 
was shut down until further strengthening in steel demand. The No. 2 
BOF shop, a new, computerized facility opened in 1978 as part of a 
$250 million modernization program, has a capacity for 2.3 million 
tons of steel per year. In addition, the steel finishing section 
includes rolling and finishing mills, ingot stripping and soaking 
pits. Final good fabrication plants are operative in Napa, California 
as well as the main Fontana facility. Kaiser also owns marine 
assembly yards in Oakland and Vallejo, Califoria, a tubing maker, 
formerly MSL Tube and Steel Company, in Vernon, California, and drum 
and pail and metal stamping facilities in California, Oregon and
Arizona.
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The list of final products includes steel slabs, plate, ingot 
molds, pig iron, coal chemicals, hot and cold rolled sheet and strip, 
galvanized sheet, high quality pipe for oil and gas, as well as 
electric resistance, submerged, high test tin mill products, large- 
diameter water pipe, penstocks, pressure vessels, tunnel supports and 
liners, and offshore exploration and drilling platforms. Kaiser 
fabricates and erects bridges and buildings, designs and manufactures 
equipment for the production of line pipe, manufactures railroad car 
and automotive components and other stamped products. Kaiser also 
owns Kaiser International Shipping Corporation, with five vessels 
totalling 525,000 dwt. and shipping mostly coal, crude oil, iron ore 
and bulk products.
Kaiser has a 32.5 percent interest in Kaiser Resources Ltd. a 
Canadian coal, oil and gas producer; sold in August 1979 was a 28.3 
percent interest in Hamersley Holding Ltd. , an Australian iron ore 
producer.
In past years the estimated total annual return to investors 
has been in the 15-30 percent rage with actual growth and dividends
O
accounting for 18 percent per year. Current debt stands at
approximately $335 million with most in low interest mortgage
obligations ($238 million), 7 to 7 1/4 percent Pollution Control
Obligations ($33 million), and 9 percent bank loans due from 1980 to
1985 ($40 million). Current net worth is estimated to be $512 million
for 1979. Kaiser's debt to equity of 1 to 2 is higher than the usual
1 to 4 in the steel industry but much lower than the 4 to 1 ratio
4found for West Coast subsidiaries of foreign firms.
I SULFUR FLOW AND BALANCE - CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES
There are three basic material inputs —  coal, iron ore and 
limestone —  that are used in the production of iron, along with an 
energy input, the major share from the burning of the coke oven gas 
(COG) arising from the conversion of coal to coke. COG provides 
roughly two-thirds of all plant-wide energy requirements, the rest 
being provided by fuel oil, natural gas and utility supplied 
electricity.^ When natural gas was under federal regulation during the 
1970s, Kaiser burned a .5 percent sulfur fuel oil; with the lifting of 
the regulations a switch has been made to natural gas. Into the 
forseeable future supplies are expected to be plentiful. We won't 
consider any so emissions due to fuel oil inputs at this time 
although they can be included using the procedure developed by 
Rogerson.^ (1980)
Sulfur content in metallurgical coal varies from .4 to 1.2 
percent sulfur by weight. During the coking process, which involves 
the heating of coal in a refractory brick-lined slot oven, light 
weight hydrocarbons are driven off and collected for further 
processing and use. The remaining material, elemental carbon with 
contaminents is called coke. This product is pushed from the ovens in 
an incandescent state onto rail cars and cooled in a "quenching" tower 
to prevent the oxidation of the carbon. Roughly 1350 pounds per ton 
of coal is produced as coke and breeze. The volatile material driven 
off in the heating cycle is collected and processed for use as COG, 
tar, ammonium sulfate, ammonia liquid and light oil. Later in this
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section we will discuss the sox emission reduction equipment currently
installed on coke ovens at Kaiser.
A coke production cost model developed by PEDCo Environmental,
Inc.^ seems to represent quite realistically the important aspects of
coke oven operation. The variable that appears to be the most crucial
in determining emission and performance relationships is the gross
coking time. Information from interviews with Kaiser personnel
suggest gross coking times of from 13 to 20 hours. The choice of
coking time depends on a number of factors: grade, quality and price
of the coal, desired properties of the final product, production
level, etc. The total tonage of coal carbonized per year depends
inversely on the gross coking time; shorter gross coking times lead to
. . . . 3higher throughput of coal to coke. Similarly, the COG yield m  ft 
per ton of coal depends on the gross coking time and the percentage of 
volatile matter in a linear manner,
COG = (14,,000-150T)(V/29)
where T is the gross coking time, V is the percentage of 
volatile matter (29% is the baseline value. The coal used by 
Kaiser has roughly 33 percent volatile matter.) The total coal 
carbonized in tons per year is given by
TCC = (8760)( .92)(CHARGE/OVEN)(# of Ovens)/T
where an overall oven outage of 8 percent is assumed. An equation for 
the ammonium sulfate produced in pounds per ton of coal under a COG 
cleaning system is given by,
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Ammonium Sulfate Yield = (3.53+.741.T)(V/29)
Table 1 presents these figures for the Kaiser facility using gross 
coking times of 13, 14 and 15 hours. A study done by KVB Research
O
Associates for the California Air Resources Board0 estimated a daily 
COG production rate of 78 million cubic feet per day. At 78 percent 
capacity utilization (1975), COG at full production is roughly 100 X 
10° cf per day, in good agreement with the PEDCO value of 100.9 x 10° 
cf per day. As a further check on the consistency of the available 
information we can estimate the underfiring heat requirements per ton 
of coal from the KVB data. The KVB report finds a usage rate for the 
underfiring of the coke ovens of 200,000 cf per hour per coke oven 
battery. A 13 hour underfiring (with a one hour decarbonization time 
for a gross coking time of 14 hours), 45 ovens per batteries, 15 tons 
of coal per oven, and 525 BTU's per cubic foot COG heating value 
yields a 2 X 10^ BTU per ton coal of underfiring requirement, in 
agreement with the 1.92 X 10^ BTU per ton of coal value used by PEDCo. 
The undesulfurized COG content can be estimated from the PEDCo
data using the total recovered ammonium sulfate, corrected for the 
stoichiometric ratio of hydrogen sulfide to ammonium sulfate. The 
resulting value of 211 grains H^S per lOOcf is in good agreement with 
the 220 grains per 100 cf found by KVB from the sampling of the 
flue gas stream on Kaiser's coke ovens.
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TABLE I
GROSS COKING TIME 13 14 15
(hours)
TOTAL COAL CARBONIZED 2.93 2.72 2.54
(Million Tons per Year)
TOTAL COKE YIELD
(Million Tons per Year)
1.81 1.68 1.57
TOTAL COG
(10 Cubic Feet per Day)
110.1 100.9 81.8
TOTAL AMMONIUM SULFATE 
(Thousand Tons per Year)
21.9 21.5 21.2
COG H„S Content 197 211 256
(Grains per Hundred Cubic Feet)
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There are currently six baghouses for particulate control on
the coke ovens at Kaiser; batteries F and G vent to a common stack.
This arrangement is not in compliance with the current standard;
bigger fans will probably be required. An earlier experiment with a
TRW wet ESP scrubber was a failure due to excessive corroding. Future
expenditures of roughly $20 million will be used to upgrade doors and
top seals, and emission controls for use during the pushing of the
incandescent coke from the ovens to the rail car. A COG
9desulfurization plant of the Takahox-Hirahox type is currently coming 
on line —  problems with napthalene sublimation currently prevent full 
operation, but no other major problems are forseen. The cost of the 
system was $34 million, which was financed by the Pollution Control 
Obligation mentioned earlier.
In our calculations of emissions from the coke ovens we will 
use a 95 percent efficiency for the desulfurization process. It 
should be noted that even with the cleaning of the COG, there will 
still be seepage through the refractory brick oven lining so the 
baghouses will still be necessary for proper control. At the present
time there appears to be no satisfactory way to estimate these
. • 10emissions.
After quenching, the coke is crushed and screened, the large 
pieces being charged directly to the blast furnace. The smaller 
pieces called coke breeze are combined with limestone, ore fines, 
dust, etc. and sintered on a travelling grate. The mixture is ignited 
under a hood, either with COG, blast furnace gas, or other fuel, 
burning from top to bottom as it travels along the grate. The
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agglomerates obtained at the end are charged directly to the blast 
furnace in mixtures with coke, iron ore, limestone and pellets. A 
typical mixture designed to yield one ton of sinter contains roughly 
2000 pounds iron ore, 135 pounds coke and from 100 to 350 pounds of 
limestone.^ Return fines and losses which balance out are roughly 
1000 pounds. The coke in the mixture provides 85 percent of the heat 
requirements for the sinter; net ignition heat requirements vary from 
.24 to .34 million BTUs per ton of output. Burning undesulfurized COG 
results in .35 pounds S02 Per ton sinter; blast furnace gas or 
desulfurized COG results in .017 pounds SO^ per ton output. In 
contrast the coke supplies 2.35 pounds SO2 per ton sinter. By far the 
largest source of sulfur results from high sulfur content iron ore, 
over 6 pounds SO2 per ton sinter, low sulfur ore being an order of 
magnitude smaller. With the trend to higher sulfur ores (low sulfur 
ores have been mined quite extensively and are at a premium price) it 
can be expected that sinter plant S0x emissions will tend to increase. 
In 1975, Kaiser's sinter emissions were less than 5 tons S02 Per day; 
by 1978 they had risen to 8 tons SO2 per day (both periods had the 
same capacity utilization.) The KVB report published in June 1976 
recorded SO2 concentrations of 250 ppm in the exhausts while results 
from the AQMD published in May, 1978 study showed concentrations of 
400 ppm.
The limestone addition value is the other determining factor
in sinter plant SO emissions. Low limestone mixtures result in
12three-fourths of the SO2 being driven off with the stack gases. As 
the limestone content is increased more of the sulfur is bound up in
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the sintered product, usually half being emitted and half being 
retained in the sinter.
Current controls on the sinter lines consist of two, 12 year
old baghouses for the control of particulate emissions. The AQMD 
13Sulfate study lists two techniques for SO^ emission reductions on 
the sinter lines. The wet scrubbing method utilizes a chemical 
reaction between the flue gas and an alkaline scrubbing solution which 
results in the removal of SO^ from the gas stream. Many units are 
presently in use in the United States, Europe and Japan. Although the 
method is well understood, the costs per ton of sulfur reduced are 
high, in the neighborhood of $2000 per ton of SO^. A method known as 
dry caustic injection,^ although still experimental, seems to blend 
better into the system at Kaiser. A dry caustic powder, usually 
sodium bicarbonate, is crushed and ground then used to coat the 
baghouse bags. Further amounts are injected into the exhaust gas 
stream to combine with SO2 to form sodium sulfate. This is collected 
in the baghouse and then disposed of in the same manner as slag from 
the blast furnace. Cost savings can be realized through the pre­
existence of the baghouse and slag disposal accommodations. Annual 
capital costs for crushing, screening, and injection equipment run 
about $600,000 per year, nahcolite ore —  which is mined nearby and 75 
percent sodium bicarbonate —  sells at $30 per ton, yielding costs of 
$775,000 per year. A reduction of 3500 tons SO2 per year results in a 
cost of $400 per ton of SO2 reduced.'*'"*
The final stage of iron production is nearly continuous. A
mixture of iron-bearing inputs —  ore, sinter and pellets —  is mixed
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with coke and limestone and charged into the top of the blast furnace. 
Blasts of superheated air are blown into the bottom of the furnace.
The incomplete burning of the coke yields carbon monoxide which forms 
with oxygen in the ore to reduce the iron in the charge. The hot 
metal collects in the bottom to be drawn off to the steel furnaces.
The limestone combines with impurities in the charge and floats on top 
of the metal as slag. Slag can also be drawn off and new raw 
materials can be periodically charged to the furnace. The proper 
composition of the charge is a very complicated problem: heat balance 
to get the proper reduction of the iron ore, and sulfur accounting to 
keep the hot metal sulfur content below .03 percent.^
Off gases from the blast furnace are well-controlled at 
Kaiser. With current equipment the sulfur content is roughly 9 grains 
per 100 cf, well within regulations. Emissions can however occur 
during the slag flush. Indications are that usually 15 percent of the 
sulfur in the slag is released to the air.^ The final emissions can 
depend on the amount of sulfur in the slag as well as the amount of 
water in contact with the slag when flushed. Blast furnace emissions 
have increased from a little over one ton per day in 1975 to over four 
tons per day in 1978, primarily due to a move to higher sulfur ores. 
These emissions are largely uncontrollable. Fortunately the Fontana 
location is quite dry so that the expected emission are much less than 
would be found in the same plant in a wetter location.
A hot metal desulfurization technique using a calcium carbide 
process is also installed. The SCAQMD seems satisfied that there is 
no excess release of sulfur. Its use is purely for metal quality and
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not for airborne emission reduction.
A wide range of variability can be seen in total so^ 
emissions. Changes in sulfur contents in the inputs as well as 
process control changes can have major effects on total airborne 
S02/sulfates released. The final section attempts to put these 
effects together to come up with a realistic emissions picture. In 
the next section we will discuss points relevant to sox emission 
licenses outside the generation and control technologies at the plant 
level.
II EXTERNAL FACTORS
An analysis of final product markets is important in
determining the impact of a system of emission license markets. If
the firm has a large degree of market control then emission costs can
be passed through to the consumers of the final goods. Steel demand
tends to be cyclical; as the business cycle swings up demand for steel
also rises, as recessionary phases are entered demand falls off.
Estimating a demand for emission licenses tends to be complicated when
final output rises and falls substantially. One smoothing effect on
19final demands is the trigger price mechanism originally designed to 
prevent the dumping of foreign steel. Under the mechanism, to the 
unit cost of steel from Japan —  the assumed lowest cost producer —  
is added currency corrections and transportation costs to arrive at a 
trigger price. If foreign concerns are selling at less than the 
trigger price to U.S. customers, then an antidumping suit is filed.
The effect is that foreign firms selling in the U.S. will keep their
1 8
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prices above the trigger price in fear of an antidumping suit. In 
times of high demand when all firms are raising prices there is no 
effect; however in times of slack demand, foreign firms will not be 
able to go below the trigger price, hence domestic firms will pick up 
the demand. This may help to increase the market power of domestic 
f irms.
The effects on the fertilizer market in Southern California
from the added production of ammonium sulfate at the Kaiser facility
will also be important. Using information from the Annual Survey of
20Manufactures published by the U.S. Department of Commerce a very
rough estimate of 60,000 tons per year of fertilizer consumed in the
Southern California Market can be made. The 20,000 tons per year from
Kaiser could make a sizeable penetration into the market. The PEDCo
study assumes a $65 per ton of ammonium sulfate credit. This figure
could conceivably be reduced substantially, perhaps as low as $30 per
ton due to market influences. Russell and Vaughan give a figure in
1968 dollars of $17 per ton. Under the previous coke oven cleaning
technology, Kaiser had losses of roughly $200 per ton of ammonium
sulfate at low production rates. With the new desulfurization
equipment at the same price per ton of ammonium sulfate it costs $600
per ton. The change in revenues from $65 to $35 per ton ammonium
sulfate is small compared to the total costs of $600 per ton.
The future viability of Kaiser steel is an important question.
With the current lack of demand and world-wide steel overcapacity the
outlook is not good. Labor costs at Kaiser have averaged 66 cents per
21hour higher than the industry average. Iron ore and coal transport
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costs are $20 per ton higher than elsewhere. Add to that the already 
high amount spent on current controls and it's not hard to imagine 
further hardship should an emissions license market be implemented.
On a brighter note these are all sunk costs so that should Kaiser go 
under and be forced to sell the facility in all likelihood it would 
continue to be operated.
Ill DEMAND FOR LICENSES
The demand for licenses is computed as follows. Emissions 
from the three major sources, coke ovens, sinter lines and blast 
furnaces are estimated, then summed to yield total emissions at full
capacity. We then use a capacity utilization factor of 85 percent to
• • 22compute the average total emissions.
From the total ammonium sulfate yield of 20,500 tons per year 
at 95 percent efficiency, we can compute net S0£ emissions after 
control of 1.4 tons per day. A calculation based on 1000 pounds of 
coke (.9% sulfur) per ton hot metal produced, a 5 percent SO2 loss 
from the slag, and a 7200 tons per day production rate yields SO^ 
emissions of 3.2 tons per day from the blast furnaces. The coke and 
ignition fuels used in sintering yield 2.6 pounds SO^ per ton sinter, 
mainly from sulfur in the coke, and six pounds SO2 per ton sinter from 
the use of high sulfur ore. Under the assumption of a 75 percent 
airborne emissions factor and a 3850 tons per day production rate, we 
compute SO2 emissions of 12.4 tons per day. All totalled we have 
17.0 tons per day SO2 at full capacity or 14.45 tons SO2 per day at 
average capacity utilization. Ninety percent reduction of sinter
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emissions at $400 per ton yields reducible emissions of 9.5 tons per 
day. Emissions of 4.95 tons per day of SO^ remain to be offset 
through the purchase of emission licenses.
It needs to be stressed again that these are very rough 
approximations. Any changes in average sulfur content of coal or iron 
ore can change SO^ emissions quite substantially. Fluctuations in the 
demand for final steel goods can also have an appreciable effect on 
total emissions. Once an emissions license market is implemented, 
process control options may become attractive measures of reducing 
emissions; SO^ prices become factors in the linear programs used by 
steel companies to optimize inputs and outputs. As an example, 
changes in blast furnace burden limestone content drastically affects 
airborne SO2 emissions from the slag; a similar effect takes place in
the sintering process.
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Purchased Licenses (TONS/DAY)
DEMAND FOR SOx EMISSIONS 
LICENSES FROM KAISER STEEL
FOOTNOTES
1. Russell and Vaughan gives an excellent introductory discussion 
of steel and iron-making processes. Any deeper incursion
can be made through the references. Input sulfur contents
are roughly the high and low concentration found in representative
samples. The upper limit on hot metal sulfur concentration
is discussed in McGannon p. 431. The McGannon reference is
the steelman's bible— a detailed and complete presentation of
all equipment and processes in iron and steelmaking and
fabrication.
2. The 1978 Inventory of Emissions for Kaiser Steel Corporation, 
the most recent available estimate of emissions from Kaiser, 
was provided by the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
in Colton, California.
3. The financial information was found in the investment survey's 
published by Moody, Value Line, and Standard and Poors.
4. U.S. Trade Commission Report, p. 27, 126.
5. McGannon gives average plant usage figures and discussions.
6. Rogerson paper in these reports to ARB.
7. The Pedco report uses a large sample of current U. S. steel 
plant coke ovens and non-steel plant ovens to estimate 
parameters in the production cost model. The Kaiser coke
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oven characteristics are included in the PedCo study data.
8. Hunter and Helgeson used actual measurements taken on the 
coke ovens at Kaiser. The readings were taken in 1976.
9. The Massey and Dunlap reference gives a survey of current 
coke oven gas cleaning systems and their economics.
10. These emissions are a small fraction of total emissions at the 
current time and hence little effort has been expended to 
estimate them.
11. Russell and Vaughan, p. 71.
12. Russell and Vaughan, p. 72.
13. Wet Scrubbing, pp. 6.42 ff. Dry Caustic Injection, pp. 6.61 ff.
14. Genco, et al. is the standard reference for dry caustic 
injection applied to SO2 emission control. The cost 
figure used by the SCAQMD Sulfur Dioxide/Sulfate Study are 
derived from those in Genco, et al.
15. SCAQMD Study, p. 6.69.
16. Russell and Vaughan, p. 86ff.
17. Russell and Vaughan, p. 92.
18. Private conversations with SCAQMD and Kaiser Steel.
19. U. S. Internation Trade Commission, p. 75ff. A detailed
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explanation of the TPM and its effects on West Coast Steel 
markets are discussed. There's a brief reference on page 83, 
to Kaiser using the TPM to discount selected flat-rolled 
products by utilizing the TPM "to maintain a margin beneficial 
to producer sales."
20. The Survey only gives dollar volumes of selected products 
sold in specific years in the Southern California region.
Using an average wholesale price of nitrogen based fertilizer 
of $25 per ton and total sales of roughly $1.5 million in 1972 
in Southern California we obtained the 60,000 ton figure.
21. L.A. Times Article, September 7, 1980.
22. Standard and Poor's investment survey gives raw iron output 
figures for the past decade, a good approximation for the 
average capacity utilization factor.
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APPENDIX F-4
THE ECONOMICS OF SULFUR OXIDE ABATEMENT STRATEGIES 
IN GLASS MANUFACTURING
Asha Paranjape
In assessing the prospects for the use of tradable emissions 
rights as an approach to controlling SO^ emissions in Los Angeles, 
the consequences for the glass industry are an especially germane 
part of the analysis. Glass manufacturing is not a particularly 
important source of SO^ emissions, accounting for only about two 
tons per day SO2 equivalent, nor is it a major component of the 
Los Angeles economy. Interest in the industry arises because it 
raises some classic regulatory problems. First, the industry is 
comprised of several small firms, and so the issue arises that a 
general environmental policy that is primarily aimed at a few 
large sources of emissions could inadvertently drive these small 
businesses out of the local market. Second, the industry emits several 
pollutants, and control strategies for one often affect the costs 
and available strategies for controlling others. This chapter seeks 
to shed some light on these and related matters, and to develop a 
method for undertaking small business impact analysis that could be 
applied to other industries and for other emissions.
THE INDUSTRY
Glass is a mixture of inorganic oxides and fluxes which are 
heated to form a solution, and then cooled sufficiently rapidly to 
prevent crystalization. The main component is silica, Si02, ordinary
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sand. The fluxing agents, which affect the melting point, working 
temperature, viscosity and color of the mixture are added in varying 
proportions to achieve the desired properties in the batch.
The process, shown in Figure 1, begins by measuring the 
ingredients, by weight, according to the batch formula, and conveying 
the materials to the grinder. Here they are ground for about five 
minutes, to facilitate the formation of the solution, and then the mixture 
is fed into the furnace. In large-scale production of glass, a continuous 
furnace is employed, which is a massive tank, constructed from refractory 
blocks, that has two sections. The sections are separated by a partial 
wall of refractory blocks that does not quite extend to the bottom of 
the tank, so as to permit a flow under it. The dry raw materials enter 
the melting end of the tank where they are raised to a temperature of 
around 2800°F (Phillips, 1960). At such a high temperature massive 
convection currents are created which serve to homogenize the mixture 
and permit trapped gases to escape. The mixture is initially very 
foamy and lumpy, but by the time it passes under the wall to the 
working end of the furnace, it is a clear solution. The temperature 
in this end of the furnace is much cooler, so that the molten glass 
has the right viscosity for formation.
The batch leaves the furnace through a small opening at the 
bottom of the extreme end of the working end of the furnace. Then it 
enters the automatic feeder which drops gobs of glass in the pregreased 
molds where they are blown or pressed. Finally, the formed containers 
move along a conveyor belt through the annealing ovens where they are 
heated again and then cooled in a regulated fashion to remove any
Fig. 1 Flow Diagram for Soda-Lime Glass Manufacture
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stress caused by the forming.
There are twenty-six glass furnaces in the Los Angeles Basin 
at thirteen locations. Altogether, they produce around 2,000 tons of 
glass per day (a very rough approximation^) and release approximately 
two tons of sulfur oxides daily into the atmosphere (Cass, 1977).
The significant part of the production occurs in eight large factories: 
Ball, Kerr, Brockway, Owens-Illinois at two locations, Glass Containers, 
Anchor-Hocking, and Thatcher. The rest are very minor producers. 
However, the situation is not as competitive as one might suspect.
Many firms specialize in particular product lines (such as open- 
mouthed containers for packaging peanut butter), in which only two 
or three other firms are engaged. Buyers typically purchase from 
at least two or three firms, not only to get a good price, but also 
to guarantee themselves a steady supply since glass furnaces are 
usually down for about two weeks of the year.
Demand for glass grows at about 8 percent per year, and 
this is linked with the population growth of the basin. There are 
many substitutes for glass containers, such as plastic and aluminum; 
however, because of its clarity, purity and the property that it has 
no effect on the taste, glass will definitely remain an important means 
of packaging foods and beverages. Furthermore, although no exact
numbers can be quoted, the demand is quite inelastic with respect to
2prices.
On the supply side, it is more difficult to say what the 
elasticity is. At present glass producers do not have any genuine 
excess capacity; the furnaces are generally running at their normal
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load, unless they are down because of malfunctions (which tend to occur
fairly frequently), and can be run harder for unexpected surges in demand,
although this practice has a serious adverse effect on the furnace. A
furnace can normally operate five to six years between renovations, but
this period, called the campaign, can be halved by overuse. In extreme
situations, manufacturers ship from their San Francisco plants. The
practice is that the glass producer must absorb the transportation costs
3when the product is not produced at the local plant. Most producers 
have filed applications to expand their capacity and are awaiting the 
word of the authorities. Their production is growing about 2-3 percent 
per year (which is slower than the demand growth), and in the short run 
the supply is not very elastic. The long run, of course, is not really 
in the hands of the producers; it depends on entry and exit of 
manufacturing firms as well as changes in existing facilities which are
greatly influenced by future environmental regulation policies.
4At present, according to an interview, most furnaces in the 
basin are quite old. The industry has failed to reinvest, possibly due 
to new source regulations. Many furnaces are due for rebricking in the 
early 1980s; however, the rest of the structure of the furnace lasts for 
about fifty years. Renovation causes a plant to come under new source 
review regulations when rebricking costs exceed 50 percent of the costs 
of total replacement. Because the rate of tecnological progress in a 
well-established industry, such as glass, is very slow, small improvements 
in technology are not sufficient incentive to replace existing furnaces, 
and low profit furnaces (7-8 percent return on total investment) are 
being run. Newer designs have been adopted for the few new facilities
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that have been approved by the environmental authorities.
S02 EMISSIONS
In the Los Angeles Basin, the dominant line of production 
is soda-lime glass, for containers and clear beverage bottles. The 
ingredients of the soda-lime glass are 70-74 percent SiQ2, 13-16 
percent Na20 and K20, 10-13 percent CaO and MgO, 1.5-2.5 percent Al^^, 
and 0-0.5 percent BaO (Phillips, 1960). These can be gotten from sand, 
soda ash, salt cake, limestone, potash, dolomite, feldspar and barium 
carbonate. The main sources of sulfur are salt cake, Na2S0^, impurities 
in the sand, and the sulfur content of any fuels used. Other particulates 
can be formed during the reactions in the melting end and can be 
liberated from the batch by the bubbling hot gases. The emissions from 
the batch are the major source of pollution from glass factories. We 
shall not consider other sources, such as emissions from burning fuel, 
which are minor, dust arising from the grinding and moving of dry 
materials, which can be prevented by sealing the whole operation, and 
the burning of lubricants in the molds, a problem which has been 
resolved with a new lubricant consisting almost entirely of water.
A curious feature of glass production is that the amount of 
sulfur oxides emitted varies widely from furnace to furnace. It depends 
largely on the particular condition of the furnace. The size and 
temperature of the smelter area influences the emissions since this 
is where the air comes in contact with the molten chemicals and reacts 
to form sulfur oxides. Another very important factor is the sulfur 
content of the batch ingredients themselves. The condition of the
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regenerative furnaces also affects the emissions. By a regenerative 
furnace we mean that the exhaust gases are used to heat up a checker- 
work of refractory blocks. Every fifteen to twenty minutes the intake 
and the outflow stacks are reversed, so that the heated blocks will 
heat the incoming air and the combustion in the furnace will be more 
efficient. However, as the dirty air passes through the checkerwork, 
dust collects on the surfaces which forms slag, and drips down to the 
lower passages. In later stages, the clogging of the checkers may be 
so severe that many passages are blocked off. Often the state of the 
checkers will determine which pollutants are emitted to the atmosphere. 
But of course, as the passages get worse, the efficiency of the furnace 
falls and more sulfur-containing fuel has to be burned to keep the 
production going. Destructive forces set in as hot spots develop 
in the clogged checkers and air is still being forced through the 
passages until complete breakdown occurs. There are access doors 
to the various checkerwork chambers that permit some periodic cleanup, 
but it can never be complete. The checkers do eventually deteriorate 
and require at least partial rebuilding every five to six years.
Thus, removal of the slag-forming pollutants is consistent with the 
interests of the glass producers. It will reduce maintenance costs 
as well as increase the campaign of the furnace, and it may also 
reduce fuel costs.
At present there are turee general environmental regulations of 
the South Coast Air Quality Management District that affect the glass 
industry: Rule 401, an opacity limit; Rule 405, limiting particulate 
matter concentration in the stack; and Rule 406, limiting the weight of
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particulate matter emitted from the furnace. Because the latter two 
have become progressively stronger, the opacity constraint is no longer 
binding. Sulfur oxides emission controls have not been applied directly 
to glass furnaces to date in the Los Angeles area. The industry is 
anticipating a ruling on NO^ emissions which would become effective in 
the next year or two.
Environmental control agencies normally seek adoption of the 
best available control technology (BACT). This approach has certain 
problems. Presumably regulatory agencies seek to meet a specified air 
quality objective using a control strategy that minimizes interference 
with the rest of the economy. The actual policy is far more simple 
than this idea would imply, being to identify the BACT, and to announce 
that a source will be subject to continuing pressure from the agency 
until it is adopted. Two immediate questions arise.First, are the 
agencies able to even find a best control technology, given that they 
are not engaged in the production activity that they are trying to 
regulate? Second, even if they do, how do they know it is best for 
every producer? Each glass furnace is different, and industry-wide 
BACT standards do not take these factors into account.
An additional problem is that, over time, regulatory policy 
sometimes overlooks compatibility issues. The BACT for one pollutant 
does not necessarily function very well in conjunction with the BACT 
for another. So those who succumbed to persuasion to reduce one 
emission last year can find themselves regretting not having left their 
options open. It is not a matter of irresponsibility, but a problem of 
uncertainty: uncertainty about which pollutants will become the
dominant problems in the future, and how various political forces
will work to form the new rules.
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"b&ble 1 (Tanner, 1975) shows that sulfur oxides are 
emitted from glass furnaces both as S02 gas and in the form of 
particulate matter. Thus our discussion of sulfur oxides abatement 
possibilities must consider control of both gaseous and particulate 
emissions. The two known means of controlling sulfur oxides emissions 
from glass furnaces are process modification and add-on devices.
TABLE 1
SULFUR MATERIALS BALANCE DATA ON A GLASS FURNACE 
AS REPORTED BY TANNER (1975)
(ALL VALUES IN EQUIVALENT LB/HR S02)
Sulfur Input
From Batch 
From Cullet
From Fuel (Natural Gas) 
Total
Sulfur Retention
64.8 LB/HR S0„ Equivalents 
2.4
3.0
70.2 LB/HR S02 Equivalents
10.9 LB/HR S02 Equivalents
SO Emission x
As Na.SO,2 4
AS H„S0,2 4
As S02 (By Difference)
2.3
1.4
55.4 LB/HR S02
Measured SO =58.4 LB/HR SO. Equivalents x 2
Process modification refers to any change in the process
which will reduce emissions. An obvious method is to minimize the
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sulfur content of the batch by using fluxing agents that do not contain 
sulfur. This procedure has met with limited success since changes in the 
fluxing agents tend to affect the properties of the glass. Akin to 
minimization of the sulfur content is the procedure of adding other 
chemicals to the batch which prevent the formation and liberation 
of sulfur-bearing particles. For example, the introduction of 
appropriate amounts of carbon to the batch can reduce particulate 
emissions by at least a factor of two (Tanner; 1975). Particle 
emissions can further be controlled by leaving the raw materials in 
a coarser mixture so that the escaping gases from the batch carry with 
them less dust from the raw materials. Another technique of reduction 
of sulfur oxides is to alter the fuel/air ratio so that the oxidation 
of sulfur is inhibited. Incidentally, this is also effective in 
reducing nitrogen oxide emissions. Some of the sulfur oxides are 
formed right on the melting surface where the hot batch ingredients 
come in contact with the air. One way to reduce this reaction is by 
keeping the surface area of the smelter as small as possible within 
certain bounds that are necessary for the production of good glass. 
Lastly, the temperature of the surface can be reduced, slowing down 
the sulfur reactions, by electric melting or just electric boosting, 
from within the tanks.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain specific 
information about these process modifications and about their costs 
except for the electric melting. Since the research in these areas 
is only in the developmental stages, the firms were reluctant to reveal 
anything in case it could benefit their competitors. It does not
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appear that these techniques have large fixed costs associated with 
them, with the exception of electric melting, and it was understood 
from the interviews that many of these methods could actually increase 
the efficiency of production.
The other approach to reducing sulfur oxides emissions 
is the use of add-on devices. There are basically three kinds 
of add-on devices: precipitators, scrubbers, and baghouses.
Electrostatic precipitators operate by passing the flue gases between 
charged collection plates. They are unable to remove the acid gases 
although they are very efficient for removing sulfur-bearing particulate 
emissions. Low energy scrubbers can be used for both particulate and 
SO2 removal provided that chemicals are added which react with the 
SO2 and cause it to be incorporated into the scrubbing liquid. An 
example of this type of scrubber, which will be considered in this 
study, is the "nucleator," a dual alkali scrubber with regeneration 
of sodium-based chemicals. Also available are venturi scrubbers.
These high energy scrubbers can be used with chemical reagents to 
remove sulfur-bearing particulate matter and SO2. Venturi scrubbers 
have the disadvantage of high operating costs because they require a 
large pressure drop in the system. Lastly, the baghouse is a large 
fabric filter through which treated or untreated exhaust gases are 
passed to remove pollutants. Here the temperature of the stack gases 
is critical since the bags are likely to burn at high temperatures.
Two kinds of baghouse systems will be considered: the "chromatographic," 
which concentrates on removing particulate emissions; and the "chromato­
graphic X," which has an additional caustic injection feature designed
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to react with SO2 and incorporate it into the aerosol phase for 
subsequent collection in the baghouse. In all cases there can be 
waste sludge from which useful chemicals might be recovered.
Table 2 (Teller, 1976) compares the costs and properties of 
five add-on devices and electric melting. Interviews with people in the 
industry indicate that costs have undoubtedly changed since 1976. One 
firm producing 200 + 50 tons per day reported the following updated 1979 
costs: for the precipitator, $500,000 capital costs and $120,000 annual
operating costs; for the scrubber, $600,000 and $175,000; and for the 
baghouse, $400,000 and $150,000, respectively. Another producing 400 
tons per day was able to give the figures for the scrubber only at 
$1,000,000 and $200,000. Thus, costs appear to have changed only slightly.
From the data it appears that the chromatographic X baghouse 
is the least expensive and will remove 89 percent of the sulfur oxides 
emissions. For further reductions, 96 percent, the nucleator must be 
employed. At a slightly higher cost the venturi scrubber can be used 
to attain approximately the same results. The rest of the add-on 
devices and the electric melting are clearly more costly than the 
chromatographic X baghouse and the scrubbers. For the purpose of this 
comparison, sulfur-bearing particulate emissions have been converted 
into SO2 equivalents and then the amount of sulfur oxides abated is 
calculated by a weighted average of SO2 gas abated and particulate 
sulfur oxides abated, using for weights the proportion each type 
comprises of the total sulfur oxides emissions expressed in SO2 equivalents.
Present costs are not the only consideration in choosing an 
add-on device. The glass manufacturers understand that once purchased,
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TABLE 2
SYSTEM COMPARISON 150-TON FURNACE
cl UJ
O p a c ity
Electrostatic
Precip ita tor
< 1 0
Chrom ato­
graphic
0
Chrom ato­
graphic
X
0
V en tu ri
< 1 0
N uclM to r
< 1 0
Electric
M elt
< 2 0
Steam  P lum e N o N o N o Y e s N o N o
o  ¥u- Z P articu late 0 .0 1 5 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 .0 0 3  — 0 .0 1 5  — 0 .0 1 5 — 0 . 0 1 5 -oc <kU g r/* c f 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 2 5 0 .0 2 5 0 .0 2 5
S O x R em o va l —  % 0 ~ 2 5 8 0 -9 5 9 0 -9 8 9 5 -9 9 0
Insta lled  C ap ita l
S 2 C o st —  $ 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 * 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 * 5 5 0 ,0 0 0 5 5 0 ,0 0 0 N ot. est.
So lid  Prod  —  Ib / h r 2 6 132 131 8 4 8 2 0
e
<  ~
C o m p a tib ility  
A p  in . w .g .
Y e s Y e s Y e s N o N o Y e s
B attery  Lim its 2 8 8 3 5 15 0
In sta lled  HP 2 5 6 0 6 0 2 5 0 1 6 0 0
z
U Electrica l Icw h /to n 0 .3 0 0 0 0 9 5 0
Steam  Ib /to n  
C o sts $ / to n  fo r *
0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0
E m issio n  C ontro l 
U tilit ies  (1) 0 .2 0 0 .1 4 0 .1 4 0 .5 7 0 .4 3 8 .5 0
W1H A m o rtiza tio n  (2) 1 .3 0 0 .7 4 0 .7 4 1 .0 2 1 .02 N ot R ep .
o M a in ten a n ce  (3) 0 .5 1 0 .2 6 0 .2 6 0 .5 6 0 .6 2 N ot R ep .
C h e m ica ls  (4) 0 .0 0 0 .0 6 0 .1 4 0 .2 3 0 .11 0 .0 0
A d d e d  O p . Lab o r (5) 
S o lid s R eu se
0 .0 7 0 .1 4 0 .1 4 0 .2 8 0 .2 8 0 .0 0
o r D isp . (6) 0 .0 1 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 0
T O T A L  *  
A d d itio n a l C o st
o v e r  Fo ssil Fuel 2 .0 9 1 .3 9 1 .4 7 2 .6 9 2 .4 9 $ 8 .5 0  +  A m o rt.
+  M aint.
R e co v e ra b le
C h e m . (7) 
N ET C O S T *
0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 5 0 .1 5
$ 8 .5 0  +  A m o rt.
2 .0 5 1 .3 3 1 .3 2 2 .5 4 2 .3 4 +  M aint.
For consistency throughout the report the capital cost is amortized with a 
20 percent capital recovery factor. Thus the costs used in this report are 
as follows:
Costs $/ton for* 2.60 1 . 43 1.48 2.04 2.04 Not Rep.
Amortization
TOTAL*
Additional Cost
3.39 2.13 2.21 3.71 3.51 $8.50 + Amort. 
+ Maint.
over Fossil Fuel
NET COST* 3.35 2 . o; 2.06 3.56 4.53 $8.50 + Amort. 
+ Maint.
*A11 costs are in dollars per ton of glass produced.
* l n  mult ip le  f u rn a c e  in s ta l la t io n s  ( 4 )  C h e m ica ls  —■ N a O H  $ 1 0 0  ton
( 5 )  L a b o r  — $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 / man y e a r
(2 )  A m o r t i z a t io n  -  10 yr.  s t ra ig h t  l ine  ( 6 )  So/; j s * euJe Qr
(3 )  M a in te n a n c e  — E le c t ro s ta t ic  — 5 %  C h r o m a t o g r a p h i c  — 3 %  D i sp o sa l  C o s t  $5. ton
W e t  Sys tem s  — 6 %  ( 7 )  R e c o v e r y  V a lu e  — % 2 0 / to n
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they are locked in to one particular add-on device for a few years.
They must be able to forecast what other pollutants will be restricted 
and whether their equipment will be able to handle it. Just five years 
ago (1974) opacity was the major source of concern. Because of the 
possibility of unanticipated additional rules, firms must choose a 
technology that is sufficiently flexible to be adaptable to the new 
rules. The present source of concern to glass producers is the 
impending NO rule. Because the technology for compliance with thisX
rule has not yet been discovered, it could prove incompatible with 
technology for SO^ removal.
RELOCATION POTENTIAL
The last alternative available to the firm is to shut down 
its Los Angeles operation and perhaps open or expand a factory 
elsewhere. A plant outside the basin is attractive if the add-on 
device costs could be avoided, either because the regulations in that 
district are less stringent or because a new plant could be built to 
be less polluting with much lower costs than add-ons to existing 
facilities. There are other considerations when choosing locations, 
such as a sufficiently large labor market and the proper infrastructure 
conducive to industry.
The crucial factor in determining whether outside firms are 
competitive is the transportation cost of shipping raw materials to the 
plants and moving the finished products to the Los Angeles market.
First we will discuss how transportation costs are computed for raw 
materials and for finished glass. Then two important questions will
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be addressed: can existing glass plants located in San Francisco supply 
Los Angeles customers in a competitive market if the Northern California 
firms do not face emissions control constraints? Secondly, can a new 
glass plant be built closer to Los Angeles than San Francisco with 
transportation costs into the basin lower than the pollution abatement 
costs imposed on local firms?
In order to compute the cost of raw materials we need a 
formula for glass. The various ingredients will have different 
transportation costs. The idea is to add up the different transportation 
costs of the raw materials in such a fashion that we find the cost of 
shipping enough materials to produce one ton of glass. The composition 
of soda-lime glass for containers (Phillips, 1960) is 71-73 percent 
Si02> 13-16 percent Na^O and K^O, 10-13 percent CaO and MgO, 0.5-1.5 
percent A ^ O ^  and 0-0.5 percent BaO. But this is not the required 
formula yet. The usual raw materials of glass (sand, soda ash, limestone, 
and fluxing agents) contain these glass-making oxides in varying 
proportions. Table 3 (Phillips, 1960) shows the raw materials used in 
soda-lime glass and the percentage of glass-making oxide each contains.
It should be noticed that there is not one unique way to combine raw 
materials to get the right proportion of glass-making oxides. Different 
firms use different formulas and all firms are very secretive about the 
formula they use. We shall assume that the batch consists of sand, 
soda ash and limestone alone, and attempt to compensate for trace 
amounts of missing chemicals. The procedure is described fully in a 
footnote.^ It turns out that .73 tons of sand, .273 tons of soda ash 
and .232 tons of limestone are needed. Fortunately, all materials are
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TABLE 3
Raw Material Chemical Formula Oxides Percent Oxides
Sand SiO2 SiO2 100.0
Soda Ash Na2CO3 Na2O 58.5
Salt Cake Na2SO4 Na2O 44.0
Limestone CaCO3 CaO 56.0
Feldspar K2(Na2)0∙Al2O3 SiO2 68.0
∙ 6SiO2 Al2O3 18.0
K2(Na2)O 13.0
Dolomite CaCO3∙MgCO3 CaO 30.4
MgO 21.8
Potash K2CO3∙1∙5H2O
k 2o 57.0
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found at the same location, in the neighborhood of Carlsbad, which is 
86 terrain and traffic-adjusted miles from Los Angeles. Using Table 4 
and other PUC rates, the cost to transport the raw materials necessary 
for producing a ton of glass to Los Angeles from the Carlsbad area is 
between $9.73 and $13.26.
The nearest location to Los Angeles of other glass producing 
facilities is San Francisco. Assuming that these plants find their 
raw materials from elsewhere at approximately the same cost as those 
in Los Angeles, competition will emerge when the abatement costs just 
balance the transportation of finished products from San Francisco.
From the PUC shipping rate schedule, Table 5, the transportation cost 
works out to $21.40 per ton of glass, which exceeds SO^ abatement 
costs. Thus, the existing environmental regulations are not likely 
to stimulate competition from outside the Los Angeles basin, but 
future regulation could change the picture.
As shown in Table 5, the farther the finished produces are 
moved, the less expensive it is per mile. So if a firm wishes to locate 
outside the basin, locating right at the source of the raw materials 
would minimize transportation costs. Thus, the minimum cost of shipping 
finished glass products to Los Angeles is in the range of $10 to $13 
per ton of glass (depending on the volume of shipments).
Because these costs are approximately the same as the additional 
costs of production in Los Angeles (incurring the abatement costs and 
the costs of bringing the raw materials to Los Angeles), in the short 
run glass producers are not expected to move their facilities outside 
the basin. The fixed costs of setting up new factories would prevent
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TABLE 4
Section 2 -- Distance Rates (Continued)
In  C e n t s  P e r  T o n
TABLE 4 (continued)
F4-312
F4-313
TABLE 5
SHIPPING RATES FOR FINISHED GLASS
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TABLE 5 (continued)
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TABLE 5 (continued)
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this alternative.
These transportation costs are higher than the cost of sulfur 
oxides abatement alone but this may change when NO regulations becomeX
effective. In addition, relocation decisions involve assessing the 
opportunity costs of abandoning the furnace at the present location. 
Because glass factories are quite specialized, they have little value 
in alternative uses, and they have long, useful lives. Thus, the sunk 
costs in Los Angeles operations are likely to be an important element 
in a relocation decision.
Even though the glass manufacturers seem very confident that 
they will be able to pass on all costs to the buyers, we should 
calculate how much they are earning per ton to decide whether it would 
be a serious problem. One producer revealed that his sales are 
approximately $35 million per year, and he produces 400 tons per day. 
Allowing him the same average net earnings to net sales ratio as his 
competitors, his net earnings per ton of glass are $8.77.^ If he is 
required to use an add-on device, he will spend at least one-sixth of 
his earnings on abatement. The assumption of buyer insensitivity to 
price increases is probably justified, because an increase in costs 
of $13.42 per ton means only a . 084c change in the price of a beer 
bottle (if it weighs 2 oz.), or a . 503q change in the price of a 
six-pack.
In conclusion, stronger air pollution rules will indeed be 
a problem for the glass producer, but they are unlikely to disrupt 
the local industry in the short run. The combined effect of NO^ . 
regulations and the requirement to adopt add-on devices for sulfur
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oxides emissions abatement may eventually cause more glass containers 
to be brought in from outside producers as the industry in the basin 
slowly exits.
In the presence of a licensing scheme, the likely result 
would be one of two events. One is less abatement by this industry 
and no incentive to relocate. This is because the market value of a 
license to emit sulfur oxides is expected to be lower than abatement 
costs in this industry, which in turn reflects the fact that other 
industries appear to face lower abatement costs per ton of emissions. 
The second possible result is abatement through process modification 
techniques, if these are substantially less expensive than add-on 
devices. In any case, we would expect the glass producers in the Basin 
to be quite secure under a license scheme. Of course, neither result 
is likely under a BACT regulatory scheme which tends to overlook 
process modifications (in part because firms do not like to reveal 
them for competitive reasons) and which does not recognize interplant
differences in abatement costs.
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DERIVED DEMAND FOR LICENSES TO EMIT SULFUR OXIDES
The derived demand for licenses to emit SO is calculatedx
from the abatement cost function. For any given license price, a firm 
will abate up to the point at which the marginal cost of abatement 
equals the price of a license. Thus, to calculate the demand for 
licenses requires estimating the marginal cost of abatement.
In Table 2 the performance of each add on device is 
measured in two x^ays: First, it tells us how much particulate in 
grains per standard cubic foot (gr/scf) remain in the stack after the 
device has been implemented (Line #1 of text). Second it tells us the 
percent removal of SO^ by each device (Line 2).
The first step toward calculating the marginal cost (MC) of 
abatement curve is to arrive at an average overall control number for 
each device (this will be a percentage). In order to do this we 
will need to find out the percentage control of particulates and SO2 
by each device and weigh those two numbers according to the ratios 
at which they are emitted. Lines 1 and 3 of Table 6 contain a range 
of numbers for each device. The midpoint of the range will be used to 
estimate the mean MC curve (to get the others, we use the end points 
of the range). Line 2 is the mean of Line 1, and Line 4 is the average 
of Line 3. Line 4 is not expressed as a percentage control but as 
average particulate in gr/scf in the stack. The base level of 
particle emission (emissions when no devices are used) is .02-.3 
gr/scf (Teller 1976) or an average of 0.165 gr/scf. Using .165 gr/scf 
is the average amount in the stack without controls, each amount in 
line 4 is expressed as a percent of .165 gr/scf in line 5, which is
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TABLE 6
DERIVING MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS
Line Performance .. oE l e c t .  P r e c ip .
Measure
Chromat. Chromat. X V e n t u r i N u cleator E l e c t r i c  Melt
1 SO^ removal % 0 25 80-95 90-98 95-99 0
2 Average SO^ % 0 25 87.5 94 97 0
3 P a r t i c u l a t e  g r / s c f  0 .01 5-0 .0 20 0 .0 0 3 -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 3 -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 1 5 -0 .0 2 5 0 .0 1 5 -0 .0 2 5 0 .0 1 5 -0 .0 2 5
4 Avg. g r / s c f . 0.0175 0.0045 0.0045 0.02 0.02 0.02
5 % p a r t i c l e s  l e f t 10.6 2.7 2.7 12.1 12.1 12.1
6 % removed 89.4 97.3 97.3 87.9 87.9 87.9
7 O v e r a l l  Average 
C o n tro l  % 16.1 38.0 89 .3 92 .9
95.4 15.8
8
Weighted Average of 
SO removed lb s / T  of 
x i glass
.36 .86 2.01 2.09 2.15 .36
9 T o t a l  Cost/Ton 3.39 2.13 2.21 3.71 3.51 8.50 + A m ort . 
+ M a i n t .
10 Net Cost/Ton 3.35 2.07 2.06 3.56 3.36 8.50 + A m ort . 
+ M a i n t .
11 T o t a l  Cost/Ton SO $X 18,833.33 4 ,9 53.4 9 2,199.00 3,550.24 3,265.12 >47,222.22
12 Net Cost/Ton SO $
X
18,611.11 4 ,8 13.9 5 2,049.75 3,4 06.7 0 3,1 25.5 8 >47,222.22
13 In d u s t r y
Emissions tons/day 1.68 1.24 0.21 0.14 0.09 1.68
Performance
Measure
No
Abatement Chrom at. X N u cleator T r i - M e r
14 T o t a l  Cost 
i n  $ 0 3936.21
6236.38 10405.42
15 Change i n  Cost 
in  $
0 3936.21 2300.17 4169.04
16
Abatement (SO 
removed) in 0 1.79 1.91 2.00
tons SO
X
17 Change i n  Abatement q 
i n  tons SO
X
1.79 .12 .09
18 Ratio  of Change i n  ^ 
Co st/Ton to to 2199.00 19,168.08 46 ,322.67
Change i n  Abatement
Note: Terras de fined i n  t e x t .
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the average percent of particles still remaining in the stack when each 
device is used. Finally, if line 5 is subtracted from 100 percent, 
the result is line 6, which is the average percent of particles 
removed by each device.
Now it remains to weigh line 6 and line 2, in an appropriate 
fashion. Of the two tons per day of emissions of SO^ as SO^ 
equivalents, 1.64 T are SO^ gas and .36 T are SO^ as SO2 equivalents 
(Cass 1977). Thus, using these weights to find a single number which 
reflects the average effectiveness of each technology for both 
particles and gases, we get line 7: line 7 = [(line 2 x 1.64) +
(line 6 x .36)]/2. In order to determine how much sulfur is removed 
per ton of glass we use the fact that 0.1-4.2 lbs of SO are emittedX
per ton of glass for an uncontrolled furnace or an average of 2.25 lbs. 
Multiplying line 7 by 2.25 yields line 8. The reason we need this 
information is that all the cost figures are expressed in dollars 
per ton of glass.
Now let us look at the cost side. Lines 9 and 10 show the 
gross and net costs of each device. Net cost means net of revenue 
from sale of recovered chemicals. Since both costs are similar, 
without loss of generality, we will deal only with the gross cost.
Notice that line 9 is the cost per ton of glass and line 8 
is the pounds of SO in S0_ equivalents removed per ton of glass.
X  z
Therefore, the cost of removing a ton of SO^ can be calculated, and
is shown in line 11: line 11 = line 8 x (2000 lbs SO /T of SO ) Fx x
line 8. Line 12 is a similar computation for the net costs. Line 
13, calculated as (100% - line 7) x 2 T/day, gives us industry emissions
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if the whole industry were using that device. What we have achieved 
so far, is the average cost of SO^ removal.
Industry-wide emissions are the tons of sulfur oxides emitted 
when the whole industry used each technology. In Graph 1, 
the total costs have been plotted (a graph of the net costs would 
look similar). Two additional data have been added to the graph: the 
cost of moving to San Francisco and the cost of a new NO^ scrubber by 
the Tri-Mer Corporation. Both of these alternatives reduce sulfur oxide
emissions to zero. The Tri-Mer scrubber for a 150 ton furnace has aj
capital cost of approximately $800,000 (in 1980 dollars), which
includes the equipment and all installation and transportation charges
and an operating and maintenance cost of $50,000 to $100,000 per 
7year.
In Graph 2, all the dominated options have been excluded, and 
error bounds have been indicated for the mean average total cost curve.
The average net costs have not been plotted since it is not clear that 
the glass producers will always be able to sell the chemicals recovered.
From these average cost curves, we can complete the marginal 
cost curves which are the derived demand for licenses, since a 
producer will be willing to pay for a license at most as much as it costs 
him to abate at the margin. In order to compute the marginal cost curve 
we first need the total cost curve. In this analysis only the undominated 
alternatives will be considered, since they are the only ones a glass 
producer will use. By multiplying the cost per ton of SO with theX
tons SO controlled, we get the total cost of each device, x
In order to get the total costs we start with line 11
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(costs/ton of SO ) and multiply by (2T - line 13), which would be the
X
tons of SO removed by each device if the whole industry were using
test device. This yields line 14, the dollars, with the alternatives 
listed in order of increasing effectiveness. Line 15 is the change 
in cost from moving to each alternative from the option that is next
most effective. Line 16 is the tons SO removed by each device (ifx
the whole industry were using that device), which is two tons less than
line 13. Line 14 is the change in abatement from switching from one
device to the next. Finally line 18 is the marginal cost, bine 15 _Line 17
AC . Thus, Graph 3 shows the expected choice of strategies for 
alternative ranges of the price of licenses in dollars for a ton per 
day of emissions: This is the average derived demand curve. The 
range of variation is computed similarly by using the variation in
the average cost curves, and is shown in Graphs 2 and 4.
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TABLE 7
ABATEMENT CHOICE FOR ALTERNATIVE LICENSE PRICES
Price per ton per day Strategy
0-2199.00 do not abate (Z)
2199.00-19,168.08 use X for 1.79 and buy license
for .21/t SOx
19,168.08-46,322.67 use N for 1.91, licenses of .09/T
SOx
46,322.67+ use T which removes all SOx
GRAPH 1
MEAN AVERAGE COST CURVE
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GRAPH 2
POSSIBLE VARIATION IN THE AVERAGE COST CURVE
Precip. Chromat. Chromat.X Venturi Nucleator Elec. Melt
San
Francisco
Tri-Mer
Scrubber
MEAN
Total 
Cost ($) 18,833.33 4,953.49 2,199.00 3,550.24 3,265.12 >47,222.22 28,822.22 3,992.77
Net
Cost ($) 18,611.11 4,813.95 2,049.75 3,406.70 3,125.58 >47,222.22 — —
Emissions(T) 1.68 1.24 .21 .14 .09 1.68 0 0
BEST
Total
Cost 9,826.09 2,662.50 1,099.50 1,827.59 1,712.20 >24,637.68 12,761.90 1,826.48
Net
Cost 9,710.14 2,587.50 1,024.88 1,753.69 1,639.02 >24,637.68 — —
Emissions 1.67 1.24 .09 .07 .05 1.67 0 0
WORST
Total
Cost 339,000.00 106,500.00 55,250.00 82,444.44 78,000.00 >850,000.00 536,000.00
94,977.00
Net
Cost 335,000.00 103,500.00 51,500.00 79,111.11 74,666.66 >850,000.00 — —
Emissions 1.68 1.24 .34 .22 .14 1.70 0 0
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TABLE 8
DATA FOR GRAPHS 1 AND 2
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GRAPH 3
AVERAGE DERIVED DEMAND FOR LICENSES
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GRAPH 4
POSSIBLE VARIATION IN THE AVERAGE DEMAND
TABLE 9
DATA FOR GRAPHS 3 AND 4
Z Z-X X X-N N N-T I
AVERAGE
C 0 3,936.21 6,236.38 10,405.42
A 0 1.79 1.91 2.00
Ac 3,936.21 2,300.17 4,169.04
AA 1.79 .12 .09
AC/AA 2,199.00 19,168.08 46,322.67
BEST
C
A
AC
AA
AC/AA
0
0
1,957.52
1.91
1,024.88
1,957.52
1.91
1,238.57
.04
30,964.25*
3,196.09
1.95
456.87
.05
9,137.40
3,652.96
2.00
WORST
C 0 91,715.00 145,080.00 189,954.00
A 0 1.66 1.86 2.00
AC 91,715.00 53,365.00 44,874.00
AA 1.66 .20 .14
AC/AA 55,250.00 266,825.00 320,528.57
xThis is a dominated point.
Key: C - cost, A - tons per day abated, MC - marginal cost..
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FOOTNOTES
1. Kerr produces 200 + 50 tons/day and claimed it had one-sixth of 
the market. Ball produces 400 tons/day and claimed only one- 
eighth of the market. Thus production in the basin could be 
anywhere between 1,200 + 300 tons and 3,200 tons per day. Glen 
Cass estimates that glass furnace sulfur oxides emissions for the 
50 by 50 mile square grid which encompasses the major portion of 
the South Coast Air Basin are approximately 2 tons/day. Including 
off-grid emissions which are part of the South Coast Air Basin 
sulfur oxides modeling inventory would raise the emissions total 
to 2.23 tons/day.
A report prepared for the Glass Container Manufacturers 
Institute, "Engineering Study Program Glass Furnace Emissions 
Abatement," revealed that 130 tons/day glass furnaces emit 10 lbs/hr 
of sulfur oxides and 403 tons/day glass furnaces emit 33 lbs/hr of 
sulfur oxides. Based on these numbers, a 2 ton/day emissions 
would imply between 2,035 and 2,167 tons of glass are produced in 
the basin.
2. Among the glass producers and bottlers I spoke to, no one was 
willing to commit himself to any numbers, but Miller Brewing 
assured me that for "small" increases in the price of bottles, 
they would be able to pass on all the extra costs to the consumers, 
and the consumers would tend to buy about the same quantities.
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3. Source is 7-Up Bottlers.
4. One interviewee claimed that the present regulation is unduly- 
biased against mid-sized industries with a slow rate of technical 
change such as glass or steel. The smaller ones such as 
laundromats, whose weaknesses were recognized by the regulators, 
were exempt from the regulation. The larger ones, such as the 
utilities, had enough political power to manipulate the regulators 
to do what they wished. The mid-sized industries with rapid 
technological change, such as chemicals and plastics, were earning 
such a large profit that they could afford to comply with the 
regulations.
5. The problems mentioned in this and the following paragaph summarize 
the principal findings of a series of interviews with executives in 
the Los Angeles glass industry. While we are not necessarily in 
agreement with all of the points these people make, nonetheless 
these perspectives on the problems of regulation are of interest.
6. The net earnings to net sales ratios were on the average 0.0366. 
Thus if sales are $35 M, net earnings are $1.28/M. Since 400 tons 
are produced per day, this is $8.77/ton.
7 . Telephone interview with Rolf Jaeger, Tri-Mer Corporation, Air 
Pollution Control Systems, California Sales Office (714)548-5853.
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APPENDIX F-5 
PETROLEUM REFINERS 
Robert W. Hahn
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is part of a larger research effort designed to
assess the viability of employing a marketable permit scheme to
control sulfur oxides emissions (SO ) in the South Coast Air Basin.x
The operation of such a market proceeds in two stages. First, the 
overall number of permits to be issued must be decided upon. In the 
second stage, the marketable permits are distributed to existing 
firms. The permits could either be given away or auctioned. Once 
distributed, the firm can trade these transferable rights in much the 
same way anyone can buy and sell shares of stock on Wall Street.
The basic idea behind this approach to regulation is to fix some 
upper limit on the allowable level of emissions and then allow firms 
to determine, by trading, how the permits will be distributed among 
firms, and how much emissions each will abate. Compared with the 
current standards approach to regulation which proceeds on a source by 
source basis, the marketable permit approach is expected to lower 
overall expenditures of abatement for a given air quality objective.
In addition, firms will be given greater flexibility in choosing 
control strategies.
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Under this approach, a firm would not be allowed to emit sulfur 
oxides in excess of the number of permits which it currently held. A 
permit will be defined as vesting the owner with the right to emit a 
fixed quantity of SO per day (measured as S0„ equivalent). The 
prices for these permits would be determined in the market.
The purpose of this paper is to develop an estimate for the cost 
of controlling S0x emissions from petroleum refiners that affect the 
sulfate air quality in the South Coast Air Basin. This information 
will then be used to simulate the effect of a marketable permits 
scheme on the decisions of the oil industry and other sources of SOx
emissions.
The oil industry poses special problems which do not arise in
other industries because a refiner not only affects SO pollutionx
directly through stack emissions, but also indirectly, by exerting 
some control over how much sulfur is distributed among the various 
refined products such as gasoline, jet fuel and heavy fuel oil. The 
first step in including the activities of petroleum refiners in a 
model of the market for tradable licenses is to consider the different 
options a refiner has with regard to sulfur acquisition and disposal. 
The guiding principle here is conservation of mass —  what goes into 
the refinery must come out somewhere. Figure 1 depicts the general 
choice facing the refiner. In selecting a crude input slate, the 
refiner chooses how much sulfur will enter the refinery. The sulfur 
essentially has three places it can go. It may be released to the 
atmosphere upon combustion of a sulfur-bearing fuel. This occurs, for 
example, when coke from the fluid catalytic cracker is burned and when
Figure 1: What to do with the sulfur?
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the fuel used to run the refinery contains sulfur. A second way the 
sulfur may leave the refinery is by traversing a path to a plant 
designed to recover sulfur or a plant using H 2 S gas or acid sludge in 
the production of sulfuric acid. If the sulfur is not emitted to the 
atmosphere or recovered as a by-product, it ends up in the refined 
products sold to industry and consumers.
This paper focuses on estimating the costs of reducing S0X 
emissions by different source categories which correspond to the 
emissions inventory contained in Cass (1979). An alternative approach 
to the problem of modeling the the abatement costs of refiners is to 
model explicitly the sulfur and energy flows within a "typical" 
refiner or class of refineries. An effort is currently under way to 
develop such a model, but it is still in its preliminary stages.
The current effort is restricted to developing abatement costs 
for the following:
1. Gasoline desulfurization
2. Diesel fuel desulfurization
3. SO^ removal from Fluid Catalytic Crackers
4. SO removal from an Oil Field Production ProcessXin Orange County
Two other estimates which are needed to complete the refinery part of 
the model are the costs of reducing the sulfur content of residual oil 
and the costs of desulfurizing jet fuel. Estimates for the former are 
developed in Appendix F-l. As an upper bound, the cost of 
desulfurizing diesel fuel can be used for jet fuel if no other 
estimates are available.^" The remainder of the paper develops 
estimates for the other four activities. This is followed by a brief
F5-339
comparison of the estimates in light of the market simulation 
objective. Unless stated otherwise, all cost estimates are in 1977— 
1978 dollars.
II. GASOLINE DESULFURIZATION
The data on costs for gasoline desulfurization are based on a 
study by Vincent (1978). Based on the assumption that the entire 
gasoline stock is unleaded, Vincent estimates that the average cost of 
moving from 500 to 400 ppm of sulfur will be $2600/ton. A more 
stringent move from 500 to 300 ppm will result in an average cost of 
$3100/ton.^ This implies that the incremental cost of moving from 400 
to 300 ppm is $3600/ton. While the gasoline pool on which the 
emissions inventory is based assumes that unleaded fuel comprises 54% 
of the total, the figure of $3600/ton is still applicable because the 
cost of removing sulfur is primarily a function of sulfur content and 
not the amount of lead in the gasoline. The cost estimates take 
account of the increased emissions that would result from the 
increased consumption of fuel oil.
III. DIESEL FUEL DESULFURIZATION
Estimates for diesel fuel desulfurization depend, among other
things, on the complexity of the refinery and whether equipment such
as distillate hydrotreaters will need to be purchased. A study
sponsored by the South Coast Air Quality Management District places
the cost of reducing S0x emissions from diesel fuel by 80% at 
3$250/ton. This assumes no new equipment would be needed. A recent
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report released by the California Air Resources Board estimates that
costs will vary between $1000 and $2000 per ton of SO^ reduction in a
4complex refinery, depending on how much equipment would be added. We 
will assume that the cost of reducing sulfur oxides emissions from 
diesel fuel is $1000/ton for the first 16% reduced and $2000/ton for 
the next 64%.^ The lower cost figure assumes that no new capital 
investment would be necessary for the first step, while the higher 
cost figure takes account of additional hydrodesulfurization, hydrogen 
production and sulfur recovery facilities.
IV. FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS
Data for the cost of reducing SO^ emissions from fluid catalytic 
crackers is taken from a study by the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District. Decreasing emissions by 80% will cost $810/ton. 
This estimate is based on the future potential of hot catalyst 
regeneration. An additional 10% decrease in emissions will cost 
$18,700/ton.^ The significant increase in cost is based on the 
assumption that wet scrubbers would be needed to achieve that level 
of abatement.
V. OIL FIELD PROCESSES
An oil production field in Orange County is a relatively small 
source of emissions, but presents an interesting example because of 
its location. If permits were defined in terms of emissions, this 
firm might be induced to put on more controls. However, if permits 
were defined in terms of ambient impact on, say, downtown Los Angeles,
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it would probably not be cost-effective to add further controls. The
basic abatement cost data have been drawn from a conversation with a
company representative.^ The company is considering use of a
Stretford process to remove sulfur from the exhaust of the oil field
enhanced recovery operation. Estimated capital costs are $1.5 million
and annual operating costs are $60,000 (at a maximum). These figures
are given in current dollars. Assuming a capital recovery factor of
.2, the total annual and operating costs would be in the neighborhood
of $360,000. The process is assumed to be at least 90% efficient.
According to Cass (1979), total emissions are approximately 4.3
8tons/day. Using this figure would imply the cost of reducing S0X is 
approximately $250/ton in current dollars, which corresponds to a cost 
of approximately $200/ton in 1977-1978 dollars.^
VI. THE DEMAND FOR PERMITS
The cost estimates developed in the previous section are 
summarized in Table 1. The corresponding derived demand for 
marketable permits is drawn in Figure 2. These estimates only 
pertain to the categories listed in the paper. The possibilities of 
reducing the sulfur content of jet fuel and residual fuel are not 
included here. The analysis indicates that the costs of controlling 
SO^ emissions for the petroleum industry vary by as much as two orders 
of magnitude, depending on the process and facility being controlled
as well as the extent of control.
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Table 1
MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST DATA 
(1977 $)
CATEGORY
BASELINE EMISSIONS3 
(Tons SOx/Day) % REDUCTION
COST 
($/Ton)
Gasoline Desulfurization 28.92b 0-25 3600
Diesel Fuel Desulfurization 70.79° 0-16
16-80
1000
2000
Fluid Catalytic Crackers 44.95 0-80
80-90
810
18,700
Oil Field Processes 4.3 0-90 200
aFigures taken from Appendix E, Table El.27.
^This includes emissions from all light duty vehicles.
c . .Source categories include Low Priority Natural Gas Customers,
Heavy Highway Diesel Vehicles and Railroad Operations.
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Figure 2: Estimate of Derived Demand for Permits— Refiners
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FOOTNOTES
1. Conversation with Sam York, South Coast Air Quality Management 
District, January 29, 1981.
2. Vincent, p. 83.
3. This estimate is taken from the Sulfur Dioxide/Sulfate Contro1
Study: Executive Summary, p. 28. A conversation with Sam York
has revealed that this number is based on the assumption that no 
new equipment is added. According to Mr. York, it is likely that 
adding such equipment would lead to an order of magnitude increase 
in marginal control costs.
4. "Public Hearing to Consider Amendment of Title 13 ...," p. 100.
The estimate for .05% control is stated as ranging from $.51 to 
$1.01 per pound of SO2 reduced for a complex refinery.
5. Our data are in terms of 1977 dollars whereas data from the California 
Air Resources Board are presumably given in current dollars.
The reason that the figures we suggest are higher in real terms 
than the figures for a complex refinery is because other types of 
refineries have somewhat higher costs of desulfurization. The 
decision to add the costs of new equipment at 16% is based on a 
conversation with Sam York.
6. Sulfur Dioxide/Sulfate Control Study: Executive Summary, p. 28.
7. Cost estimates are based on a conversation with Alex Iwasiw on 
February 9, 1981.
8. Cass, Table El.27.
9. This calculation is based on the GNP deflator data from the Survey 
of Current Business. p. 34.
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APPENDIX G
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND FOR EMISSION LICENSES
Robert W. Hahn
ABSTRACT
The issue of how firms with inputs of variable quality will 
react in a market for transferable emissions licenses is analyzed. 
First, it is shown that the derived demand for licenses will, in 
general, be downward sloping. This is followed by a discussion of the 
effects of imperfections in product and factor markets on abatement 
decisions.
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This paper examines the qualitative effects that a market in
transferable licenses in emissions will have on a firm's input
decisions and its expenditure on abatement equipment. The case of the
competitive firm is examined in detail, and this is compared with a
firm which can exert monopoly power in product and factor markets.
The model employed here differs from previous work in that the price
of the variable input is explicitly related to its quality. This can
be compared with the more conventional approach which treats the
pollutant as a factor of production.'*' Several authors have shown that
the derived demand for inputs of fixed price and quality are downward
2sloping. In Section 1, this result is extended to the case where 
input quality can be varied. Section 2 compares the demand for 
licenses under competition with the demand for licenses when a firm 
can exert power over product or factor markets. In Section 3, the 
role of other traders and the authority issuing licenses is explicitly 
included in the analysis. Section 4 summarizes the results.
1. The General Problem
Attention is focused on the problem of controlling emissions 
associated with the use of productive inputs. When the relationship 
between emissions and ambient pollutant concentrations is linear, then 
the subsequent analysis obtains for the control of secondary 
pollutants as well as the control of primary emissions.
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The control of sulfur oxides emissions is one example for 
which the model would be appropriate. Sulfur enters into the 
production process through the use of natural resources that contain 
it, usually coal and petroleum used as energy inputs. When these 
inputs are burned some of the sulfur contained in them is converted to 
SO^ and SO^. For a given abatement technology, the relationship 
between sulfur entering the production process and resulting emissions 
of sulfur oxides is approximately linear.
The firm may adopt two basic approaches to reducing emissions. 
It can either reduce emissions directly by purchasing equipment such 
as scrubbers and baghouses or it can reduce the level of pollutant 
entering into the production process. This latter reduction is 
normally accomplished by purchasing higher quality inputs, which 
typically cost more, by curtailing output, or by varying the amount of 
inputs used per unit of output in production. For simplicity, the 
last method for reducing emissions will be ignored. Suppose that the 
firm has a production function f(E), where E represents the level of 
inputs. The function f is assumed to be twice differentiable and 
strictly concave so that f' > 0 and f'' <0.
Let X(R,s,E) characterize the firm's abatement opportunities.
X is the total annual emission rate; R is the total annual expenditure 
on abatement; and s is the amount of the pollutant contained in a unit 
of the input stream, E. Emissions are assumed to decrease with 
greater abatement expenditures, but there are decreasing returns to
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such endeavors, (i.e., < 0 and X ^  >0). On the other hand, annual
emissions will increase if the firm chooses lower quality inputs or 
increases the level of its inputs (i.e., X > 0 and X. > 0).
^  J
Furthermore, it will be assumed that increasing inputs will not
improve the marginal effect of a given pollutant content, and may make
3it worse (i.e., 2. 0). The firm's problem is to maximize profits,
or the difference between total revenues and the sum of input costs, 
abatement costs and license costs. Formally, we have:
Maximize pf(E) - e(s)E - wX(R,s,E) - R (1)
R, s ,E
where
p = price of output,
e(s) = unit price of inputs; e' < 0 e'' > 0, and
w = license price.
The price of inputs is presumed to be a convex function of the
pollutant content. From this, it immediately follows that a firm
would never wish to use two or more different quality inputs
simultaneously, where such inputs are defined solely in terms of 
4pollutant content. Empirically, this relationship has been shown to 
hold approximately for heavy fuel oil prices in Los Angeles.^
First-order conditions for an interior solution are given by:
-wXj^  - 1  = 0 (2)
-e'E - wX2 = 0 (3)
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(4)
Equation  (2) says that at the margin, an a d d it io n a l  d o l l a r  spent on 
abatement equipment w i l l  be e x a c t ly  o f f s e t  by the sav ings  r e s u l t in g  
from decreased em iss ions.  Equation  (3) ba lances the reduction  in  
em issions from buying h igher  q u a l i t y  inputs a g a in s t  the increase  in  
the cost o f  buying l i c e n se s .  Equation  (4) equates the m arginal  
revenue product o f  u s ing  an a d d it io n a l  u n it  o f inputs  with the 
increase in  the cost o f input, which c o n s is t s  of two components: the 
d ire c t  cost o f  inputs,  e, and the in d ire c t  cost due to having to  
purchase more l ic e n se s ,  wX^.
The in te r e s t in g  comparative s t a t i c s  quest ions revolve around 
the e f fe c t  o f  a change in  the l ice n se  p r ice  on abatement expenditures,  
the p o l lu ta n t  content of inpu ts ,  the le v e l  o f  inputs,  and hence, the 
u lt im ate  le v e l  o f  em issions which i s  chosen. T o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  
the f i r s t  order con d it ion s  g iv e s  r i s e  to the fo l lo w in g  Hessian  
m atrix , C:
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Let C . . denote ij
Performing the 
of a change in
the i j t h  co fac to r  o f  C and [C] denote the determinant, 
comparative s t a t i c s  y ie ld s  express ions fo r  the e ffec t  
l ice n se  p r ice  on the endogenous v a r ia b le s :
(5)
( 6)
( 7 )
(8)
6Assume that s u f f ic ie n c y  con d it ion s  fo r  an in t e r io r  maximum are met.
Th is  im p lie s  that C i s  negative  d e f in i t e .  Even w ith  t h i s  assumption,
~  and ~  cannot be signed unam biguously. However, i t  i s  p o s s ib le
to show that the demand fo r  l ic e n se s  i s  downward s lo p in g  ( i . e . ,
0X—  < 0) .  S u b s t i tu t in g  equations (5) -  (7) in to  (8) y ie ld s :
(9)
Because C i s  negative  d e f in i t e ,  t h i s  im p lie s  C  ^ i s  negative  d e f in it e
0X
Thus, equation (9) in d ica te s  that  —  < 0.
dw
While the s ig n  o f the terms in equations (5) -  (7) cannot be 
determined exac t ly ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to in fe r  from equation (9) that an
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increase in the price of a license will induce at least one of the 
following events: (1) an increase in the level of annual abatement 
expenditures, (2) a decrease in the pollutant content of inputs or (3) 
a decrease in the level of inputs. Of course, it is possible that 
more than one of these events will occur in response to a license 
price increase, but at least one such event must occur.
The result derived here concerning the downward sloping demand 
curves also holds for the case in which the level of inputs are fixed, 
but the quality is allowed to vary. This latter case may be 
applicable to several firms in the short run. A case in point would 
be electric utilities who burn high sulfur residual fuel oils. The 
only difference between the case when inputs are constrained and the 
more general case is that in the constrained case, an increase in the 
license price will lead to an increase in abatement expenditures or a 
decrease in the pollutant content of inputs, and possibly both.
It is a straightforward matter to show a monopolist will have 
a downward sloping derived demand for licenses in this general case. 
However, at this level of analysis, it is not obvious how the demand 
by a competitive firm compares with the demand by a firm that can 
exert market power. To allow for a case by case comparison, it is 
helpful to consider a less general formulation. This is the subject
of the next section.
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2. A Comparison of Competition w ith  Market Power
A simple case to analyze i s  where the p o l lu ta n t  in  the inputs  
ju s t  equals em iss ions;  that i s ,  no abatement can be achieved through  
expenditure on equipment. I n  t h i s  case, reductions can be achieved by 
reducing the p o l lu ta n t  content o f inputs and/or reducing the le v e l  of 
inputs.  One example would be the containment o f s n l fu r  oxides through  
the purchase of lower s u l fu r  fu e ls .  Form ally ,  the f i r m 's  problem may 
he w ritten  as fo l low s:
Maximize p f (E )  -  e ( s )E  -  wsE (10)
s ,E
F i r s t - o r d e r  con d it ion s  fo r  an in t e r io r  maximum are g iven  by:
Equation  (11) in d ica te s  that s should be chosen so as to  equate the 
cost o f p o l lu t in g  more, w, w ith  the m arg ina l co st  o f buying h igher  
q u a l i t y  inputs,  - e ' ( s ) .  Equation  (12) ba lances the m arginal revenue 
product w ith  an increase in  input cos t s .
Define B to be the Hess ian  a ssoc ia te d  with (10).  Then,
(13)
From the assumptions on e and f ,  B i s  negative  d e f in i t e .  An
(11)
(12)
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examination o f the e f fe c t s  o f  a change in  the p r ice  o f a l ice n se  on 
p o l lu ta n t  content and the o v e r a l l  le v e l  of inputs y ie ld s :
(14)
(15)
Equation  (14) says that the p o l lu ta n t  content decreases w ith  an 
increase  in  the p r ice  of a l ice n se  while (15) says that the le ve l  of 
inputs a lso  d e c l in e s .  Since the o v e ra l l  le ve l o f em issions i s  g iven  
by sE, i t  i s  r e a d i ly  seen that em iss ions decrease in  response to an 
increase  in  the p r ice  o f a l ic e n se .
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to compare the s i t u a t io n  when the f irm  can 
exert market power w ith  the com petitive case by making su ita b le  
changes in  (10) and ca r ry in g  out the requ ired o p t im iza t ion .  Three 
cases w i l l  be considered: f i r s t ,  the case of pure monopoly; next, the 
case when a firm  exerts some in fluence  over the energy market and 
f i n a l l y ,  the case when a f irm  can dominate the l ice n se  market. The 
m o n o p o l is t 's  problem i s  the same as above, except now p = p ( f ( E ) ) ,  
which g ive s :
Maximize p ( f ( E ) ) f ( E )  -  e ( s )E  -  wsE (16)
s ,E
F i r s t - o r d e r  con d it ion s  fo r  an in t e r io r  maximum are g iven  by:
(17)
(18)
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Equations (17) is identical with equation (11) . From the assumptions 
on e, the value for s which solves (17) (assuming one exists) will be
7unique. Thus, the monopolist and perfect competitor will choose the 
same pollutant content. To determine who would pollute more, it is 
only necessary to consider whether the monopolist will use more or 
fewer inputs than in the competitive case. Assuming the revenue 
function for the monopolist is strictly convave and an interior 
solution to the problem exists, then the monopolist will use less 
energy and, hence, pollute less than his competitive counterpart. To 
see this, define the revenue function: R(E) = p(f(E))f(E). The usual 
differentiability assumptions imply R' > 0 and R'' <0. Comparing 
conditions (12) and (18), it is clear that setting E at the optimal 
level in the competitive case will yield the following inequality:
pf' + fp'f' < e(s) + ws, (19)
since fp'f' < 0. The question is whether (19) can be brought into 
equality by adjusting E. From (11) and (17),i'we saw that the 
pollutant content is identical for the two cases, independent of the 
level of inputs which is chosen. This means that the expression on 
the right-hand size of (19) can be treated as a constant. Noting that 
the left-hand side of (19) equals R'(E), it immediately follows that 
the only way to bring (19) back into equality is to decrease E from
the competitive level.
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So far, we have derived conditions under which the monopolist 
will emit less and produce less than in the perfectly competitive 
case. The key assumption concerned the shape of the revenue function. 
This assumption is also critical for deriving the comparative statics 
results given below:
(20)
( 21)
A comparison of Equations (14) and (20) reveals that the effect of a 
change in license price on pollutant content will be the same for the 
monopolist and the competitive firm for a given level of input 
quality. The effect of a change in license price on input usage will, 
in general, differ, even for inputs of the same quality. However, the 
analysis reveals that the qualitative results under monopoly and 
competition are the same. Both pollutant content and input usage 
decline with an increase in the price of a license.
The results for the case in which the firm faces an upward 
sloping supply curve for inputs closely parallel the monopoly case. 
The problem is the same as the competitive case except e is now a 
function of s and E. The firm tries to:
Maximize pf(E) - e(s,E)E - wsE. 
s,E
(22)
The p r ice  o f inputs i s  assumed to increase  as demand increases
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(e^ > 0 ).  In  ad d it ion ,  i t  w i l l  he assumed that changing the p o l lu ta n t  
content w i l l  have no in fluence on the re la t io n s h ip  between input 
demand and p r ice  ( e ^  = 0 ).  Th is  l a t t e r  assumption e s s e n t i a l l y  a llows  
the so lu t io n  to the f i r s t - o r d e r  con d it ion s  to proceed in  two s tages.  
F i r s t ,  the p o l lu ta n t  content i s  determined, and then the le v e l  of 
inputs i s  chosen.
F i r s t  order con d it ion s  fo r  an in t e r io r  maximum to (22) are 
given  by:
Equation (23) determines the optimal p o l lu ta n t  content, s. I f  E i s  
set to the optimal competitive le v e l,  th i s  g iv e s  r i s e  to the fo l low in g  
ine q u a l i ty :
p f '  -  Ee^ < e + ws (25)
The problem i s  to ad just E so as to b r in g  (24) in to  e q u a l it y  so that  
the f i r s t  order con d it ion s  are s a t i s f i e d .  Assuming that the co s ts  o f  
inputs eE, i s  a convex fun ct ion  in  E ( fo r  any g iven  s) i s  s u f f i c ie n t  
to insure that the optim al le v e l  o f inputs w i l l  be le s s  than the 
competitive case.
The problem of a s se s s in g  the behavior o f a firm  which can 
exert con tro l over the market p r ice  fo r  em issions l ic e n se s  i s  s im i la r
to the previous case, but somewhat more complex. The general problem
(23)
(24)
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is the same as in the competitive case except now license price is 
presumed to be negatively related to emissions so that w=w(sE) and 
w' > 0. The conventional approach to such problems is to disregard 
output effects and solve the following cost minimization.
Minimize C(s) = e(s)E + w(sE)sE, (26)
s
where the level of inputs is fixed at E. There are two basic reasons 
for ignoring output effects: first, because the comparative statics 
results are ambiguous when these effects are included, and secondly, 
because output effects may not be very important in the short-run.
Dividing (26) by E and solving the equivalent minimization 
problem yields the following first order condition:
e'(s) + w + sEw' = 0 (27)
Equation (27) balances the marginal cost of buying more licenses, 
w + sEw', with the cost of buying lower sulfur fuel. If the cost 
function, C(s), is convex so that C''(s) >_ 0, then the optimal 
pollutant content chosen will be less than in the competitive case, 
provided the output produced is the same. The argument parallels the 
case of monopoly and will not be repeated here. Instead, we turn to 
an alternative formulation of the market power problem which 
explicitly considers the role of other agents.
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3. Market Power: A More General Approach
The subsequent analysis considers the case where one agent 
exercises market power, while all other agents assume they cannot 
affect the price of a license or the quantity of licenses issued, L, 
(i.e., a Stackelberg ''leader and follower'' model). The aggregate 
j-o^ oj-ted demand curve for all agents excluding i is denoted by Q X(w); 
it is assumed that Q 1 is twice continuously differentiable and
-i'downward sloping, i.e., Q <0. Let Q(w) represent the aggregation 
of i's true demand for licenses, Q^(w), with Q 1(w), which i takes as 
given. The quantity of licenses supplied by the ''center''1 is given 
by C(w) which is presumed to be twice continuously differentiable and 
strictly increasing, i.e., C' > 0. The curves are illustrated in 
Figure 1.
Agent i is aware that he may choose any point on the center's 
supply curve above the price of wq, which represents the equilibrium 
price if i submits no demand. A price of w^, assumed to be greater
than w , would result if i submitted his true demand.o
To derive i's best approach to the problem, first note that 
his effective supply, denoted as S(w) is given by:
S(w) = C(w) - Q *(w) for w > w (28)— o
— i fBecause C' > 0 and Q <0, S'(w) > 0, which means that agent i's 
effective supply curve of licenses to i is strictly increasing.
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FIGURE 1
The General Supply and Demand Problem
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Define the inverse of S(w) as s(L). Since S is upward sloping, so is 
its inverse, i.e..
w = s(L) s' > 0 (29)
Finally, define agent i's inverse demand function as d^(L); this 
function is presumed to be strictly decreasing, i.e., d^' < 0. Agent 
i's problem is depicted in Figure 2. L^ represents the quantity of 
licenses agent i receives if he reveals his true demand and the market 
clears at .
The question which i must address is whether it is in his 
interest to misstate his true demand, and if so, in which direction.
To answer this question i's interest is defined as follows:
Agent i's net gain = d.(q)dq - s(L)L (30)
Jo 1
Equation (30) says that the gain i derives by purchasing L licenses is 
given by the difference between the area under his inverse demand 
curve between 0 and L and the costs of purchasing L licenses. With 
this measure of welfare, it is apparent that agent i will never demand 
more than L^ licenses since he not only has to pay more for all 
inframarginal units, but he also loses on the marginal units as well. 
The only other possibility is that agent i demands fewer than 
licenses. Suppose that he chooses a level of licenses equal to as 
illustrated in Figure 2. To compare this outcome to the situation in 
which i recieves licenses, it is convenient to sort out his gains
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FIGURE 2
Agent i's Problem
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and losses in a systematic manner. The gains to i which result from 
being charged a price w^ instead of are noted by the shaded area B. 
His losses due to the fact he purchases (L^ - L^) fewer licenses are 
represented by area A. If (B - A) is positive, then we may conclude 
that i's welfare associated with (L^.w^) exceeds that associated with 
revealing his truthful demand, (L^,w^). The problem of showing that 
it is always in i's interest to overabate is equivalent to showing
that there exists an Le(0,L.) for which (B - A) is positive.1 r~
Maximizing (30) with respect to L and assuming an interior 
maximum exists yields the following first order condition:
d.(L)(s(L) + Ls'(L)) = 0 (31)
Noting s'(L) > 0 implies:
d.(L1) < s(L1) + L1s'(L1) (32)
To bring (32) back into equality requires that the L selected be less 
than . This shows that it is in agent i's interest to 
underrepresent his demand for pollution emission provided that there 
is no subsequent trading of licenses, agent i knows the demand curve 
of all other agents and the supply curve of the center, and the second 
order conditions are satisfied. It is of some importance to know what 
conditions on the demand or supply curve would guarantee that the 
stationary point is a local maximum. The second order sufficiency
conditions require:
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d! (L) - 2s' (L) - Ls"(L) < 0 (33)
From (33), we see that it is sufficient to presume that the rate of
change of the slope of the effective supply curve, s''(L), is 
. . 8nonnegative.
The problem analyzed above parallels the case of pure 
monoposony very closely. The only difference is that agent i is not 
the only buyer, and hence, must consider how the demand of others will 
affect his supply. The qualitative results which emerge in the two 
problems are the same, namely that output and price are both below the 
level they would have reached in the presence of competition.
The extreme cases were not considered in the analysis. If 
agent i's effective supply curve does not vary with price, then he 
will demand licenses since, by assumption, he cannot exert any 
downward pressure on the price of a license. In this case i would 
perceive the license market in the same light as an emissions tax. 
Another case not considered is when the center fixes the supply of 
licenses so that C'(w) = 0. In this case, the result still obtains 
that the firms with market power will overabate.
The principal result is called into question, however, when 
any ''real world'' considerations are brought to bear on the problem. 
For example, an incomplete knowledge of others' demand curves and the 
center's supply curve would mean that agent i would have to guess at 
the equilibrium price in his absence. Of course, knowing the
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equilibrium price is not enough. Agent i cannot construct his 
effective supply curve without knowing the center's supply and others' 
demands over a fairly wide range. The addition of secondary markets 
further complicates the issue. The clearing price expected in the 
secondary markets is likely to vary across agents and will affect each 
individual's behavior in the initial auction. Without explicit 
modeling of such problems, it is a little premature to conclude that 
market power will result in overabatement.
4. Conelus ions
The analysis focused on the derived demand for tradable 
licenses. In the general case it was found that introducing inputs of 
different quality did not change the basic result that the derived 
demand was downward sloping. This holds both for the monopolist and 
the competitive firm. A comparison of three cases of market power in 
a more restricted setting revealed that in all three cases, firms 
would tend to overabate in comparison to the competitive firm. A more 
general analysis of the case when a firm can dominate the license 
market indicated that the assumptions required to obtain the 
overabatement result may be too restrictive. This is one area which 
merits further thought if marketable permits are to become a reality.
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Footnotes
1. For example, see Baumol and Oates (1975), p. 35ff.
2. For examples, see Samuelson (1974), pp. 76-78, Russell (1964) and 
Winch (1965).
3. This assumption can be explained in terms of the desulfurization
of fuel oil. Suppose the effect of desulfurization is to remove a
constant fraction (1 - —) of total potential emissions, sE. Totaln
expenditure on abatement is constant by assumption. The . ,problem is to
0X
consider how —  changes as inputs increase. Consider a discrete change
in inputs from E to (E + AE). Before _ , AX 1. „the change, -—  = —AsE. After As n
the change 7 ^ = —As(E + AE). In As n
the limit, it is apparent that ^ 3 —
4. The proof is straightforward. Suppose the firm wishes to use two 
different inputs with respective costs e(s^) and 6 (5 ^). Let X equal 
the fraction spent on the first type and (1-k) be the fraction spent 
on the second. Then, the average cost of inputs would be
[ke(s^) + (1-X)e(s2)l > e(Xs + (l-kjs^). Thus, using inputs of the 
same quality with the. equivalent pollutant content would be cheaper.
If the firm wishes to purchase n different quality inputs, where n is 
arbitrary, the same line of reasoning holds.
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The proof assumes, of course, that any convex combination of 
pollutant contents are available for values of X on the unit interval. 
In the case of sulfur in fuel oil, this is a reasonable approximation.
5. On this point, see Chapter 3 of ''Implementing Tradable Emission
Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles Air Shed,'' written by
William Rogerson.
6. For the problem to make sense, R, s, and E must be nonnegative. 
These constraints are assumed to be ineffective.
7. For example, if lim e'(s) = +°° and lim e'(s) = 0 (i.e., e is a
S“H) s -H-<°
''neoclassical'' function), then for any w > 0, (17) has a unique 
positive solution in s.
8. In the economics literature the abatement cost function for all 
firms is typically presumed to be twice differentiable and strictly 
convex. Accepting this assumption would mean that a sufficient 
condition for a global maximum on (0,L^) would be that C''(w) >0. For 
a specific example, see Ackerman, p. 279.
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APPENDIX H
DATA FOR MARKETABLE PERMITS STUDY 
Robert W. Hahn
I. Introduction
This paper discusses the data which are used to derive the 
calculations on which the market simulations are based for the 
marketable permits study. Calculations based on these data are 
presented in Hahn (1981a), Chapter 4.
There are three sets of data representing the derived demand for 
marketable permits, and three 6ets of air quality data that are used in 
Hahn (1981a). The three sets of demand data correspond to three 
different natural gas supply scenarios: low, high and historical. The 
three sets of air quality data link sulfur oxides emissions in the 
South Coast Air Basin of California to sulfate air quality. All of the 
air quality data presented here are associated with the case of low 
natural gas supply. The three different sets of air quality data 
correspond to different assumptions about meteorological conditions. 
Year 1 corresponds to meteorological conditions in 1972; Year 2 
corresponds to meteorological conditions in 1973; and Year 3 
corresponds to meteorological conditions in 1974.
The demand curve links the willingness to pay for permits to 
quantity demanded. It should be understood that the cost data is 
preliminary and should not be used without the permission of the 
author. Units for the demand estimates are tons/day of sulfur dioxide
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(SO^) equ iva len t and d o l la r s / t o n .  A l l  e stim ates are g ive n  in  1977-1978 
d o l la r s  .
p a r t ic u la r  source c la s s  to  a i r  q u a lity  at a g iven  m on ito rin g s i t e .  A ir
II. Abatement Cost Data for Low Natural Gas Supply
Demand i s  based on projected  em issions in  the e a r ly  1980's under
There are 45 a c t iv i t ie s  fo r  the low n a tu ra l gas supply  case . They are 
described  in  Table 1. Table 2 g iv e s  the re le van t co st data fo r  each of 
the a c t iv i t ie s  in  Table 1. Data on S0x em ission s fo r  Table 2 are taken 
from Cass (1979). W ith each a c t iv i t y  there are three a sso c ia te d  
numbers w ritte n  in  double p re c is io n  intended fo r  use in  a FORTRAN 
program — hence, the "D+0" n o ta t io n . The f i r s t  column o f numbers 
corresponds to the w i l l in g n e s s  to  pay fo r  reducing one ton SO2  
equ iva len t per day. I f  there i s  a n egative  number in  th is  column, then 
the a c t iv i t y  has no known c o n tro ls .  The second column o f numbers 
corresponds to  the number o f tons/day that are a sso c ia te d  w ith  the 
m arg in a l co st o f abatement g ive n  in  Column 1. The f i n a l  column 
corresponds to any u n con tro lle d  em ission s fo r  the a c t iv i t y  in  question . 
A fte r  each set o f a c t iv i t ie s ,  supporting  m a te r ia ls  are noted.
The a i r  q u a lit y  data l in k  su lfu r  ox ides (S0x ) em issions from a
quality is measured in terms of the amount of sulfate (SO^ ) per unit 
volume. Data converting emissions to air quality are given in 
y^gm/rn /ton per day.
the assum ption 1977 re g u la t io n s  concerning S0x em ission s are e f fe c t iv e .
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III. Abatement Cost Data for High Natural Gas Supply
There are 39 activities for the high natural gas supply case.
They are described in Table 3. Table 4 gives the relevant cost data 
for each of the activities in Table 3. Data on S0x emissions for Table 
4 are based on Cass (1979). Appropriate adjustments are made in 
emissions to reflect the higher supply of natural gas. See Hahn (1981b) 
for a more detailed discussion. The interpretation of the columns in 
Table 4 is the same as in Table 2. After each set of activities, 
supporting materials are noted.
IV. Abatement Cost Data for Historical Natural Gas Supply
There are 48 activities for the historical natural gas supply
case. They are described in Table 5. Table 6 gives the relevant cost
data for each of the activities in Table 5. Data on SO emissions forx
Table 5 are based on Cass (1978). See Hahn (1981b) for a more detailed 
discussion. The interpretation of the columns in Table 6 is the same 
as in Table 2. After each set of activities, supporting materials are 
noted.
V. The Relationship between Emissions and Air Quality
This section summarizes the set of linear transfer coefficients 
which are used to relate source emissions to annual average air 
quality. Recall from Table 1 that there are 45 activities for the low 
natural gas case. Coefficients will be needed which link the seventeen
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monitoring sites listed in Table 7 to these 45 activities.
Table 8 links the 17 receptor sites to 20 generic activity
classes for each of the three years which are used in the analysis.
For a more detailed discussion of the meaning of these activity
classes, the reader is referred to Cass (1979). The unit of the source
3receptor coefficient is^/egm/m /ton per day. For example, if the 
coefficent for a given source-receptor relationship were .02, this 
would iimply that a daily emissions rate of 2 tons of S0x would result 
in .04/^ gm/m of sulfate.
The next step in the analysis is to link the generic activity 
classes to the activities given in Table 1. This is done in Table 9.
At this point, the change in sulfate air quality at the various 
monitoring sites can be predicted given any change in the distribution 
of emissions from the 45 source categories listed in Table 1. To 
predict the absolute level of sulfate air quality, background levels 
must be added to the change in air quality resulting from anthropogenic 
sources. These figures, taken from Cass (1978, p.288), are reproduced 
in Table 10.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This presentation of the data is designed to be concise. Anyone 
interested in using this data set should consult the references. It 
may be possible to place some of this data on tape should there be
sufficient interest.
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Table 1
Activities for Low Natural Gas Supply 
Number/Abbreviation/Descript ion
1 EUR1 UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .025 TO .1 PCT S FUEL
2 EUR2 UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .1 TO .25 PCT S FUEL
3 EUR3 UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .25 TO .5 PCT S FUEL
4 EUR4 UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .5 TO 1 PCT S FUEL
5 EUR5 UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 1 TO 2.5 PCT S FUEL
6 EUR6 UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 2.5 TO 4 PCT S FUEL
7 EUD UTILITIES DISTILLATE FUEL— UNCONTROLLED
8 RF1 REFINERY SWITCH FROM .025 TO .1 PCT S FUEL
9 RF2 REFINERY SWITCH FROM .1 TO .25 PCT S FUEL
10 RF3 REFINERY SWITCH FROM .25 TO .5 PCT S FUEL
11 RF4 REFINERY SWITCH FROM .5 TO 1 PCT S FUEL
12 RF5 REFINERY SWITCH FROM 1 TO 2.5 PCT S FUEL
13 RF6 REFINERY SWITCH FROM 2.5 TO 4 PCT S FUEL
14 NGL1 LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS CUSTOMERS— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
15 NGL2 LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS CUSTOMERS— 16 PCT SOX REMOVAL
16 NGH HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS CUSTOMERS— UNCONTROLLED
17 SRP SULFUR RECOVERY PLANTS— UNCONTROLLED
18 SAP SULFURIC ACID PLANTS— UNCONTROLLED
19 OC OTHER CHEMICALS— UNCONTROLLED
20 FCC1 FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS— 90 PCT SOX REMOVAL
21 FCC2 FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
22 SWS SOUR WATER STRIPPERS— UNCONTROLLED
23 MRP MISCELLANEOUS REFINERY PROCESS— UNCONTROLLED
24 OFP OIL FIELD PRODUCTION
25 CCG1 GREAT LAKES CARBON— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
26 CCG2 GREAT LAKES CARBON— 70 PCT SOX REMOVAL
27 CCM MARTIN MARIETTA CARBON— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
28 GL1 GLASS PLANTS—  .GT.95 PCT REMOVAL
29 GL2 GLASS PLANTS— ABOUT 85 PCT REMOVAL
30 GL3 GLASS PLANTS— ABOUT 15 PCT REMOVAL
31 NFM NONFERROUS METALS— UNCONTROLLED
32 STL FERROUS METALS— KAISER STEEL— REMOVE 80 PCT SOX AT $400/T
33 MP MINERAL PRODUCTS— UNCONTROLLED
34 STD SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS— UNCONTROLLED
35 OIP OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES— UNCONTROLLED
36 PI PERMITTED INCINERATORS— UNCONTROLLED
37 CTS CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— SURFACE
38 CTF CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— FREEWAY
39 NCL NONCATALYST LT. DUTY VEHICLES
40 HYD1 HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
41 HYD2 HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES— 16 PCT SOX REMOVAL
42 AIR AIRPORT OPERATIONS— UNCONTROLLED
43 SEA SHIPPING OPERATIONS— UNCONTROLLED
44 RR1 RAILROAD OPERATIONS— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
45 RR2 RAILROAD OPERATIONS— 16 PCT SOX REMOVAL
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Cost Data and References for Low Natural Gas Case
Table 2
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3
EUR1 4590. D+0 60.28 D+0 20.09 D+0
EUR2 2720. D+0 120.57 D+0 0. D+0
EUR3 940. D+0 200.95 D+0 0. D+0
EUR4 470. D+0 401.9 D+0 0. D+0
EUR5 420. D+0 1205.69 D+0 0. D+0
EUR6 210. D+0 1205.69 D+0 0. D+0
Data on Electric Utilities Residual fuel burning are taken from 
Cass (1979)— Tables El.5, El .6 and El.7. These are used in 
S0XDEM.2 to generate this data. See also:
Rogerson, W.P. (1980) "Electric Utilities" in "Implementing Tradable 
Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles Air 
Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena.
EUD -1. D+0 0. D+0 2.12 D+0
Electric Utilities Distillate fuel burning— uncontrolled
Utility turbine fuel is already very high quality.
RFl 4590. D+0 4.83 D+0 4.47 D+0
RF2 2720. D+0 9.66 D+0 0. D+0
RF3 940. D+0 16.1 D+0 0. D+0
RF4 470. D+0 32.21 D+0 0. D+0
RF5 420. D+0 96.62 D+0 0. D+0
RF6 210. D+0 96.62 D+0 0. D+0
Refinery Fuel Burning 
Uncontrolled 2.86 + 1.61 = 4.47
The 2.86 tons/day are the emissions from refinery gas (Table El.14) 
The 1.61 tons/day result from the fact that Rogerson assumes 
the cleanest fuel oil is .025 percent.
Refinery fuel burning— 7365237. Bbl/Yr (Table El.4— Cass)
Adjust Electric Utility demand curve to this quantity of oil.
This calculation is done automatically in S0XDEM.1.
NGL1 2000. D+0 30.58 D+0 9.55 D+0
NGL2 1000. D+0 7.64 D+0 0. D+0
Low Priority Natural Gas Customers
H - 3 7 6
These numbers assume 80 percent of the sulfur can bt removed.
The first 20 percent of the sulfur removed costs $1000 per ton. 
The latter 80 percent of the sulfur removed costs $2000 per ton.
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
NGH -1. D+0 0. D+0 .27 D+0
High Priority Natural Gas Customers— uncontrolled
SRP -1. D+0 0. D+0 3.51 D+0
Sulfur Recovery Plants— uncontrolled
SAP -1. D+0 0. D+0 3.08 D+0
Sulfuric Acid Plants— uncontrolled
OC -1. D+0 0. D+0 .04 D+0
Other Chemicals— uncontrolled
FCC1 18700. D+0 4.5 D+0 4.5 D+0
FCC2 810. D+0 35.96 D+0 0. D+0
Fluid Catalytic Crackers (80 and 90 percent control)
South Coast Air Quality Management District (1978) "Sulfur 
Dioxide/Sulfate Control Study— Executive Summary,"
El Monte, California, p. 25.
SWS -1. D+0 0. D+0 1.03 D+0
Sour T,ater Strippers— uncontrolled
MRP -1. D+0 0. D+0 .76 D+0
Miscellaneous Refinery Processes— uncontrolled
OFP 200. D+0 3.87 D+0 .43 D+0
Oil Field Production
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Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
CCG1 920. D+0 1.52 D+0 3.05 D+0
CCG2 650. D+0 10.67 D+0 0 . D+0
CCM 1320. D+0 3.56 D+0 1.52 D+0
Petroleum Coke Calciners
Hahn, R.W. (1980) "Petroleum Coke Calciners" in "Implementing
Tradable Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles 
Air Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, (revised using MM and 
GLC data) .
GL1 46323. D+0 . 1 D+0 0. D+0
GL2 19168 . D+0 .13 D+0 0. D+0
GL3 2199. D+0 2 . D+0 0. D+0
Glass Plants
Figures have been scaled to reflect on and off-grid emissions.
2.23 Tons SOx/day = total; 2 Tons SOx/day = on-grid.
Paranjape, A. (1980) "Glass Manufacturing" in "Implementing
Tradable Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles 
Air Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, p. 30, Table 7.
NFM -1. D+0 0. D+0 .98 D+0
Nonferrous Metals— uncontrolled
STL 400. D+0 9.5 D+0 5.05 D+0
Fox, G. (1981), "Sulfur Abatement at Kaiser Steel," working 
paper, Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, (received February 20).
MP -1. D+0 0. D+0 1.9 D+0
Mineral Products— uncontrolled
STD -1. D+0 0. D+0 .64 D+0
Sewage Treatement Digesters— uncontrolled
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OIP
PI
CTS
CTF
NCL
HYDl
HYD2
-1. D+0 0. D+0 .02 D+0
Other Industrial Processes— uncontrolled
-1. D+0 0. D+0 .07 D+0
Permitted Incinerators— uncontrolled
3600. D+0 1.93 D+0 5.77 D+0
Catalyst Equipped Light Duty Vehicles— surface
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
3600. D+0 1.34 D+0 4.02 D+0
Catalyst Equipped Light Duty Vehicles— freeway
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
3600. D+0 3.97 D+0 11.89 D+0
Noncatalyst Light Duty Vehicles
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
2000. D+0 11.96 D+0 3.74 D+0
1000. D+0 2.99 D+0 0. D+0
Heavy Highway Diesel Vehicles
These numbers assume 80 percent of the sulfur can be removed.
The first 20 percent of the sulfur removed costs $1000 per ton. 
The latter 80 percent of the sulfur removed costs $2000 per ton.
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
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AIR -1. D+0 0 D+0 1.02 D+0
Airport Operations— uncontrolled
SEA -1. D+0 0. D+0 13.21 D+0
Shipping Operations— uncontrolled
RR1 2000.
RR2 1000.
D+0 2.77 D+0 .87 D+0
D+0 .69 D+0 0. D+0
Railroad Operations
These numbers assume 80 percent of the sulfur can be removed.
The first 20 percent of the sulfur removed costs $1000 per ton. 
The latter 80 percent of the sulfur removed costs $2000 per ton.
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
H-380
Table 3
Activities for High Natural Gas Supply 
Number/Abbreviation/Descript ion
1 EUR1
2 EUR2
3 EUR3
4 EUR4
5 EUR5
6 EUR6,
7 EUD
8 RF
9 NGL
1 0 NGH
1 1 SRP
1 2 SAP
13 OC
14 FCC1
15 FCC2
16 SWS
17 MRP
18 OFP
19 CCG1
2 0 CCG2
2 1 CCM
2 2 GLl
23 GL2
24 GL3
25 NFM
26 STL
27 MP
28 STD
29 OIP
30 PI
31 CTS
32 CTF
33 NCL
•> /. HYDl
35 HYD2
36 AIR
37 SEA
38 RR1
39 RR2
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .025 TO .1 PCT S FUEL
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .1 TO .25 PCT S FUEL
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .25 TO .5 PCT S FUEL
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM .5 TO 1 PCT S FUEL
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 1 TO 2.5 PCT S FUEL
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 2.5 TO 4 PCT S FUEL
UTILITIES DISTILLATE FUEL-UNCONTROLLED
REFINERY GAS— UNCONTROLLED
LOW PRIORITY NATURAL GAS CUSTOMERS
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS CUSTOMERS— UNCONTROLLED
SULFUR RECOVERY PLANTS— UNCONTROLLED
SULFURIC ACID PLANTS— UNCONTROLLED
OTHER CHEMICALS— UNCONTROLLED
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS— 90 PCT SOX REMOVAL
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS— UNCONTROLLED
MISCELLANEOUS REFINERY PROCESS— UNCONTROLLED
OIL FIELD PRODUCTION
GREAT LAKES CARBON— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
GREAT LAKES CARBON— 70 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
MARTIN MARIETTA CARBON— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
GLASS PLANTS— .GT.95 PCT REMOVAL 
GLASS PLANTS— ABOUT 85 PCT REMOVAL 
GLASS PLANTS— ABOUT 15 PCT REMOVAL 
NONFERROUS METALS— UNCONTROLLED
FERROUS METALS— KAISER STEEL— REMOVE 80 PCT SOX AT $400/T
MINERAL PRODUCTS— UNCONTROLLED
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS— UNCONTROLLED
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES— UNCONTROLLED
PERMITTED INCINERATORS— UNCONTROLLED
CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— SURFACE
CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— FREEWAY
NONCATALYST LT. DUTY VEHICLES
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES— 16 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
AIRPORT OPERATIONS— UNCONTROLLED 
SHIPPING OPERATIONS— UNCONTROLLED 
RAILROAD OPERATIONS— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
RAILROAD OPERATIONS— 16 PCT SOX REMOVAL
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Cost Data and References for High Natural Gas Case
Table 4
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 2
EUR1 4590. D+0 13.87 D+0 4.62 D+0
EUR2 2720. D+0 27.73 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR3 940. D+0 46.22 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR4 470. D+0 92.44 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR5 420. D+0 277.31 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR6 2 1 0 . D+0 277.31 D+0 0 . D+0
Data on Electric Utilities Residual fuel burning are taken from 
Cass (1979)— Tables El.5, El . 6 and El.7. These are used in 
S0XDEM.3 to generate this data. See also:
Rogerson, W.P. (1980) "Electric Utilities" in "Implementing Tradable 
Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles Air 
Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena.
Cass, G.R. (1975) "Dimensions of the Los Angeles S02/Sulfate 
Problem," EQL Memorandum No. 15, Environmental Quality 
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, 
Appendix Al.
For the years 1970 and 1971, 77 percent of the fuel burned 
was natural gas. This figure is used to generate the utility 
demand.
EUD -1. D+0 0. D+0 .49 D+0
Electric Utilities Distillate fuel burning— uncontrolled 
Utility turbine fuel is already very high quality. 
(1-.77)*(2.12)=.49 The figure used for the low natural 
gas scenario was 2 .1 2 .
RF -1. D+0 0. D+0 2.86 D+0
Refinery Fuel Burning 
Uncontrolled 2.86 Tons SOx/day
The 2.86 tons/day are the emissions from refinery gas (Table El.14) 
All other fuel used in refinery operations is presumed to be 
natural gas.
NGL -1. D+0 0. D+0 0. D+0
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Low Priority Natural Gas Customers
This number is based on the assumption that these users 
burn only natural gas.
NGH -1. D+0 0. D+0 .27 D+0
High Priority Natural Gas Customers— uncontrolled
SRP -1. D+0 0. D+0 3.51 D+0
Sulfur Recovery Plants— uncontrolled
SAP -1. D+0 0. D+0 3.08 D+0
Sulfuric Acid Plants— uncontrolled
OC -1. D+0 0. D+0 .04 D+0
Other Chemicals— uncontrolled
FCC1 18700. D+0 4.5 D+0 4.5 D+0
FCC2 810. D+0 35.96 D+0 0. D+0
Fluid Catalytic Crackers (80 and 90 percent control)
South Coast Air Quality Management District (1978) "Sulfur 
Dioxide/Sulfate Control Study— Executive Summary,"
El Monte, California, p. 25.
SWS -1. D+0 0. D+0 1.03 D+0
Sour Water Strippers— uncontrolled
MRP -1. D+0 0. D+0 .76 D+0
Miscellaneous Refinery Processes— uncontrolled
OFP 200. D+0 3.87 D+0 .43 D+0
Oil Field Production
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
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CCGl 920. D+0 1.52 D+0 3.05 D+0
CCG2 650. D+0 10.67 D+0 0 . D+0
CCM 1320. D+0 3.56 D+0 1.52 D+0
Petroleum Coke Calciners
Hahn, R.W. (1980) "Petroleum Coke Calciners" in "Implementing
Tradable Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles 
Air Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, (revised using MM and 
GLC data) .
GL1 46323. D+0 . 1 D+0 0. D+0
GL2 19168. D+0 .13 D+0 0. D+0
GL3 2199. D+0 2 . D+0 0. D+0
Glass Plants
Figures have been scaled to reflect on and off-grid emissions.
2.23 Tons SOx/day = total; 2 Tons SOx/day = on-grid.
Paranjape, A. (1980) "Glass Manufacturing" in "Implementing
Tradable Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles 
Air Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, p. 30, Table 7.
NFM -1. D+0 0. D+0 .98 D+0
Nonferrous Metals— uncontrolled
STL 400. D+0 9.5 D+0 5.05 D+0
Fox, G. (1981), "Sulfur Abatement at Kaiser Steel," working 
paper, Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, (received February 20).
MP -1. D+0 0. D+0 1.9 D+0
Mineral Products— uncontrolled
STD -1. D+0 0. D+0 .64 D+0
Sewage Treatement Digesters— uncontrolled
OIP - 1 . D+0 0. D+0 .02 D+0
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PI
CTS
CTF
NCL
HYDl
HYD2
Other Industrial Processes— uncontrolled
-1. D+0 0. D+0 .07 D+0
Permitted Incinerators— uncontrolled
3600. D+0 1.93 D+0 5.77 D+0
Catalyst Equipped Light Duty Vehicles— surface
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
3600. D+0 1.34 D+0 4.02 D+0
Catalyst Equipped Light Duty Vehicles— freeway
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
3600. D+0 3.97 D+0 11.89 D+0
Noncatalyst Light Duty Vehicles
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
2000. D+0 11.96 D+0 3.74 D+0
1000. D+0 2.99 D+0 0. D+0
Heavy Highway Diesel Vehicles
These numbers assume 80 percent of the sulfur can be removed.
The first 20 percent of the sulfur removed costs $1000 per ton. 
The latter 80 percent of the sulfur removed costs $2000 per ten.
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
AIR -1. D+0 0. D+0 1.02 D+0
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Airport Operations— uncontrolled
Shipping Operations— uncontrolled
D+0 2.77 D+0 .87 D+0
D+0 .69 D+0 0. D+0
Railroad Operations
These numbers assume 80 percent of the sulfur can be removed.
The first 20 percent of the sulfur removed costs $1000 per ton. 
The latter 80 percent of the sulfur removed costs $2000 per ton.
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
SEA -1. D+0 0. D+0 13.21 D+0
RR1 2000.
RR2 1000.
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Activities for Historical Natural Gas Supply
Table 5
Number/Abbreviation/Descript ion
1 EUR1
2 EUR2
3 EUR3
4 EUR4
5 EUR5
6 EUR6
7 RFl
8 RF2
9 RF3
1 0 RF4
1 1 RF5
1 2 RF6
13 NGLl
14 NGL2
15 NGL3
16 NGL4
17 NGL5
18 NGL6
19 NGH
2 0 SRP
2 1 SAP
2 2 OC
23 FCC1
24 FCC2
25 SWS
26 MRP
27 OFP
28 CCGl
29 CCG2
30 CCM
31 GL1
32 GL2
33 GL3
34 NFM
35 STL
36 MP
37 STD
38 OIP
39 PI
40 CTS
41 CTF
42 NCL
43 HYDl
44 HYD2
45 AIR
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 
UTILITIES SWITCH FROM 2.5 TO 4 PCT S FUEL
.025 TO .1 PCT S FUEL
.025 TO .1 PCT S FUEL 
.1 TO .25 PCT S FUEL 
.25 TO .5 PCT S FUEL 
.5 TO 1 PCT S FUEL 
1 TO 2.5 PCT S FUEL
TO
TO
REFINERY SWITCH FROM 
REFINERY SWITCH FROM .1 
REFINERY SWITCH FROM .25 
REFINERY SWITCH FROM .5 
REFINERY SWITCH FROM 1 TO 2.5 PCT 
REFINERY SWITCH FROM 2.5 TO 4 
LOW PRIORITY N.G. SWITCH FROM 
LOW PRIORITY N.G.
LOW PRIORITY N.G.
LOW PRIORITY N.G.
LOW PRIORITY N.G.
LOW PRIORITY N.G.
.25 PCT S FUEL 
.5 PCT S FUEL
TO 1 PCT S FUEL 
S FUEL 
PCT S FUEL 
.025 TO .1 PCT S
.1
.25
.5
FUEL
.25 PCT S FUEL 
.5 PCT S FUEL 
1. PCT S FUEL 
TO 2.5 PCT S FUEL 
TO 4. PCT S FUEL
TO
TO
TO
SWITCH FROM 
SWITCH FROM 
SWITCH FROM 
SWITCH FROM 1.
SWITCH FROM 2.5 
HIGH PRIORITY NATURAL GAS CUSTOMERS— UNCONTROLLED 
SULFUR RECOVERY PLANTS— UNCONTROLLED 
SULFURIC ACID PLANTS— UNCONTROLLED 
OTHER CHEMICALS— UNCONTROLLED 
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS— 90 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKERS— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
SOUR WATER STRIPPERS— UNCONTROLLED 
MISCELLANEOUS REFINERY PROCESS— UNCONTROLLED 
OIL FIELD PRODUCTION
GREAT LAKES CARBON— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
GREAT LAKES CARBON— 70 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
MARTIN MARIETTA CARBON— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
GLASS PLANTS REMOVE ALL BUT .1 TONS/DAY SOX— .GT.95 PCT REMOVAL 
GLASS PLANTS REMOVE ALL BUT .31 TONS/DAY SOX— ABOUT 85 PCT REMOVAL 
GLASS PLANTS REMOVE ABOUT .31 TONS/DAY SOX— ABOUT 15 PCT REMOVAL 
NONFERROUS METALS— UNCONTROLLED
FERROUS METALS— KAISER STEEL— OPTION TO REMOVE 80 PCT SOX AT $400/T
MINERAL PRODUCTS— UNCONTROLLED
SEWAGE TREATMENT DIGESTERS— UNCONTROLLED
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES— UNCONTROLLED
PERMITTED INCINERATORS— UNCONTROLLED
CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— SURFACE
CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— FREEWAY
NONCATALYST LT. DUTY VEHICLES
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES— 80 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES— 16 PCT SOX REMOVAL 
AIRPORT OPERATIONS— UNCONTROLLED
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46 SEA SHIPPING OPERATIONS--UNCONTROLLED
47 RR1 RAILROAD OPERATIONS--80 PCT SOX REMOVAL
48 RR2 RAILROAD OPERATIONS--16 PCT SOX REMOVAL
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Cost Data and References for Historical Natural Gas Case
Table 6
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3
EUR1 4590. D+0 41.02 D+0 13.67 D+0
EUR2 2720. D+0 82.04 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR3 940. D+0 136.74 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR4 470. D+0 273.48 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR 5 420. D+0 820.43 D+0 0 . D+0
EUR6 2 1 0 . D+0 820.43 D+0 0 . D+0
Data on Electric Utilities Residual fuel burning are taken from 
Cass (1978)— PP. 493, 598. These are used in S0XDEM.6 to generate 
this data. See also:
Rogerson, W.P. (1980) "Electric Utilities" in "Implementing Tradable 
Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles Air 
Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena.
RF1 4590. D+0 1.23 D+0 2.86 D+0
RF2 2720. D+0 2.47 D+0 0. D+0
RF3 940. D+0 4.11 D+0 0. D+0
RF4 470. D+0 8 . 2 2 D+0 0. D+0
RF5 420. D+0 24.66 D+0 0. D+0
RF6 2 1 0 . D+0 24.66 D+0 0. D+0
Refinery Fuel Burning 
Uncontrolled 2.45 + .41 = 2.86
The 2.45 tons/day are the emissions from refinery gas . (Cass(1978),p .677) 
The .41 tons/day result from the fact that Rogerson assumes 
the cleanest fuel oil is .025 percent.
Refinery fuel burning— 1880241. Bbl/Yr (Cass(1978), pp. 500, 598)
Adjust Electric Utility demand curve to this quantity of oil.
This calculation is done automatically in S0XDEM.6.
NGL.1 4590. D+0 .48 D+0 .16 D+0
NGL2 2720. D+0 .96 D+0 0. D+0
NGL3 940. D+0 1 . 6 D+0 0. D+0
NGL4 470. D+0 3.2 D+0 0. D+0
NGL5 420. D+0 9.59 D+0 0. D+0
NGL6 2 1 0 . D+0 9.59 D+0 0. D+0
Data on Low Priority Natural Gas Customers are taken from
Cass (1978)— pp. 508 , 598 . The amount of oil burned by
this class 'of sources is 731 ,141. The demand curve is
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is generated in S0XDEM.6. This class is really Other 
Interruptible Gas Customers for this run. The two are 
very closely related.
NGH -1. D+0 0. D+0 .27 D+0
High Priority Natural Gas Customers— uncontrolled
SRP -1. D+0 0. D+0 3.51 D+0
Sulfur Recovery Plants— uncontrolled
SAP -1. D+0 0. D+0 3.08 D+0
Sulfuric Acid Plants— uncontrolled
OC -1. D+0 0. D+0 .04 D+0
Other Chemicals— uncontrolled
FCC1 18700. D+0 4.5 D+0 4.5 D+0
FCC2 810. D+0 35.96 D+0 0. D+0
Fluid Catalytic Crackers (80 and 90 percent control)
South Coast Air Quality Management District (1978) "Sulfur 
Dioxide/Sulfate Control Study— Executive Summary,"
El Monte, California, p. 25.
SWS -1. D+0 0. D+0 1.03 D+0
Sour Water Strippers— uncontrolled
MRP -1. D+0 0. D+0 .76 D+0
'iscellarc-ous Refinery Processes— uncontrolled
OFP 200. D+0 3.87 D+0 .43 D+0
Oil Field Production
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
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CCGl 920. D+0 1.52 D+0 3.05 D+0
CCG2 650. D+0 10.67 D+0 0 . D+0
CCM 1320. D+0 3.56 D+0 1.52 D+0
Petroleum Coke Calciners
Hahn, R.W. (1980) "Petroleum Coke Calciners" in "Implementing
Tradable Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles 
Air Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, (revised using MM and 
GLC data).
GL1 46323. D+0 . 1 D+0 0. D+0
GL2 19168. D+0 .13 D+0 0. D+0
GL3 2199. D+0 2 . D+0 0. D+0
Glass Plants
Figures have been scaled to reflect on and off-grid emissions.
2.23 Tons SOx/day = total; 2 Tons SOx/day = on-grid.
Paranjape, A. (1980) "Glass Manufacturing" in "Implementing
Tradable Emissions Licenses: Sulfur Oxides in the Los Angeles 
Air Shed", Environmental Quality Laboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, p. 30, Table 7.
NFM -1. D+0 0. D+0 .98 D+0
Nonferrous Metals— uncontrolled
STL 400. D+0 9.5 D+0 5.05 D+0
Fox, G. (1981), "Sulfur Abatement at Kaiser Steel," working 
paper, Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, (received February 20).
MP -1. D+0 0. D+0 1.9 D+0
Mineral Products— uncontrolled
STD -1. D+0 0. D+0 .64 D+0
Sewage Treatement Digesters— uncontrolled
OIP - 1 . D+0 0. D+0 .02 D+0
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PI
CTS
CTF
NCL
HYDl
HYD2
AIR
Other Industrial Processes— uncontrolled
-1. D+0 0. D+0 .07 D+0
Permitted Incinerators— uncontrolled
3600. D+0 1.93 D+0 5.77 D+0
Catalyst Equipped Light Duty Vehicles— surface
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
3600. D+0 1.34 D+0 4.02 D+0
Catalyst Equipped Light Duty Vehicles— freeway
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
3600. D+0 3.97 D+0 11.89 D+0
Noncatalyst Light Duty Vehicles
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
2000. D+0 11.96 D+0 3.74 D+0
1000. D+0 2.99 D+0 0. D+0
Heavy Highway Diesel Vehicles
These numbers assume 80 percent of the sulfur can be removed.
The first 20 percent of the sulfur removed costs $1000 per ton. 
The latter 80 percent of the sulfur removed costs $2000 per ton.
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
-1. D+0 0. D+0 1.02 D+0
Airport Operations— uncontrolled
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D+0 13.21 D+0
Shipping Operations— uncontrolled
RR1 2000.
RR2 1000.
D+0 2.77
D+0 .69
D+0 .87 D+0
D+0 0. D+0
Railroad Operations
These numbers assume 80 percent of the sulfur can be removed.
The first 20 percent of the sulfur removed costs $1000 per ton. 
The latter 80 percent of the sulfur removed costs $2000 per ton.
Hahn, R.W. (1981), "Petroleum Refiners," working paper,
Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, Pasadena, March 12, 11 pp.
SEA -1. D+0 0.
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Table 7
Location of Air Quality Monitoring Sites
Number Location
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8  
9
1 0
1 1
1 2
13
14
15
16 
17
DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES 
AZUSA
WEST LOS ANGELES
LENNOX
PASADENA
LYNWOOD
SANTA MONICA
ANAHEIM
GARDEN GROVE
GLENDORA
WEST COVINA
TORRANCE
LONG BEACH
GLENDALE
SANTA ANA
SANTA FE SPRINGS
EAST LA (PEAK)
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Table 8
Source-Receptor Coefficients for Generic Activity Classes
1 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - DOWNTOWN LA
UTILITY 
YEAR RESID.
1 0.01606
2 0.01310
3 0.01757
SULFURIC
ACID
1 0.02740
2 0.02648
3 0.02916
GLASS
FURNACES
1 0.06914
2 0.05566
3 0.07123
NON-CAT
VEHICLES
1 0.02646
2 0.01790
3 0.02077
UTILITY 
DIST OIL
REFINERY
FUEL
0.02025
0.01379
0.01439
0.03163
0.03272
0.03687
REFINERY 
FCC UNIT
OTHER
REFINERY
0.02513 
0.02635 
0.028 4 5
0.02255
0.01855
0.02449
FERROUS
METALS
MISC.
UNITS
0.00238
0.00230
0.00190
0.01552
0.01303
0.01505
DIESEL
VEHICLES
AIRPORT
0.05296
0.04242
0.04691
0.04620
0.03132
0.03588
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
0.03076
0.02392
0.03139
0.03479
0.02457
0.03564
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
0.01060
0.00520
0.00539
0.01758
0.01613
0.01463
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
0.06616
0.05415
0.05938
0.30750
0.26151
0.28582
SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.02626
0.02228
0.02521
0.12346
0.10460
0.11739
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2 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - AZUSA
UTILITY UTILITY
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL
1 0.01734 0.02070
2 0.01203 0.02995
3 0.01437 0.02540
SULFURIC REFINERY
ACID FCC UNIT
1 0.02828 0.02751
2 0.04291 0.03830
3 0.04406 0.03737
GLASS FERROUS
FURNACES METALS
1 0.05086 0.01114
2 0.04386 0.00441
3 0.05008 0.00570
NON-CAT DIESEL
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.02399 0.02944
2 0.01720 0.02229
3 0.01929 0.02487
REFINERY
FUEL
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
0.02984
0.03854
0.04102
0.02765
0.02459
0.02822
0.03112
0.04024
0.04679
OTHER
REFINERY
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
0.02433
0.03111
0.03564
0.01445
0.00924
0.01218
0.02297
0.03497
0.03660
MISC.
UNITS
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
0.01804
0.01447
0.01594
0.03495
0.02567
0.02847
0.12151
0.11235
0.12108
AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.01873
0.00831
0.00681
0.02333
0.02836
0.03128
0.U3624
0.02761
0.03177
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UTILITY 
YEAR RESID.
UTILITY 
DIST OIL
REFINERY
FUEL
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
1 0.01216
2 0.00850
3 0.01050
0.01248
0.00943
0.01383
0.02186
0.01896
0.01911
0.02060
0.01361
0.01733
0.01870
0.01596
0.01781
SULFURIC
ACID
REFINERY 
FCC UNIT
OTHER
REFINERY
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
1 0.01877
2 0.02006 
3 0.01992
0.01844
0.01676
0.01820
0.01485
0.01418
0.01478
0.00511
0.00311
0.00492
0.01425
0.00976
0.01053
GLASS
FURNACES
FERROUS
METALS
MISC.
UNITS
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
1 0.02578
2 0.01724
3 0.02223
0.00202
0.00112
0.00054
0.00905
0.00592
0.00756
0.05792
0.04854
0.05355
0.17116
0.14599
0.16191
NON-CAT
VEHICLES
DIESEL
VEHICLES
AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
1 0.02088
2 0.01394
3 0.01615
0.04227
0.03406
0.03756
0.07055
0.04491
0.03973
0.01836
0.01407
0.01739
0.02869
0.01902
0.02292
3 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER T/DAY OF SOX - WEST LOS ANGELES
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4 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - LENNOX
UTILITY 
YEAR RESID.
1 0.01381
2 0.00980
3 0.01184
SULFURIC
ACID
1 0.03029
2 0.02858
3 0.03739
GLASS
FURNACES
1 0.03205
2 0.02214
3 0.03122
NON-CAT
VEHICLES
1 0.01843
2 0.01291
3 0.01362
UTILITY REFINERY
DIST OIL FUEL
0.01409 0.03201
0.01092 0.03059
0.01463 0.03792
REFINERY OTHER
FCC UNIT REFINERY
0.02640 0.02183
0.02293 0 . 0 2 0 0 0
0.02837 0.02350
FERROUS MISC.
METALS UNITS
0.00198 0.00958
0.00170 0.00711
0.00156 0.00792
DIESEL AIRPORT
VEHICLES
0.03493 0 . 1 1 0 0 1
0.02950 0.07956
0.03116 0.06350
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
0.01982
0.01525
0.01908
0.02784
0.02379
0.02880
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
0.00927
0.00501
0.00562
0.01639
0.01787
0.01382
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
0.04561
0.03935
0.04206
0.13196
0 . 1 2 0 0 1
0.13513
SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.02312
0.02357
0.02787
0.04274
0.04009
0.04091
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5 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - PASADENA
UTILITY UTILITY REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
RESID. DIST OIL FUEL FUEL PLANTS
1 0.01564 0.02345 0.02751 0.03244 0.02633
2 0.01915 0.01648 0.02733 0.02927 0.02458
3 0.01833 0.01597 0.02958 0.03306 0.03249
SULFURIC REFINERY OTHER OIL COKE
ACID FCC UNIT REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
1 0.02090 0.02501 0.02274 0.01028 0.01725
2 0.02296 0.02417 0.02093 0.00655 0.01544
3 0.02658 0.02932 0.02216 0.00688 0.01588
GLASS FERROUS MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
FURNACES METALS UNITS STREET FREEWAY
1 0.05357 0.00314 0.01514 0.04803 0.13577
2 0.04964 0.00288 0.01493 0.03906 0.12949
3 0.06041 0.00247 0.01630 0.04410 0.13992
NON-CAT DIESEL AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.02576 0.03625 0.02926 0.02054 0.04686
2 0.01860 0.02926 0.02977 0.01999 0.04445
3 0 . 0 2 2 1 2 0.03312 0.03742 0.02292 0.05061
H-399
6  SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - LYNWOOD
UTILITY 
YEAR RESID.
1 0.01585
2 0 . 0 1 0 1 2
3 0.01399
SULFURIC
ACID
1 0.03529
2 0.03892
3 0.04239
GLASS
FURNACES
1 0.05382
2 0.03879
3 0.04982
NON-CAT
VEHICLES
1 0.02098
2 0.01434
3 0.01548
UTILITY 
DIST OIL
REFINERY
FUEL
0.02424
0.01663
0.01891
0.04161
0.03473
0.04018
REFINERY 
FCC UNIT
OTHER
REFINERY
0.03256
0.03308
0.03349
0.02751
0.02240
0.02337
FERROUS
METALS
MISC.
UNITS
0.00322
0.00299
0.00371
0.01332
0.00961
0.01033
DIESEL
VEHICLES
AIRPORT
0.03587
0.02876
0.03054
0.02096
0.00812
0.00752
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
0.02643
0.01997
0.02423
0.03613
0.02880
0.03393
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
0.01566
0.01225
0.01209
0.03338
0.02387
0.02152
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
0.04734
0.03817
0.04051
0.14010
0.13442
0.14275
SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.03318
0.03056
0.03269
0.058 98 
0.04792 
0.04971
7 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - SANTA MONICA
UTILITY UTILITY
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL
1 0.01012 0.00871
2 0.00549 0.01067
3 0.00833 0.01233
SULFURIC REFINERY
ACID FCC UNIT
1 0.01972 0.01687
2 0.01790 0.01436
3 0.01660 0.01749
GLASS FERROUS
FURNACES METALS
1 0.01826 0.00034
2 0.01361 0.00117
3 0.01579 0.00067
NON-CAT DIESEL
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.01656 0.02971
2 0.01096 0.02460
3 0.01251 0.02694
REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
FUEL FUEL PLANTS
0.02087 0.01615 0.02109
0.01706 0.01095 0.01278
0.01976 0.01351 0.01522
OTHER OIL COKE
REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
0.01329 0.00476 0.01305
0.01037 0.00391 0.00921
0.01256 0.00384 0.01218
MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
UNITS STREET FREEWAY
0.00632 0.04009 0.08721
0.00514 0.03405 0.08195
0.00538 0.03768 0.09141
AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.05589 0.01821 0.02180
0.07356 0.01361 0.01373
0.07017 0.01707 0.01604
H-401
8 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - ANAHEIM
UTILITY UTILITY
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL
1 0.01496 0.02364
2 0.00653 0.00718
3 0.00675 0.00897
SULFURIC REFINERY
ACID FCC UNIT
1 0.01904 0.01813
2 0.00590 0.00475
3 0.00485 0.00435
GLASS FERROUS
FURNACES METALS
1 0.02446 0.00912
2 G.02123 0.01074
3 0.02163 0.00659
NON-CAT DIESEL
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.01580 0.03131
2 0.00932 0.02407
3 0.00997 0.02558
REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
FUEL FUEL PLANTS
0.01989 0.01424 0.01969
0.00556 0.00700 0.00631
0.00436 0.00743 0.00555
OTHER OIL COKE
REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
0.01978 0.03283 0.02338
0.00701 0.03250 0.00667
0.00631 0.03357 0.00431
MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
UNITS STREET FREEWAY
0.01531 0.03824 0.16586
0.01113 0.02924 0.15357
0.01218 0.03105 0.16451
AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.00762 0.02520 0.03090
0.00303 0.00927 0.02328
0.00387 0.01075 0.02346
H-402
9 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - GARDEN GROVE
UTILITY UTILITY
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL
1 0.01376 0.01803
2 0.00586 0.00394
3 0.00579 0.00464
SULFURIC REFINERY
ACID FCC UNIT
1 0.01620 0.01624
2 0.00419 0.00391
3 0.00353 0.00346
GLASS FERROUS
FURNACES METALS
1 0.02903 0.00761
2 0.02397 0.00760
3 0.02781 0.00651
NON-CAT DIESEL
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.01438 0.02896
2 0.00854 0.02185
3 0.00901 0.02303
REFINERY
FUEL
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
0.01596 
0 ."00487 
0.00370
0.01234
0.00617
0.00632
0 . 0 2 0 2 2
0.00551
0.00503
OTHER
REFINERY
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
0.01758
0.00463
0.00454
0.04105
0.02905
0.04698
0.02218
0.00555
0.00287
MISC.
UNITS
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
0.01457
0.01049
0.01324
0.03461
0.02664
0.02804
0.16013
0.13888
0.14403
AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.00927
0.00404
0.00370
0.02382
0.00866
0.00855
0.02666
0.01895
0.01850
H-403
UTILITY
RESID.
UTILITY 
DIST OIL
REFINERY
FUEL
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
0.01719
0.01464
0.01513
0.02259
0.04183
0.04472
0.02714
0.04017
0.03950
0.02623
0.02057
0.02306
0.03305
0.05377
0.04701
SULFURIC
ACID
REFINERY 
FCC UNIT
OTHER
REFINERY
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
0.02800
0.04156
0.03554
0.02694
0.03563
0.03720
0.02499
0.04029
0.04063
0.01454
0.01387
0.01473
0.02424
0.04339
0.04387
GLASS
FURNACES
FERROUS
METALS
MI SC. 
UNITS
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
0.03852
0.02710
0.03086
0.00984
0.00900
0.01172
0.02048
0.01581
0.01756
0.03263
0.02450
0.02696
0.08394
0.06951
0.07499
NON-CAT
VEHICLES
DIESEL
VEHICLES
AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.02288
0.01600
0.01770
0.02618
0.01935
0.02126
0.02214
0.00587
0.00777
0.02422
0.03273
0.03598
0.03326
0.02603
0.02965
YEAR
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
10 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - GLENDORA
H-404
11 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - WEST COVINA
UTILITY UTILITY REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL FUEL FUEL PLANTS
1 0.01719 0.02359 0.03140 0.02866 0.03978
2 0.01401 0.04045 0.03958 0.02116 0.04926
3 0.01204 0.04200 0.04372 0.02378 0.06082
SULFURIC REFINERY OTHER OIL COKE
ACID FCC UNIT REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
1 0.02860 0.02621 0.02957 0.01823 0.02688
2 0.03743 0.03704 0.04142 0.01315 0.04134
3 0.04272 0.03955 0.03758 0.01845 0.04558
GLASS FERROUS MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
FURNACES METALS UNITS STREET FREEWAY
1 0.04997 0.00818 0.02154 0.03719 0.13533
2 0.02602 0.00445 0.01719 0.02745 0.10296
3 0.02966 0.00633 0.01901 0.03001 0.10919
NON-CAT DIESEL AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.02364 0.03141 0.02665 0.02582 0.03846
2 0.01581 0.02258 0.00531 0.03804 0.02800
3 0.01744 0.02502 0.00539 0.03746 0.03202
H-405
12 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - TORRANCE
UTILITY UTILITY REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL FUEL FUEL PLANTS
1 0.01069 0.01229 0.03639 0.01867 0.03014
2 0.00821 0.01554 0.02932 0.01337 0.02774
3 0.00886 0.01777 0.03564 0.01742 0.03484
SULFURIC REFINERY OTHER OIL COKE
ACID FCC UNIT REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
1 0.03619 0.02968 0.02355 0.01223 0.02241
2 0.02447 0.02170 0.02125 0.00603 0.02579
3 0.03695 0.02764 0.02469 0.01138 0.02749
GLASS FERROUS MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
FURNACES METALS UNITS STREET FREEWAY
1 0.03080 0.00262 0.00991 0.03991 0.11392
2 0.02773 0.00245 0.00686 0.03287 0.10915
3 0.03164 0.00237 0.00706 0.03459 0.11814
NON-CAT DIESEL AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.01642 0.03019 0.02301 0.03494 0.04134
2 0.01117 0.02449 0.01950 0.03058 0.03676
3 0.01119 0.02525 0.01098 0.03604 0.03650
H - 4 0 6
13 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - LONG BEACH
UTILITY UTILITY REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL FUEL FUEL PLANTS
1 0.01342 0.03881 0.03568 0.01756 0.03472
2 0.00776 0.03693 0.02810 0.01154 0.02687
3 0.01054 0.04463 0.03393 0.01384 0.03160
SULFURIC REFINERY OTHER OIL COKE
ACID FCC UNIT REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
1 0.03005 0.03225 0.02797 0.01583 0.03546
2 0.02407 0.02245 0.02717 0.01398 0.03592
3 0.02862 0.02600 0.03385 0.01634 0.05117
GLASS FERROUS MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
FURNACES METALS UNITS STREET FREEWAY
1 0.02080 0.00288 0.00958 0.03538 0.19350
2 0.01601 0.00388 0.00774 0.02875 0.16903
3 0.01595 0.00354 0.00848 0.02980 0.18393
NON-CAT DIESEL AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.01682 0.03273 0.01975 0.05117 0.05315
2 0.01083 0.02597 0.01037 0.05319 0.04521
3 0.01100 0.02714 0.00772 0.06087 0.04673
H-407
14 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - GLENDALE
UTILITY UTILITY REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL FUEL FUEL PLANTS
1 0.01389 0.01481 0.02415 0.02682 0.02086
2 0.01072 0.01113 0.01962 0.02110 0.01727
3 0.01260 0.01718 0.02095 0.02504 0.02277
SULFURIC REFINERY OTHER OIL COKE
ACID FCC UNIT REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
1 0.02376 0.01937 0.01781 0.00553 0.01598
2 0.01826 0.01781 0.01271 0.00389 0.01047
3 0.01977 0.02065 0.01731 0.00451 0.01250
GLASS FERROUS MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
FURNACES METALS UNITS STREET FREEWAY
1 0.03536 0.00326 0.01207 0.04762 0.16725
2 0.02948 0.00231 0.01032 0.04016 0.13579
3 0.03532 0.00099 0.01273 0.04539 0.14699
NON-CAT DIESEL AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.02462 0.03635 0.04016 0.01964 0.03749
2 0.01761 0.02879 0.04136 0.01598 0.02636
3 0.02125 0.03318 0.04982 0.01824 0.03205
H-408
CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - SANTA ANA
UTILITY
RESID.
UTILITY 
DIST OIL
REFINERY
FUEL
OTHER
FUEL
SULFUR
PLANTS
0.01716
0.00751
0.00711
0.01909
0.00296
0.00311
0.01228
0.00305
0.00243
0.00968
0.00458
0.00435
0.01024
0.00473
0.00363
SULFURIC
ACID
REFINERY 
FCC UNIT
OTHER
REFINERY
OIL
FIELDS
COKE
KILNS
0.00974
0.00204
0.00244
0.01153
0.00228
0.00217
0.01145
0.00396
0.00247
0.04767
0.06326
0.07245
0.01412
0.00257
0.00241
GLASS
FURNACES
FERROUS
METALS
MI SC. 
UNITS
CAT AUTO 
STREET
CAT AUTO 
FREEWAY
0.03414
0.02161
0.03137
0.00807
0.00733
0.00828
0.01802
0.01717
0.01866
0.02943
0.02233
0.02333
0.17589
0.15864
0.16754
NON-CAT
VEHICLES
DIESEL
VEHICLES
AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
0.01233
0.00728
0.00740
0.02631
0.02009
0.02121
0.00919
0.00620
0.00577
0.02015
0.00542
0.00434
0.02140
0.01347
0.01370
15 SOURCE
YEAR
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
H-409
16 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER T/DAY OF SOX - SANTA FE SPRINGS
UTILITY UTILITY REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL FUEL FUEL PLANTS
1 0.01814 0.03286 0.04221 0.02479 0.05463
2 0.01062 0.03333 0.05141 0.01841 0.05013
3 0.01423 0.03466 0.05585 0.02166 0.06526
SULFURIC REFINERY OTHER OIL COKE
ACID FCC UNIT REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
1 0.04221 0.03612 0.03669 0.02054 0.04637
2 0.04623 0.04073 0.04343 0.01716 0.05274
3 0.04816 0.04128 0.03934 0.01317 0.06201
GLASS FERROUS MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
FURNACES METALS UNITS STREET FREEWAY
1 0.03629 0.00347 0.01582 0.04964 0.22360
2 0.02200 0.00457 0.00985 0.03933 0.20541
3 0.03072 0.00405 0.01328 0.04249 0.22323
NON-CAT DIESEL AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.02220 0.04117 0.02347 0.03295 0.04668
2 0.01480 0.03324 0.00690 0.04545 0.03966
3 0.01627 0.03605 0.00786 0.04663 0.04081
H-410
17 SOURCE CLASS CONTRIBUTION PER TON/DAY OF SOX - EAST LA
UTILITY UTILITY REFINERY OTHER SULFUR
YEAR RESID. DIST OIL FUEL FUEL PLANTS
1 0.01820 0.01960 0.03005 0.03492 0.03135
2 0.01684 0.01397 0.02938 0.03024 0.03419
3 0.02047 0.01777 0.03446 0.03670 0.03390
SULFURIC REFINERY OTHER OIL COKE
ACID FCC UNIT REFINERY FIELDS KILNS
1 0.02441 0.02741 0.02424 0.01179 0.01843
2 0.02607 0.03191 0.02237 0.00824 0.01802
3 0.03095 0.02844 0.02612 0.00960 0.02160
GLASS FERROUS MISC. CAT AUTO CAT AUTO
FURNACES METALS UNITS STREET FREEWAY
1 0.08963 0.00440 0.01793 0.05405 0.28893
2 0.09189 0.00217 0.01349 0.04246 0.23985
3 0.11531 0.00176 0.01691 0.04672 0.25984
NON-CAT DIESEL AIRPORT SHIPPING RAILROAD
VEHICLES VEHICLES
1 0.026 47 0.04694 0.03420 0.02384 0.09142
2 0.01770 0.03665 0.01078 0.02159 0.07850
3 0.02043 0.04019 0.01509 0.02630 0.08586
H-411
Table 9
Relationship between Generic Activity Classes and the 
Activity Classes for the Low Natural Gas Case
Generic Activity Class
Corresponding Activities 
_____from Table 1_______
UTILITY RESIDUAL FUEL USE 
UTILITY DISTILLATE FUEL USE 
REFINERY RESIDUAL FUEL USE 
OTHER FUEL USER 
SULFUR RECOVERY PLANTS 
SULFURIC ACID PLANTS 
REFINERY FCC UNIT 
OTHER REFINERY EMISSIONS 
OIL FIELDS 
COKE KILNS 
GLASS FURNACES 
FERROUS METALS 
MISCELLANEOUS UNITS
CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— SURFACE
CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES— FREEWAY
NON-CATALYST EQUIPPED LT. DUTY VEHICLES
HEAVY HIGHWAY DIESEL VEHICLES
AIRPORT OPERATIONS
SHIPPING OPERATIONS
RAILROAD OPERATIONS
1,2,3,4,5,6 
7
8,9,10,11,12,13
14,15,16
17
18
20,21
22,23
24
25,26,27
28,29,30
32
19,31,33,34,35,36
37
38
39
40,41
42
43
44,45
H-412
TABLE 10
T a b u la t io n  o f  E s t im ate d  S u l f a t e  
Background C o n cen tra t ion s  
f o r  the South Coast  A ir  B a s in
( in  ugm/m^ a s  S0^“ )
Month 1972_________  1973_________  1974
V i s t a
Background 
E s t im ate  a t  
40Z o f  V i s t a
V i s t a
Background 
E s t im ate  a t  
40Z o f  V i s t a
V i s t a
Background 
E s t im a te  a t  
40Z o f  V i s t a
Jan u ary 6 .0 3 2 .4 1 5 .8 7 2 .35 6 .7 8 2 .71
February 11 .07 4 .4 3 4 .9 8 1 .9 9 6 .5 0 2 .6 0
March 14.12 5 .6 5 3 .28 1 .31 7 .21 2 .88
A p r i l 8 .0 3 3 .21 6 .5 4 2 .62 6 .4 3 2 .57
May 9 .7 8 3 .91 10 .32 4 .1 3 9 .84 3 .94
June 16 .12 6 .4 5 11 .39 4 .5 6 8 .55 3 .4 2
J u l y 8 .1 4 3 .2 6 19 .25 7 .7 0 7 .76 3 .1 0
August 1 1 .7 3 4 .6 9 17 .71 7 .0 8 12 .35 4 .9 4
September 9 .16 3.66 14 .02 5 .6 1 1 3 .9 8 5 .5 9
October 7 .91 3 .16 11 .03 4 .4 1 12 .17 4 .8 7
November 4 .9 0 1 .9 6 6 .6 6 2 .6 6 7 .40 2 .9 6
December 5 .7 5 2 .3 0 7 .9 3 3 .17 4 .8 7 1 .95
Unweighted Mean 3 .76 3 .97 3 .4 6
Note: Background s u l f a t e  c o n c e n tr a t io n s  a re  e s t im a te d  from the se a s o n a l  
trend in  s u l f a t e s  observed a t  V i s t a ,  s c a le d  to  the l e v e l  o f  the 
a v e ra g e  s u l f a t e  c o n c e n tr a t io n s  measured a t  San N ic o la s  I s l a n d .  
S u l f a t e s  a t  V i s t a  du rin g  the months o f  J u l y  through October 
averaged  12 .15  ugm/m^ (3 y e a r  mean) v e r s u s  an average  o f  
4 .9  ygm/m^ a t  San N ic o la s  I s l a n d  in  t h a t  se a so n  o f  the y e a r  ( s e e  
T ab le  2 . 1 ) .  Background s u l f a t e  co n c e n tr a t io n s  a t  San N ic o la s  
I s l a n d  a re  app rox im ate ly 40Z  o f  those  a t  V i s t a ,  our most remote 
s i t e  v i t h  enough d a ta  to  e s t im a t e  s e a s o n a l  t re n d s  In  background 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s .

